The sentence provides that appellant is to be given credit for time served in jail prior to sentencing, but does not specifically set forth the period of credit time to be allowed as required by Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1981). Smith v. State, 310 So.2d 770 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Grine v. State, 301 So.2d 122 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment but remand for correction of appellant's sentence.
Hollingshead v. State, 292 So.2d 617 (Fla.1st DCA 1974) held that "[a]llowance of credit for time served in jail prior to sentencing is now mandatory." See Smith v. State, 310 So.2d 770 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Grine v. State, 301 So.2d 122 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). Cf., Deaver v. State, 326 So.2d 222 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Williams v. State, 310 So.2d 53 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). When read together, Section 921.161 and Section 775.087, Florida Statutes support the conclusion herein.
This cause is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of entering a corrective sentence order specifically setting forth the period of credit time allowed appellant in accordance with Sec. 921.161(1), Florida Statutes. Grine v. State, 301 So.2d 122 (2 Fla.App. 1974). The judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded with directions.
The trial court erred in failing to give appellant credit for all the time he spent in the county jail before sentence in compliance with § 921.161(1) F.S. The court properly credited appellant in Circuit Court Case No. 73-348 with 89 days spent in jail after his most recent arrest, even though during that time he was held to answer for other charges; Voulo v. Wainwright, Fla. 1974, 290 So.2d 58; Miller v. State, Fla.App. 1st, 1974, 297 So.2d 36; Lawrence v. State, Fla.App.4th, 1975, 306 So.2d 561, but failed to give him credit for 128 days he had spent in jail on the charge prior to the recent arrest. Appellant was entitled to credit for all jail time served before sentence. Sec. 921.161(1) F.S.; Grine v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 301 So.2d 122; Lawrence, supra; Nash v. State, Fla.App.2d 1975, 313 So.2d 118. See also State v. Jones, Fla. 1976, 327 So.2d 18.
After reviewing the briefs and record on appeal, we find the appellant has failed to demonstrate any reversible error; therefore, the judgment appealed is affirmed. The judgment and sentence of the court, while indicating the appellant was to receive credit for all time served in jail, does not specifically set forth the period of credit time to be allowed as required by F.S. § 921.161(1), Grine v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 301 So.2d 122. Remanded for correction of judgment and sentence; otherwise affirmed.
Hollingshead v. State, Fla.App.1st 1974, 292 So.2d 617. Appellant, having been sentenced after the effective date of Ch. 73-71, was entitled to credit for the time spent in jail awaiting trial. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of entering a corrective sentence order, setting forth specifically the period of credit time allowed appellant in accordance with § 921.161(1) F.S. Grine v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 301 So.2d 122; Marshall v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 310 So.2d 55 (1975). This action may be taken by the trial court without the appellant appearing before the court.
The cause is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of entering a corrective sentence order giving appellant credit for all the time he had been incarcerated since January 22, 1972, specifying the period of time allowed. Chambers v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 293 So.2d 752; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; Grine v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 301 So.2d 122; § 921.161(1) F.S. This action may be taken by the trial court without the appellant appearing before the court. The judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded with directions.