Opinion
B299173
04-09-2021
DEBRA LYNN GRIGGS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUESS?, INC., Defendant and Appellant.
Alston & Bird, Martha S. Doty and Lisa L. Garcia for Defendant and Appellant. Griggs Little Law, Johnny D. Griggs; Douglas / Hicks Law and Jamon R. Hicks for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC722429 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Affirmed. Alston & Bird, Martha S. Doty and Lisa L. Garcia for Defendant and Appellant. Griggs Little Law, Johnny D. Griggs; Douglas / Hicks Law and Jamon R. Hicks for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Debra Lynn Griggs sued her former employer Guess?, Inc. (Guess), alleging wrongful termination and other employment-related causes of action. Guess petitioned to compel arbitration, asserting Griggs electronically signed an arbitration agreement covering all claims. Griggs denied she electronically signed the agreement. In opposing Guess's petition, Griggs offered her own declaration, unequivocally stating she "did not" electronically sign the agreement, and the declaration of an information security expert, who opined Guess's technical security controls were not sufficiently secure to confirm the electronic signature was "the act of" Griggs, as required under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). (Civ. Code, § 1633.9.) The trial court credited Griggs's denial and concluded Guess had failed to prove she electronically signed the arbitration agreement. Guess appeals the order denying its petition to arbitrate. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings. We affirm.
Statutory references are to the Civil Code, unless otherwise designated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Griggs's Lawsuit
Guess is a global apparel and accessories manufacturer, retailer, and distributor. The company employed Griggs from 1996 to June 2017. At the time of her termination, Griggs held a director-level position in Guess's allocation division. She was 58 years old.
Griggs sued Guess, asserting causes of action for race and age discrimination, wrongful termination, retaliation, and other claims related to her former employment.
2. Guess's Petition to Compel Arbitration
Guess filed a petition to compel arbitration with a supporting declaration by its Vice President of Human Resources, Thomas Andreasen. According to Andreasen, in 2014, Griggs electronically signed an arbitration agreement via Guess's HR Self Service (HRSS) system. Guess based its petition on the 2014 arbitration agreement, which required Griggs to arbitrate all claims related to her employment with Guess.
According to Andreasen, Griggs executed two other arbitration agreements in 1996 and 2000 with "live" or "wet" signatures. But Guess did not present those agreements with its petition, and Andreasen's declaration confirmed the petition was based on the 2014 agreement. (See Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846 (Ruiz) [rejecting argument that, even if the plaintiff did not electronically sign most recent arbitration agreement, arbitration should still be compelled based on earlier agreements, including one he signed by hand, where the defendant "did not adduce the [earlier] arbitration agreements in its petition, and did not mention either agreement until it filed its reply papers"].)
Andreasen's declaration described the security protocols for Guess's HRSS system and detailed the review and signature process by which Griggs purportedly electronically signed the 2014 arbitration agreement. The HRSS system is a self-service online portal that Guess uses for, among other things, the distribution of company forms to U.S. corporate employees for the employees' review and signature. When Guess implemented the HRSS system, it assigned each corporate employee, including Griggs, a temporary password. Guess employees were required to log into the HRSS system with the temporary password and create a confidential password of their choice before they could access or sign documents on the HRSS system. According to Andreasen, "No other person at Guess has the ability to access an employee's established password" and, "because no one else would know an employee's password, passwords were never mailed, emailed, texted, left on a voicemail, or provided to anyone."
In September 2013, Guess initiated a new annual affirmation process for U.S. corporate employees to electronically review and sign three company policies via the HRSS system: the company's Code of Ethics, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Policy, and Agreement to Arbitrate. Andreasen described the process as follows:
On September 5, 2013, Guess emailed its employees a hyperlink to the HRSS system and detailed instructions for completing the affirmation process. After clicking the link, an employee, like Griggs, was required to use her assigned login ID and confidential password to access the documents in the HRSS system. She then would click on the "Sign Annual Affirmation" link under the "Guess Electronic Signature" folder, which took the employee to the "Annual Affirmation" page that had links to the three documents (the Code of Ethics, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Policy, and Arbitration Agreement). After clicking an "I Accept" box next to the name of a document, that document would display for the employee's review. At the end of each document was an "I Accept" link to acknowledge the employee had reviewed and accepted the document. Only after clicking the "I Accept" link would the employee be prompted to complete the electronic signature page.
