Opinion
E066978
03-26-2018
JOSEPH GRIMES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT CLAIMS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.
Joseph Grimes, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1602771) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. Joseph Grimes, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Joseph Grimes (Grimes), a prisoner serving his sentence at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, alleges that a correctional officer violated his civil rights by disclosing to the general population at the Chino Institution for Men (CIM) that he was formerly in protective custody. Grimes filed a grievance, which was rejected on the ground that he failed to demonstrate a material adverse effect upon his welfare. He then filed a claim with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (Board) seeking $50,000. His claim was rejected as untimely, and he initiated this action against the defendant and respondent Board, requesting relief from the requirements of Government Code section 945.4. On June 30, 2016, the trial court denied Grimes's petition for failure to give proper notice to the Attorney General pursuant to Government Code section 946.6, subdivision (d). Grimes appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
On or about May 5, 2015, Grimes initiated a written grievance against "Correctional Officer Munos" using an outdated CDC 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeals form. On May 5, 2015, Grimes's appeal was rejected because the issue was "obscured by pointless verbiage or voluminous unrelated documentation such that the reviewer cannot be reasonably expected to identify the issue under appeal." (Original italics.) Grimes was directed to resubmit his appeal using the correct form and providing the correct information.
On May 31, 2015, Grimes completed an updated CDCR 602 form, complaining that on April 30, 2015, Correctional Officer Munos, a female staff member of CIM, violated his civil rights by divulging to inmates in the general population at CIM that he was formerly assigned to a sensitive needs yard. Grimes claimed that Munoz used her employment position to gain access to his records, and her conduct could cause him "serious harm an[d] even killed [sic]." On July 17, 2015, an informal first level screening was finished and the documents were returned to Grimes. The response stated: "Your appeal has been rejected pursuant to the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section (CCR) 3084.6(b)(2). You have failed to demonstrate a material adverse effect upon your welfare. Material adverse effect means a harm or injury that is measurable or demonstrable, or the reasonable likelihood of such harm or injury. In either case, the harm or injury must be due to any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff." [¶] . . . On August 1, 2015, Grimes replied: "APPEALS MY PRIVACY WAS INVADED . . . [AND] THIS C/O COMMIT [sic] A CRIME AND SO YOUR OFFICE SAYING I'M NOT ALLOW [sic] TO FILE THIS AS A COMPLAINT EITHER WAY THIS WILL BE IN FEDERAL COURT."
On August 14, 2015, a second notice regarding the informal first level screening was sent to Grimes. It reiterated its July 17, 2015, response (noted above). On September 6, 2015, Grimes replied: "APPEALS I DO NOT UNDERSTAND T.A.B.E SCORE 1.8[.] I'M EXECISING [sic] (3084.5) (1)[.] THIS OFFICE NEED [sic] TO EXPLAIN WHY YOU'LL [sic] WILL NOT PROCESS APPEAL."
On October 27, 2015, Grimes filled out a government claim form seeking $50,000. He alleged that the incident occurred on May 31, 2015. He explained that on April 30, 2015, and May 31, 2015, he filed an inmate grievance against Correctional Officer Munos, asserting that while he was housed at CIM in April 2015, Munos disclosed to other inmates that he had been in protective custody. Grimes claimed that he "is now in emotional distress, suffering from anxiety and paranoia," causing damages in the amount of $50,000.
On December 10, 2015, the Board met and denied Grimes's application for leave to present a late claim, and the Board rejected the claim on its merits. On December 18, 2015, a letter was sent to Grimes informing him of the Board's decision.
On February 18, 2016, Grimes initiated this action against the Board, seeking relief from the denial of his request to file a late claim. On April 18, 2016, a status hearing on the petition was held, and the court found: "Court does not find any hearing to confirm petition set/filed by plaintiff." The court therefore set a hearing for May 18, 2016, to check the status or dismiss the petition for Grimes's failure to pursue.
