Opinion
24-672
12-06-2024
RENEE LYNN GRISMORE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted December 4, 2024 [**] Pasadena, California
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 5:21-cv-01914-JWH-SHK for the Central District of California John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Renee Grismore appeals the district court's order granting Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC's motion for summary judgment. We apply the law of the State of California in this diversity action. See Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 30 F.4th 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2022). We review de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment, and we "must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law." Killgore v. SpecPro Pro. Servs., LLC, 51 F.4th 973, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Grismore alleges two claims against Mercedes-Benz for breach of express and implied warranties under California's Song-Beverly Act. A consumer may bring a claim for breach of express warranty against a manufacturer if their vehicle is a "new motor vehicle" as defined in the Song-Beverly Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(a). Grismore claims that Mercedes-Benz failed to uphold its "refund-or-replace" obligations under the Song-Beverly Act, id. § 1793.2(d)(2), because her 2021 Mercedes-Benz GLA250W, which she leased from a non-party dealership, qualifies as a "new motor vehicle."
The Song-Beverly Act defines "new motor vehicle" in relevant part as:
[A] new motor vehicle that is bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes .... 'New motor vehicle' includes . . . a dealer-owned vehicle and a 'demonstrator' or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty .... A demonstrator is a vehicle assigned by a dealer for the purpose of demonstrating qualities and characteristics common to vehicles of the same or similar model and type.Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2).
Her argument on appeal is premised on the proposition that her vehicle is an "other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty" because it has a "still-pending manufacturer new-car warranty." Accordingly, Grismore contends that under the Song-Beverly Act, the definition of a "new motor vehicle" encompasses "pre-owned vehicles sold with a balance remaining on a manufacturer's new-car warranty."
Although Grismore twice describes her vehicle as a "dealership owned" service loaner vehicle, she develops no argument that her vehicle qualifies as a "new motor vehicle" because it is a "dealer-owned vehicle." See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2).
This argument was recently rejected by the California Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, 557 P.3d 735 (Cal. 2024), which held that "a motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty does not qualify as a . . . 'new motor vehicle' [under the Song-Beverly Act] unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale." Id. at 737 (emphasis added). The relevant inquiry, the state high court explained, is whether the vehicle was sold or leased to the consumer with "a new car warranty [that] was issued with the sale." Id. at 739 (cleaned up). Under Rodriguez, Grismore's vehicle does not qualify as a "new motor vehicle" under California law.
Grismore does not raise any argument or point to any evidence to avoid this conclusion. Only in her reply brief does she suggest that a warranty was issued with her lease of the vehicle. Even assuming she has not waived this argument by waiting until her reply brief to raise it, see Barnes v. FAA, 865 F.3d 1266, 1271 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017), the evidence does not show that a new car warranty was issued when she leased the vehicle. Rather, her lease states that the vehicle was "preowned" and was not covered by a warranty.
2. Grismore's second claim against Mercedes-Benz for the breach of implied warranties of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act fares no better. The statute does not create implied warranties against manufacturers for the sale of used consumer goods. Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.5; Nunez v. FCA U.S. LLC, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 618, 628 (Cal.Ct.App. 2021) (finding implied warranty claim failed because in sale of used goods, liability lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer). Because Grismore's vehicle is used, she cannot assert an implied warranty claim against Mercedes-Benz. See Nunez, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d at 628; Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 484, 487 (Cal.Ct.App. 2019).
The only exception to this rule is "[w]here the manufacturer sells directly to the public" such that it "takes on the role of a retailer." Nunez, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d at 628 (quoting Kiluk, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d at 488). Here, it is undisputed that a nonparty dealership leased the vehicle to Grismore, not Mercedes-Benz.
Consequently, Grismore cannot assert the Song-Beverly Act's implied warranties against Mercedes-Benz as a matter of law.
Mercedes-Benz's motion for judicial notice and Grismore's motion to supplement her opening brief are denied as unnecessary to the resolution of this matter.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).