To sign the document on the electronic signature page, the employee was required to type her first and last name as she would sign a document, along with her birthdate and the last four digits of her Social Security number. After entering this information, the employee would click a button labeled "Electronically Sign" to complete the electronic signature process. An electronic signature would be applied to the document only if all the information was correctly entered; otherwise, the employee would receive an error message and no electronic signature would be applied. Upon completion of the process, an electronic signature would be applied to the document with the date of completion.
Andreasen reviewed Griggs's purported arbitration agreement, which contained the electronic signature, "Digitally Signed by: Debra Griggs," and the date, April 3, 2014. Andreasen also reviewed Griggs's "electronic signature records" on the HRSS system, which "capture the electronic signature details, including the signature creation date and time stamp, operator identification information of the computer the signature was made from, and document name." Based on his review of these records, Andreasen reported Griggs's arbitration agreement was "electronically signed . . . from the company computer assigned to [Griggs], . . . on April 3, 2014 at 7:47:55 am." Andreasen reported the Code of Ethics and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Policy were likewise electronically signed "on April 3, 2014 with the name 'Debra Griggs.' "
Based on Andreasen's declaration, Guess argued Griggs was the only person who could have placed the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement, because only Griggs had access to her unique login ID, confidential password, date of birth, and the last four digits of her Social Security number.
3. Griggs's Opposition to the Petition to Compel Arbitration
Griggs did not dispute the 2014 arbitration agreement covered her claims, but she denied that she electronically signed the agreement.
In her supporting declaration, Griggs responded to Guess's assertion: "Guess claims that in April of 2014, I electronically signed an agreement to arbitrate all disputes against them. I did not." During the period leading up to her termination, Griggs maintained she had been subjected to unfair treatment at Guess, and she explained this context, coupled with her recent marriage to a "seasoned employment lawyer," made her certain about her denial: "Because of [the] treatment I had been subjected to at work during this period, my fiancée, who in 2013 became my husband, was assisting me. Had I seen the arbitration agreement during the time frame at issue, I would have taken it home immediately for my husband to review. I would not have signed the arbitration agreement without first having him review it."
Additionally, Griggs offered the declaration of Jennifer L. Bayuk, Ph.D., an information security expert, to address the technical aspects of Guess's electronic signature process and to opine on whether that process was sufficiently secure to prove Griggs must have electronically signed the arbitration agreement. Bayuk opined the process was not sufficiently secure to authenticate the electronic signature as the act of Griggs. She highlighted the lack of password security, insecure access points within the HRSS system, and the lack of validation protocols as significant shortcomings.
Regarding password security, Bayuk disputed Andreasen's assertion that no one other than Griggs would have access to Griggs's confidential password. Based on Andreasen's declaration and screenshots of emails submitted with it, Bayuk determined Guess's network connection to the HRSS server was unencrypted, which could allow others on the network to see the password Griggs created. She also determined technology staff must have had access to password change utilities, as evidenced by a "Forgot Your Password" prompt in the email instructions for the annual affirmation process. And, Bayuk noted there were other means by which those in physical proximity to Griggs could steal or discover her password.
Even if Griggs was the only person with access to her password, Bayuk asserted Griggs "would not have been the only person in the company with authorization to create a record including her name in the HRSS database." She explained, in a typical web-based application data flow, "there are several points at which the data flow may be intercepted or tampered with," including as data flows to and from the database and directly from an employee's desktop computer to the company's servers. To "dismiss the possibility that someone other than Griggs created a given database record," Bayuk maintained "Andreasen would [need] to describe the application software architecture and how its data flow is controlled." But "Andreasen [had] describe[d] no technical security controls that would mitigate the risk that Grigg[s's] records may have been updated by someone other than Griggs."
As for validation protocols, Bayuk declared, "an effective electronic signature process" would, at a minimum, have "technical security controls around identification of [a user's] unique attributes that may be used to create a signature, authorization for the user to associate those unique signature attributes to a document, and authentication that allows others to verify the signature at a later date." In contrast to the process Andreasen described, which Bayuk emphasized "contains no validation step," Bayuk explained commercially available digital signature services, like Adobe and DocuSign, create a digital certificate or use a hash algorithm with a private encryption key to revalidate the unique attributes of an electronic signature as part of a post-signing authentication process.
Based on these deficiencies, Bayuk opined Guess's electronic signature protocols were not sufficiently secure to prove Griggs applied the electronic signature to the arbitration agreement.
