Similarly. "[i]t is well settled that the doctrine of estoppel . . . cannot be relied on to create a right where none exists" (Grishman v New York, 183 AD2d 464, 466 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 760 [1992], citing Matter of Hauben v Goldin, 74 AD2d 804 [1980]). This rule applies "notwithstanding any inconsistent statement made by a governmental officer" (Legal Aid Soc. v City of New York, 242 AD2d 423, 426 [1997], citing Grishman, 183 AD2d at 466).
In this regard, it has been held that estoppel "is not available against a local government unit for the purpose of ratifying an administrative error'" ( Parkview Assocs. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 282, cert denied 488 US 801, quoting Morley v Arricale, 66 NY2d 665, 667; accord Oxenhorn v Fleet Trust Co., 94 NY2d 110, 116 [a mistake does not estop a government entity from correcting errors]). Similarly, "[i]t is well settled that the doctrine of estoppel . . . cannot be relied on to create a right where none exists" ( Grishman v New York, 183 AD2d 464, 466, lv denied 80 NY2d 760, citing Matter of Hauben v Goldin, 74 AD2d 804). This rule applies "notwithstanding any inconsistent statement made by a governmental officer" ( Legal Aid Soc. v City of New York, 242 AD2d 423, 426, citing Grishman, 183 AD2d at 466).
We agree with the City, however, that the court erred in denying its cross motion to the extent that the City asserted that plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought. "In general, a public employee whose employment has terminated may not recover the monetary value of unused vacation and sick time in the absence of statutory or contractual authority" ( Grishman v. City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 464, 465, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 760; see Matter of Briggs v. Town of Portland, 256 A.D.2d 1091). In this case, there is no statutory authority for the relief sought, nor is there any contractual authority for such relief.
In its decision, the Appellate Division determined that the foregoing claims stated actionable claims — albeit based solely upon the defendants' alleged representations that the plaintiff would be compensated for, inter alia, accrued compensation time upon leaving the County's employ ( Andruzzi v. County of Nassau, 34 AD3d 607, 608). More particularly, and while discharged public employees generally cannot recover accrued benefits absent express contractual or statutory authority ( see e.g., Baksh v. Town/Village of Harrison, 38 AD3d 808, 809; Karp v. North Country Community College, 258 AD2d 775; Gratto v. Board of Educ. of Ausable Valley Central School, 271 AD2d 175, 176; Briggs v. Town of Portland, 256 AD2d 1091; Grishman v. City of New York, 183 AD2d 464, 465; Matter of Rubinstein v. Simpson, 109 AD2d 885, 886 see also, General Municipal Law § 92), the Appellate Division relied upon an equity-based, special exception to the general rule. In accord with this principle, public employees "may be entitled to recover for unused time if-after being assured they could utilize the accrued time — they are then "discharged without being given the opportunity to use the time and without being compensated for its monetary value" ( Andruzzi v. County of Nassau, supra, at 608 see also, Kornfeld v. County of Nassau, 27 AD3d 743, 744; Garrigan v. Incorporated Village of Malverne, 12 AD3d 400, 401; Gendalia v. Gioffre, 191 AD2d 476, 477; Clift v. City of Syracuse, 45 AD2d 596).
(Def. Memo. at 6 (quoting Grishman v. City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 464, 465, 583 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (1st Dep't 1992)). Mr. Gordon replies by objecting that the legal support the defendants muster is distinguishable.
