Plaintiff claims that "[c]oerced annexation violates [p]laintiff's property rights." In plaintiff's view, "units of local government [have] band[ed] together" to deprive plaintiff of property without due process of law. Citing Groenings v. City of St. Charles , 215 Ill. App. 3d 295, 308, 158 Ill.Dec. 923, 574 N.E.2d 1316 (1991), plaintiff argues that "[t]he application of land use regulations offends substantive due process rights related to property if the application is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious and does not bear a substantial relationship to the public welfare." ¶ 81 Groenings , however, tends to undercut plaintiff's argument.

It is well established that points not supported by authority may be deemed waived. Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 215 Ill.App.3d 295, 306, 158 Ill.Dec. 923, 574 N.E.2d 1316 (1991). However, this principle is "an admonition to the parties and not a limitation upon the power of a reviewing court to address issues of law as the case may require."

By signing a signature page each plaintiff represented and warranted he or she met the financial criteria set forth in the PPM. A complaint should be dismissed under section 2-615 for failure to state a cause of action only when it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. ( Ogle v. Fuiten (1984), 102 Ill.2d 356, 360-61; Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. S. Smith Intermediaries, Inc. (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 119, 123; Groenings v. City of St. Charles (1991), 215 Ill. App.3d 295, 299.) This broad statement, however, should not be interpreted as an adoption of notice pleading.

Attached exhibits are an integral part of the complaint and must be so considered. ( 735 ILCS 5/2-606 (West 1992); Sharps v. Stein (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 435, 438, 413 N.E.2d 75.) A section 2-615 motion admits as true all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those facts ( Meerbrey v. Marshall Field Co. (1990), 139 Ill.2d 455, 473, 564 N.E.2d 1222), but not conclusions of law or conclusions of fact unsupported by allegations of specific facts ( Groenings v. City of St. Charles (1991), 215 Ill. App.3d 295, 299, 574 N.E.2d 1316). To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege that a contract exists, plaintiff performed its obligations under the contract, defendant breached the contract, and plaintiff was injured as a result.

Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 574 N.E.2d 1316, 1324 (Ill.App.Ct. 1991) (characterizing property owners' interest in increasing the value of their land “as an entitlement rather than an expectancy”); see also Residences at Riverbend Condo.

"A unilateral expectation of a protected interest is insufficient to establish a claim of entitlement." Id. (citing Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 215 Ill.App.3d 295, 307 (1991)).

Id. at 317-318. Although we will accept as true all well-pleaded facts and inferences to be drawn from those facts (Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 499, (1991)), we will not accept mere conclusions of law or fact which are unsupported by specific factual allegations (Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 215 Ill. App. 3d 295, 299 (1991)). We review a circuit court's section 2-615 dismissal of a complaint de novo. Elderman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164 (2003). ¶ 14 Viewing the amended complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we find the circuit court properly dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint under section 2-615 of the Code. ¶ 15 Plaintiff first argues it stated a cause of action for abuse of process because it adequately alleged defendants sought to destroy plaintiff's business by issuing the 28 subpoenas. ¶ 16 To state a claim for abuse of process, a plaintiff must allege "(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive and (2) the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings."

It does not give the District any option to purchase the land or acquire it through eminent domain proceedings.           Likewise, in Groenings v. City of St. Charles, 215 Ill.App.3d 295, 158 Ill.Dec. 923, 574 N.E.2d 1316 (1991) , the plaintiffs owned land that they wanted the City of St. Charles to annex. St. Charles denied their petition and simultaneously entered into a boundary agreement with the Village of Wayne, where the plaintiffs' property was situated.

Talbert v. Home Savings of America, F.A., 265 Ill.App.3d 376, 379, 202 Ill.Dec. 708, 638 N.E.2d 354 (1994). If, after disregarding any legal and factual conclusions, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action, the motion to dismiss should be granted. Groenings v. City of St. Charles,Ts&sS Signs, Inc. v. Village of Wadsworth, 215 Ill.App.3d 295, 299-300, 158 Ill.Dec. 923, 574 N.E.2d 1316 (1991). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a cause of action, the complaint's factual allegations are to be interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but factual deficiencies may not be cured by liberal construction.

In Lagen v. Balcor Co., 274 Ill. App.3d 11 (1995), we stated: "A complaint should be dismissed under section 2-615 for failure to state a cause of action only when it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. ( Ogle v. Fuiten (1984), 102 Ill.2d 356, 360-61; Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. S. Smith Intermediaries, Inc. (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 119, 123; Groenings v. City of St. Charles (1991), 215 Ill. App.3d 295, 299.) * * * A section 2-615 motion admits all well-pleaded facts as true, but not conclusions of law or factual conclusions which are unsupported by allegations of specific facts.