4. Order Denying the Petition to Compel Arbitration
The trial court denied Guess's petition to compel arbitration. Starting with the settled rule that the " 'petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence,' " the court observed that, under UETA, this requires the petitioner to prove that an electronic signature " 'was the act of the person' " to whom the signature is purportedly attributable. Under this standard, the court concluded Griggs had effectively "impeached" Guess's evidence and Guess had failed to establish " 'by a preponderance of the evidence that the [electronic] signature was authentic,' [i.e.,] that it was Griggs who entered it."
With respect to the evidence, after accurately summarizing Guess's electronic signature protocol, the court found Griggs had presented "substantial credible evidence that she did not execute the purported signature." Specifically, the court noted, "[a]s to Guess'[s] claim that Griggs signed the [arbitration agreement], Griggs declares under penalty of perjury, 'I did not.' " The court emphasized it gave "great weight to Plaintiff's credibility."
The trial court also credited Griggs's explanation about the circumstances of the relevant period and why that context made her certain she would not have electronically signed the arbitration agreement. Commenting on the evidence at the hearing, the court observed: "It was pretty clear [from Griggs's declaration] that she did not and she would not for the reason stated [have signed the agreement]. . . . [C]oncurrently going on at the time . . . she was already involved in disputes at work and . . . [she] claims that she was being treated very disparately at work . . . . And this is in the context . . . [of a] more sophisticated employee than your typical employee . . . , given her senior level and given the relationship that she had with her partner at the time." In its written order, the court reiterated these observations, emphasizing, "[i]n the context of what plaintiff was experiencing in defendant's employment . . . this Court gives great weight to Plaintiff's credibility."
The court also "consider[ed]" the Bayuk declaration. Focusing on Bayuk's opinion that "Guess'[s] system was unsecure," the court observed, "[Bayuk] illustrates, anyone could have stolen Griggs's password, [and] any administrator [could] easily reset Griggs's password or create the record in an electronic database indicating that Griggs had signed the document, when she had not." Bayuk, the court noted, also explained "Guess's HRSS system is less secure than systems like Adobe and DocuSign, which contain an additional validation step that the HRSS system lacks."
Based on this evidence, the court found "Guess has not satisfied its burden of proof," as Guess had "provided no evidence that as a matter of law . . . outweighs Griggs'[s] substantial declaration and other evidence that she did not sign the 2014 arbitration agreement." The court's order concludes: "Accordingly, the Court factual[ly] finds that Griggs has established by substantial evidence that the signature presented by Guess is not Griggs's signature."
DISCUSSION
1. Governing Principles: Petitions to Compel Arbitration and Authentication of an Electronic Signature Under UETA
In California, " '[g]eneral principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate,' " including the principles governing a party's acceptance of the agreement. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) The "party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement." (Ibid.; Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 (Engalla); Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) On a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. (Engalla, at p. 972; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414 (Rosenthal); Ruiz, at p. 842.)
Under UETA (§ 1633.1 et seq.), "an electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten signature." (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 843; Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1061 (Espejo); see § 1633.7, subd. (a) ["A . . . signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form."].) Like any writing, an electronic record "must be authenticated before the writing, or secondary evidence of its content, may be received in evidence." (Ruiz, at p. 843, citing Evid. Code, § 1401.) "[S]ection 1633.9 addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature may authenticate the signature—that is, show the signature is, in fact, the signature of the person the proponent claims it is." (Ruiz, at p. 843.) The statute states: "An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable." (§ 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added; Ruiz, at p. 843; Espejo, at p. 1061.)
If the party opposing arbitration is unable to recall making an electronic signature or denies having done so, then the party petitioning for arbitration bears "the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the electronic signature was authentic." (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846, citing Evid. Code, § 1401; Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 ["Once Espejo challenged the validity of that signature in his opposition, defendants were then required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic."].)
With these principles in mind, we turn to whether the trial court erred in concluding Guess failed to meet its burden to prove the electronic signature on the 2014 arbitration agreement was "the act of" Griggs. (§ 1633.9, subd. (a).)
2. Guess Failed to Prove Griggs Made the Electronic Signature on the Arbitration Agreement
When the trial court's decision on a petition to compel arbitration "is based upon resolution of disputed facts, we review the decision for substantial evidence." (NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newton (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 71 (NORCAL); accord, Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) Under this test, " ' " 'we are bound by the established rules of appellate review that all factual matters will be viewed most favorably to the prevailing party [citations] and in support of the judgment.' " ' " (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465 (Sonic).) The " ' " ' "appellate court ordinarily looks only at the evidence supporting the successful party, and disregards the contrary showing." [Citation.] All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent.' " ' " (Ibid.; NORCAL, at p. 71.)
