Opinion
04-06-1888
GRINLEE v. ROCKHILL.
George Vroom, for complainant. Scovel & Harris, for defendant.
This was a bill to restrain the enforcement of a chattel mortgage, brought by Grinlee against Rockhill.
George Vroom, for complainant. Scovel & Harris, for defendant.
BIRD, V. C. The parties in this case became related to each other as lessor and lessee. The lessee executed to the lessor a chattel mortgage upon a large number of goods which were upon the premises, which he was then occupying as lessee, to secure the sum of $500, payable in two years, the interest payable semi-annually. Before the expiration of the first year, the lessor gave notice to the lessee, the complainant, to quit and surrrender the premises. This obliged the lessee, of course, to surrender the premises at the expiration of the year. Under the law he could not do otherwise, but it did not oblige him, in a strict legal sense, to remove the goods mortgaged without the payment of the amount due thereon, which was secured thereby. But the chattel mortgage itself had a longer period of time to run; by the terms of the chattel mortgage the due-day of the principal was not until the 23d of April, —more than a year following. Looking at the case from this stand-point only, the defendant would seem to be justified in pressing his rights under the chattel mortgage, the complainant, the lessee, having removed all the goods from the premises, the chattel mortgage itself providing that if any goods are removed therefrom, or if judgment is entered against him, or any attachment, it shall be the right of the mortgagee—in this case the lessor—to enter and take possession of the goods, and to sell them. The only question, practically, that remains to be considered, is whether the defendant in this case, the mortgagee, has done anything, which, in equity, deprives him of that right; that is, has he done anything by acts, or by an omission, when he was required to act, which would amount, in equity, to a release of the forfeiture which, otherwise, exists by the terms of the agreement? In one sense, undoubtedly, the mortgagee had a right to look on, and see everything done that was being done by the complainant in removing the goods, without objection. I am not by any means prepared to say that it was the duty of the defendant, or that it is the duty of the mortgagee in every case, to declare, when his rights are being invaded, that this or that act is an invasion of his legal rights. It wouldbe quite a hardship, indeed, if that should be required of the mortgagee in every case. I admit, however, that circumstances may readily be conceived when it would become a party, situated as these parties were, to make known what he regards as his rights. In this case, Mr. Eockhill, the mortgagee, was living upon the premises with the mortgagor. He knew that his chattel mortgage did not expire until the expiration of two years from the time it was given, and consequently more than a year after the time of the expiration of the lease which he had made to the complainant in this case. But notwithstanding that fact, notwithstanding he had such knowledge, he gave his lessee, or mortgagor, notice to quit the premises at the end of the year, Now, as I have said, I think he had a right to do that; but at the same time, when he gave that notice, he had full knowledge of the length of time that the mortgage had to run. Now, did these considerations impose upon the defendant, in this case the mortgagee, any duty, any additional obligation. He says to his tenant and mortgagor, "Now, do this." I am strongly disposed to think that the landlord in this case was not justified in standing by, from time to time, and seeing done what he did see, without expressing his unqualified dissent. It is true he says that, when the hay was moved in January, he said, "You must not move anything without my consent;" and I believe that is uncontradicted. The cow was sold afterwards. He says he did not give his consent to the sale of the cow. The mortgagor says he expressly told him he had better sell the cow, she was "no good" in the condition in which she was, and was eating up the food from the other cattle. Some weeks before the final moving took place, the complainant, the mortgagor, also moved some things, —a plough, a harrow, and cultivator. This was warning to the mortgagee and landlord of the mind of his lessee and mortgagor, and showed to him what the mortgagor expected and intended to do, and ought, in my judgment, to have aroused him to something more than mere inactivity. But, if there were nothing in these things, it is perfectly plain that upon the 1st day of March, the day of the moving, or thereabouts, all of these things were taken away under his eye. He says he did not help load the mowing-machine, but I understand the proof to be that he helped to get the things out of some place of shelter, and not that he helped to load them. But, at all events, here was a very great number of articles, nearly all of which were taken away at that particular time,—a very large number; I should think over 100,—including household goods and furniture of almost every character and description; and there is no pretense that Mr. Rockhill was not cognizant of the fact that they were all being removed from the premises, as well as that he had a lien upon them by virtue of his chattel mortgage; and I cannot say that in equity it was not his duty to speak then. It was the assertion of the right in his presence, which right was being exercised, to move these goods and chattels away. I think that equity holds him to some responsibility for not speaking then. I do not mean to say that he lost his title to the goods, I do not mean to say that he could not then, at any time, have asserted his claim to them, but I think it was his duty to make known his claim to retain them. I do not mean to say, because he did not claim them then, that he has now lost his right under the chattel mortgage by way of lien. But does his right go so far as to permit him to declare a forfeiture under and by virtue of the chattel mortgage which provides that, if any article is removed, there shall be forfeiture? That is the question. I think that, considering the relations of the parties and the abhorrence with which the law looks upon a forfeiture of this kind, there is not such proof as to justify me in saying there was a forfeiture.
But there is another consideration. These goods are taken out of the county, and they are now subject to the destruction or postponement of the lien by judgment against the complainant, the mortgagor, or attachment, or other chattel mortgages. It is not surprising that Mr. Rockhill is solicitous, when he comes to understand his rights. I think nobody can find fault with himin that particular; and I think he must have been prompted by the very considerations that have moved me to the decision that I have so far expressed. For, when he went there with the sheriff, he was very willing to accept of certain terms, and not to make sale of the goods. If I am right so far, what should be the terms? If I am right so far, then the principle upon which I stand springs entirely from the inactivity of Mr. Rockhill, from his refusing to speak when I think equity requires he should have spoken. If that is so, then Mr. Rockhill is not entitled to costs. If I am wrong in that, then he is entitled to costs. He is entitled to sell; he is entitled to strip this man of every article named because of that forfeiture. It was his agreement, which the mortgagor made, and he must stand by his agreement. This court does not aid parties in breaking their agreements. It may restrain another party, as I think it ought to in this case, when that other party is wrong himself, or has failed to do something which the law requires that he should have done; it may restrain him in such a case from taking advantage of what would otherwise be a forfeiture or breach of agreement. I say, if I am right in this, then Mr. Rockhill is not entitled to costs. I think I must come to that conclusion; but his lien must be made good, and I shall require the complainant in this case to execute a new chattel mortgage, precisely like this in all respects, and to see that it is recorded in the county of Burlington forthwith, and shall make an order, instantly, that he be restrained from making any disposition of any of these articles until that chattel mortgage is recorded. That will be the order I will make.