We have addressed this issue previously and have held that, "[a]n officer may give his opinion as to the sobriety vel non of the accused in a DUI case." Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053, 1055 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 491 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 1986) (citing Grimes v. State, 488 So.2d 8 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 488 So.2d 8 (Ala. 1986). We find no error as to this issue.
We fail to see how the appellant can claim that he did not have reasonable notice of the charge against him.... The State established a prima facie case under § 32–5A–191(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975. See Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053 (Ala.Crim.App.1986). Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal.”
In response, the state asserts that Officer McDonald's statements about the information provided by Webb were not hearsay because "Officer McDonald was never asked, nor did he attempt to repeat any statement made to him by Mr. Webb." The state relies on State v. Grimes (July 2, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 50762, 1986 WL 7523, in support of its argument. {¶ 14} Other appellate districts have held that a police officer's statement that a witness corroborated information during an investigation is not hearsay because no specific out-of-court statement is presented.
In the instant case, Little Johnny did not testify as to anyone's out-of-court statements, thus there is no hearsay. {¶ 15} In State v. Grimes (July 2, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 50762, a similar scenario was presented during the testimony of a police officer, wherein the officer indicated that the Johnsons corroborated another's statement to the police. The following exchange took place:
We fail to see how the appellant can claim that he did not have reasonable notice of the charge against him . . . . The State established a prima facie case under § 32-5A-191(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975. See Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal.'
The State established a prima facie case under § 32-5A-191(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975. See Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal.
The State established a prima facie case under § 32-5A-191(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975. See Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal.
Although defense counsel's general objection at trial did not preserve this issue for our review, Johnson v. State, 526 So.2d 34 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987), it is clear that this testimony was admissible. See Patterson v. State, 518 So.2d 809 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987), cert. denied, (Ala. 1988) (non-expert witness may testify as to the apparent intoxication of another at scene of automobile accident); Grimes v. State, 488 So.2d 8 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, (Ala. 1986) (police officer may testify as to the sobriety vel non of an accused); Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). Furthermore, another officer testified, without objection, to this very same matter.
This argument has been rejected in regard to witnesses other than a defendant. See, e.g., Sanders v. City of Birmingham, 542 So.2d 325, 330 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988); Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053, 1055 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Grimes v. State, 488 So.2d 8 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). In fact, the arresting officer testified that, in his opinion, appellant was under the influence of alcohol to the point that she was an impaired driver.
It should be noted also that an investigating officer may give his opinion as to the sobriety of the accused in a DUI case. See Grimes v. State, 491 So.2d 1053 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). III