Decided October 20, 1992 Appeal from (1st Dept: 183 A.D.2d 464) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED
g party's words or conduct, has been misled into acting upon the belief that such enforcement would not be sought" ( Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp. , 56 NY2d 175, 184 [1982] ). However, it has long been the rule that " ‘[g]enerally, estoppel may not be invoked against a municipal agency to prevent it from discharging its statutory duties’ " ( Matter of Parkview Assoc. v. City of New York , 71 NY2d 274, 282 [1988], quoting Scruggs-Leftwich v. Rivercross Tenants' Corp. , 70 NY2d 849, 852 [1987] ; see e.g.Town of N. Elba v. Grimditch , 131 AD3d 150, 157 [2015] ; People ex rel. Farren v. Williams , 263 AD2d 956, 956 [1999] ), and, in particular, " ‘for the purpose of ratifying an administrative error’ " ( Matter of Parkview Assoc. v. City of New York , 71 NY2d at 282, quoting Morley v. Arricale , 66 NY2d 665, 667 [1985] ; seeSullivan Farms IV, LLC v. Village of Wurtsboro , 134 AD3d 1275, 1277 [2015] ; Legal Aid Socy. v. City of New York , 242 AD2d 423, 426 [1997] ; see alsoGrishman v. City of New York , 183 AD2d 464, 466 [1992] ["the errors of law of employees and officers are not binding upon the city"] ). Thus, where a municipality has unreasonably delayed action to enforce a violation or even issued a permit in error, the municipality may not normally be estopped from correcting that error notwithstanding that "there are harsh results" ( Matter of Parkview Assoc. v. City of New York , 71 NY2d at 282 ; see e.g.Matter of Astoria Landing, Inc. v. New York City Envtl. Control Bd. , 148 AD3d 1141, 1143 [2017] ; Town of Southold v. Estate of Edson , 78 AD3d 816, 817 [2010] ; Matter of Westbury Laundromat, Inc. v. Mammina , 62 AD3d 888, 890 [2009] ).
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Police Commissioner was authorized to impose the penalty of a 30–day suspension without pay and to dismiss petitioner from the police force (see Civil Service Law § 75[3–a] ; Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 14–115[a] ). Petitioner was also not entitled to his unused accrued vacation and sick leave since he was terminated from employment (see Grishman v. New York, 183 A.D.2d 464, 465, 583 N.Y.S.2d 425 [1st Dept.1992], lv. denied 80 N.Y.2d 760, 591 N.Y.S.2d 138, 605 N.E.2d 874 [1992] ). Respondents properly denied issuing petitioner a Pistol License Inquiry Response Form.
The defendants appeal. “ ‘In general, a public employee whose employment has terminated may not recover the monetary value of unused ... sick time in the absence of statutory or contractual authority’ ” ( Kerlikowske v. City of Buffalo, 305 A.D.2d 997, 997, 758 N.Y.S.2d 739, quoting Grishman v. City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 464, 465, 583 N.Y.S.2d 425). The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that there was no statutory or contractual authority for the relief sought by the plaintiff. In opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Baksh v. Town/Village of Harrison, 38 A.D.3d 808, 809, 832 N.Y.S.2d 645). Accordingly, upon renewal, the Supreme Court should have vacated the determination in the order dated January 19, 2011, denying that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract with regard to unused sick-leave benefits, and thereupon granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion.
oster, 71 NY2d 359, 369; see Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v. Axelrod, supra at 33; Matter of Hamptons Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Moore, supra at 93 n. 1; Matter of Montipark Realty Corp. v. Village of Monticello, 174 AD2d 876, 877; Brennan v. New York City Hous. Auth., 72 AD2d 410, 412-414), FASA may not avail itself of the exception here because it failed to undertake a reasonably-diligent inquiry into the applicability of relevant statutes ( see Matter of Parkview Assoc. v. City of New York, supra; Waste Recovery Enters. v. Town of Unadilla, 294 AD2d 766, 768-769, lv denied 1 NY3d 507, cert denied ___ US ___, 124 S Ct 2839; Matter of Montipark Realty Corp. v. Village of Monticello, supra). Moreover, equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to relieve a party "from the mandatory operation of a statute" ( Matter of Hauben v. Goldin, 74 AD2d 804, 805; see Waste Recovery Enters. v. Town of Unadilla, supra at 768-769; Matter of Scheurer v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 223 AD2d 379; Grishman v. City of New York, 183 AD2d 464, 466; Wood v. Cordello, 91 AD2d 1178, 1179; cf. Matter of Sea Cliff Manor v. Glen Cove Planning Bd., 39 Misc 2d 50, affd 22 AD2d 855). Because FASA, in effect, sought relief from the mandatory consequences of Village Law § 7-728 (11), estoppel against the Village was unavailable. The Village thus established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and FASA failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.