Grimes v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Talbot

    400 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 1 times

    "The facts which [can be] presented to show the responsibility of the defendant . . . . are the motive and opportunity of the accused, his prior threats, subsequent admissions of fact, and suspicious conduct on his part." Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489, 495 (1) ( 54 S.E.2d 302) (1949). There was evidence that Mr. Talbot had previously threatened to kill his wife if she should ever leave him.

  2. Griffin v. State

    211 S.E.2d 382 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 7 times

    It has been held that the corpus delicti of the crime consists of the burning of the house, a cause due to a criminal agency, and the defendant's participation therein, which last may be established by circumstantial evidence. Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387 ( 94 S.E.2d 741), and see on circumstantial evidence, Smith v. State, 85 Ga. App. 129 ( 68 S.E.2d 393); Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489 ( 54 S.E.2d 302); Jenkins v. State, 181 Ga. 610 ( 183 S.E. 567). Testimony that Anderson was involved in Griffin's meeting with the seller's agent, as a result of which Griffin purchased the house; that the Cooks had conspired with Anderson to burn their home; that Anderson had removed the refrigerator from that house and it was found, after the fire, in the defendant's house, and was included in the Griffin insurance claim constitutes in its totality admissible circumstantial evidence of the manner in which the defendant could have procured the house to be burned. It is accordingly relevant and admissible unless excludable for some other reason. It does not fall under the "other crimes" inhibition of Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 ( 71 S.E.2d 615). We are cited to no cases which would suggest another reason for barring it. Being admitted, it sufficiently established circumstantially that this defendant and others were involved in a crime which, in the first instance at least, would inur

  3. Moon v. State

    68 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952)   Cited 5 times

    However, `a conviction may be lawfully had upon a free and voluntary confession though the same be not otherwise corroborated than by proof of the corpus delicti.' Wimberly v. State, 105 Ga. 188 (1) ( 31 S.E. 162)." Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489, 490 ( 54 S.E.2d 302). 6. Under an application of the foregoing rules of law, where it appears from the evidence that one of the two codefendants, charged with the possession of non-tax-paid whisky, in the conscious presence of the other, stated to one of the arresting officers after the automobile in which the defendants were riding had been wrecked and the non-tax- paid whisky found therein, that he and the other defendant were "setting the whisky off [the car?]" at the time the police appeared and they had slammed the door of the car and taken the flight which ended in the automobile being wrecked, this statement amounted to an admission of the possession, custody, and control of the illegal whisky by both defendants, and possession, custody, or control of illegal whisky being the gist of the whole offense, the statement constituted a confession, and the present defendant's acquiescence in the confession of the other codefendant amounted to a confession upon his part, and the corpus de

  4. State v. Kitowski

    44 Wis. 2d 259 (Wis. 1969)   Cited 11 times

    In addition, there was a complete lack of evidence showing the possibility that the fire resulted from natural causes. While the remote possibility of a fire occasioned by natural causes was not ruled out, we believe that the law is correctly stated in Grimes v. State (1949), 79 Ga. App. 489, 54 S.E.2d 302, quoting from Curtis, Law of Arson, p. 533, sec. 486: "`the mere possibility that the fire was occasioned by spontaneous combustion or by some other cause innocent of criminal intent, does not demand an acquittal, for the jury must act on probabilities, not possibilities.'"

  5. Williams v. State

    69 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952)

    Where evidence such as that specified in the foregoing division is introduced upon the trial, the jury is authorized to find that the corpus delicti has been established and that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged ( Mack v. State, supra, and citations); and 3. Were it not true that such evidence is alone sufficient to authorize the conviction of the defendant of the offense charged, the defendant twice confessed his guilt, once orally at the time of his arrest, and again in writing after he had been confined in the stockade, and these confessions were both sufficient to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged; and, when taken in connection with the proof of the corpus delicti, authorized the jury to find him guilty. Bines v. State, 118 Ga. 320, 325 ( 45 S.E. 376, 68 L.R.A. 33); Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489, 501 ( 45 S.E.2d 302); Daniel v. State, 63 Ga. 339; Paul v. State, 65 Ga. 152; Williams v. State, 69 Ga. 11; Westbrook v. State, 91 Ga. 11 (2) ( 16 S.E. 100); Schaefer v. State, 93 Ga. 177 ( 18 S.E. 552); Wimberly v. State, 105 Ga. 188 ( 31 S.E. 162). 4. ( a) If a confession is admitted without objection, and if the evidence shows without dispute that it was not voluntary, then, whether the confession is objected to or not, it is not legal evidence and has no probative value; but,

  6. Smith v. State

    68 S.E.2d 393 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951)   Cited 5 times

    `To sustain a conviction, it is not required that the evidence exclude every possibility or every inference that may be drawn from proved facts. It is only necessary to exclude reasonable inferences and reasonable hypotheses which may be drawn from the evidence under all the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case.' Graves v. State, 71 Ga. App. 96, 97 ( 30 S.E.2d 212); Smith v. State, 64 Ga. 605." Grimes v. State, 799 Ga. App. 489, 502 ( 54 S.E.2d 302). 3. Applying the foregoing rules to the evidence in the instant case, the jury was authorized to find the defendant, Roy Smith, guilty of arson.