Rather, plaintiff reported to a supervisor at Foit–Albert. Oakgrove established as a matter of law that it had no control over plaintiff or the work he was performing, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Kulaszewski, 272 A.D.2d at 856, 707 N.Y.S.2d 558 ; Greenleaf v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 231 A.D.2d 902, 903, 648 N.Y.S.2d 407 [4th Dept.1996] ). Plaintiff's reliance on the fact that Oakgrove provided GPS units for plaintiff to use is misplaced inasmuch as "[t]he determinative factor on the issue of control is not whether a [contractor] furnishes equipment but[, rather, is] whether [it] has control of the work being done and the authority to insist that proper safety practices be followed" ( Everitt v. Nozkowski, 285 A.D.2d 442, 443–444, 728 N.Y.S.2d 58 [2d Dept.2001] ; see Grimes v. Pyramid Cos. of Onondaga, 237 A.D.2d 940, 940–941, 655 N.Y.S.2d 206 [4th Dept.1997] ). Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Oakgrove had such control over plaintiff's work, and the court therefore should have dismissed the Labor Law § 241(6) claim against Oakgrove.

The court properly granted that part of the motion of Mendon seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against it. Mendon submitted proof establishing as a matter of law that it is not an owner or contractor and that it lacked "contractual or other actual authority to control the activity bringing about [plaintiff's] injury" ( Nowak v. Smith Mahoney, 110 AD2d 288, 289; see Wright v. Nichter Constr. Co., 213 AD2d 995). Lacking such authority, Mendon is not subject to liability as an "agent" under the statute ( see Grimes v. Pyramid Cos. of Onondaga, 237 AD2d 940, 940-941; see generally Russin v. Louis N. Picciano Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317-318). The court also properly granted defendants' motions insofar as they sought summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim.

It is undisputed that plaintiff supervised Daruszka. Thus, because Daruszka did not exercise any supervision over plaintiff's work, he was not an agent of the owner or general contractor within the meaning of sections 240 (1) and 241 (6) ( see, Russin v. Picciano Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311, 317-318; Grimes v. Pyramid Cos., 237 A.D.2d 940, 940-941; Long v. Danforth Co., 236 A.D.2d 781). The court properly granted those parts of the cross motions of Elmar and Wilhelm Kiefer, Tower and Daruszka for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 Lab. and common-law negligence causes of action against them.

The court erred in denying Crippen's motion. Plaintiffs failed to controvert proof submitted by Crippen establishing that plaintiff does not come within the special class of persons entitled to the protections of the Labor Law (see, Mordkofsky v V.C.V. Dev. Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 573, 577; Bosse v. City of Hornell, 197 A.D.2d 893). Moreover, Crippen is not liable under Labor Law § 241 (6) because it was not an owner or general contractor and it had not been delegated the authority to supervise or control plaintiff's work (see, Grimes v. Pyramid Cos., 237 A.D.2d 940). Crippen also is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action because plaintiffs failed to controvert proof submitted by Crippen establishing that it had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect and that it did not control or supervise plaintiff's work (see, Di Giulio v. City of Buffalo, 237 A.D.2d 938; see also, Riley v. Stickl Constr. Co., 242 A.D.2d 936).

Nor does the fact that GE did not send a tender demand until March 10, 2006, or that in its letter of August 17, 2006 it stated that it only sought fees from the said date of tender, bar it from later seeking to enforce its entire contractual indemnity rights. In Grimes v. Pyramid Companies of Onondaga, 237 AD2d 940, 941 (4th Dept. 1997), it was held that the lower court "erred in limiting Pyramid's entitlement to recovery of attorney's fees . . . to those fees incurred 'from the time Pyramid tendered its defense' . . . (and that) Pyramid is entitled to recover all reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defense of plaintiff's action" (emphasis in original).

It does not, by its terms, limit indemnification only to claims arising out of the negligence of VIP in the performance of the subcontracted work (see Tobio v Boston Props.,Inc. , 54 AD3d 1022, 1023-1024). Therefore, Halsted is entitled to indemnification against VIP, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in Halsted's defense of the within action ( see Tobio, 54 AD3d at 1023-1024; Grimes v Pyramid Cos., 237 AD2d 940 [4th Dept 1997]). Accordingly, Halsted's motion for summary judgment seeking contractual indemnification against VIP is granted.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Harris exercised any actual control or supervision over the construction procedures and safety measures employed at the site ( see Walker v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 11 AD3d at 341; Carter v. Vollmer Assocs., 196 AD2d 754 [1st Dept 1993]). Pertinent to the above, the uncontroverted deposition testimony of both plaintiff and Gundle's construction foreman indicated that plaintiff was operating under the exclusive direction of his immediate supervisors at the time of the accident, and had received neither instructions nor equipment from Harris ( see Hornicek v. William H. Lane Inc., 265 AD2d 631 [3rd Dept 1999]; Grimes v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 237 AD2d 940 [4th Dept 1997]). Further support for this proposition can be found in the deposition testimony of Harris' witness, George Lehan, and the written subcontract between Harris and SCS, in which the latter agreed to furnish actual inspection and resident engineering services at the construction site.