On May 17, 2016, Grimes filed an ex parte request for extension of time to effect service. He asked that the court extend the time to effect service "to and including June 30, 2016." On May 18, 2016, the trial court granted his request, stating: "Plaintiff must serve parties and set a hearing date on the petition." On June 21, 2016, Grimes served the summons and petition on the Board. There was no proof of service of the summons and petition on the Attorney General.
On June 30, 2016, the trial court denied the petition pursuant to Government Code section 946.6, subdivision (b), on the grounds that notice "does not comply with the code," because "notice of this hearing was not given to the Attorney General as the code requires." On July 26, 2016, Grimes moved to vacate the order denying the petition. He claimed that he had instructed the San Diego Sheriff's Department to serve the petition on the Attorney General's Office. On September 15, 2016, the trial court treated Grimes's motion as a motion for reconsideration and denied it as untimely.
II. DISCUSSION
Grimes contends the trial court's decision "was erroneous because (1) the motion to vacate should have been ruled on as in fact a motion to vacate, which was timely filed, and not a motion for reconsideration which would have been too late; and (2) there was no opposition to the motion to vacate, although the defendant was served with all of the pertinent documents relevant to the case on 06-21-16." We disagree.
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied Grimes's Petition.
Under Government Code section 945.4, a person seeking to sue a public entity "for money or damages" must generally first file a claim with that entity within six months of the accrual of the plaintiff's claim. If the claim is not timely filed, the plaintiff must then file a request with the public entity for permission to file a late claim. If such request is denied, the plaintiff's next step is to invoke the provisions of Government Code section 946.6 and petition the court for relief from the claim-filing requirements of Government Code section 945.4. The determination of the trial court in granting or denying a petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6 will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 275.)
Here, the trial court entered an order denying Grimes's petition on the grounds he failed to comply with Government Code section 946.6, subdivision (d), which, in relevant part, provides: "A copy of the petition and a written notice of the time and place of hearing shall be served before the hearing as prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure on . . . the Attorney General, if the respondent is the state." Service must be "at least 16 court days before the hearing." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Based on the record before this court, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to deny the petition based on Government Code section 946.6, subdivision (d).
B. Grimes's Motion Was Procedurally Improper.
We agree with the trial court that Grimes's motion was not properly brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 663, which "empowers a trial court, on motion of '[a] party . . . entitl[ed] . . . to a different judgment' from that which has been entered, to vacate its judgment and enter 'another and different judgment.'" (Forman v. Knapp Press (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 200, 203.) "It is designed to enable speedy rectification of a judgment rendered upon erroneous application of the law to facts which have been found by the court or jury or which are otherwise uncontroverted. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
"A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court . . . may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment: [¶] 1. Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected. . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 663.)
Here, Code of Civil Procedure section 663 does not apply because Grimes was not seeking to have the trial court enter a different judgment. Instead, as he expressly stated in his motion, he requested that the court "vacate its order entered 06-30-16, denying the petition and enter a new order GRANTING the petition." Although Grimes's motion was labeled as a motion to vacate, in substance it was a motion for reconsideration. The trial court did not err by treating it as such.
Grimes's use of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 is misplaced. The instant order denying his petition does not fall within the mandatory relief provision of that section. Its purpose is "'to relieve the innocent client of the burden of the attorney's fault, to impose the burden on the erring attorney, and to avoid precipitating more litigation in the form of malpractice suits.' [Citation.] In the words of the author, '"Clients who have done nothing wrong are often denied the opportunity to defend themselves, simply because of the mistake or inadvertence of their attorneys in meeting filing deadlines."' [Citation.]" (Huens v. Tatum (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 259, 263.)
Furthermore, even if the motion had been designated a motion for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, it was properly denied as untimely because it was not brought within 10 days of the date that Grimes was served with notice of the order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) Additionally, Grimes was unable to establish "different facts, circumstances, or law" to support reconsideration of the June 30, 2016 order.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Grimes's petition for relief from the claim filing requirements in Government Code section 945.4 is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: SLOUGH
J. FIELDS
J.