This general formulation of the substantial evidence test is typically implicated when a defendant contends the plaintiff succeeded at trial despite insufficient evidence. (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) But this appeal implicates a different formulation. Here, Guess—the petitioner and the party with the burden of proof—challenges the trial court's factual determination that Guess failed to prove Griggs electronically signed the arbitration agreement. (See § 1633.9, subd. (a); Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846; Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) In a case like this, " 'where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.' " (Sonic, at p. 465.) This follows because such a characterization inappropriately " 'allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact's unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the case.' " (Ibid.; see Hicks v. Reis (1943) 21 Cal.2d 654, 659-660 (Hicks) ["Provided the trier of the facts does not act arbitrarily, he may reject in toto the testimony of a witness, even though the witness is uncontradicted."].)
Where, as here, an appeal turns on the appellant's failure of proof, " 'the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) "uncontradicted and unimpeached" and (2) "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding." ' " (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466, italics added [plaintiff could not establish reversible error where he had burden of proof and trial court discounted the testimony of his expert].)
Guess's evidence in this case was not uncontradicted and unimpeached, as the trial court's order makes clear. The trial court unambiguously found "Griggs has impeached Guess'[s] evidence in her challenge [to] the validity of the signature on the arbitration agreement, and Guess has not established 'by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic,' [i.e.,] that it was Griggs who entered it." (Italics added.) In making this finding, the court explicitly gave "great weight to [Griggs's] credibility," in particular her firm declaration, "under penalty of perjury," that she " 'did not' " electronically sign the arbitration agreement. (Italics added.) Griggs's denial alone gave the trial court a nonarbitrary basis to reject Guess's evidentiary showing and to conclude Guess failed to meet its burden of proof. (See Hicks, supra, 21 Cal.2d at pp. 659-660; Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
Guess contends Griggs's denial must be "viewed in the context of the record as a whole, including the employer's showing," before we may accept the trial court's factual finding. But the only authority Guess cites for this proposition is Warren v. Del Taco Restaurants, Inc. (C.D.Cal., Apr. 23, 2018, No. EDCV 18-0082 JGB) 2018 WL 6167937—a federal district court ruling that has no bearing on our substantial evidence standard of review. (See Alliant Ins. Services, Inc. v. Gaddy (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1311 [reliance on federal district court case improper because it was "not an appellate case" and thus did not implicate abuse of discretion standard of review].) Unlike the district court in Warren, it is not our function to weigh the evidence, nor are we permitted to second-guess the trial court's failure of proof determination where the evidence is in conflict. (See Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) We have no issue with the district court's determination that the employer in Warren "presented sufficient evidence" to authenticate the plaintiff's signature under UETA (Warren, at p. *5), but this factual finding by another trial court is not authority for Guess's implicit contention that our trial court was compelled, as a matter of law, to reject Griggs's firm declaration that she "did not" electronically sign the arbitration agreement. (See Nunez v. Nevell Group, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 838, 847-848 ["Federal decisional authority does not bind the California Courts of Appeal on matters of state law."]; Sonic, at p. 466 [where appeal turns on appellant's failure of proof, reviewing court may reverse only if " 'the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law' "].)
Ruiz and Espejo do not compel reversal of the order either. In Ruiz, the reviewing court affirmed a trial court's ruling denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration on the ground the employer did not meet its burden of authenticating the employee's purported electronic signature on the arbitration agreement. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.) The employer's initial evidence consisted of its business manager's declaration summarily asserting the employee, Ruiz, was the person who electronically signed the agreement, and a copy of the agreement bearing an electronic signature in Ruiz's name with a date and time stamp for the signature. (Id. at p. 843.) After Ruiz averred he "did not recall" electronically signing the agreement, the business manager offered a reply declaration explaining that the arbitration agreement was part of an employee acknowledgment form the employer presented to all of its employees, and that each employee was required to log into the company's HR system, using his or her " 'unique login ID and password,' " to review and sign the acknowledgment form. (Id. at p. 844.) However, the business manager "did not explain how, or upon what basis, she inferred that the electronic signature on [the agreement] was 'the act of' Ruiz." (Ibid.) The Ruiz court held this omission "left a critical gap in the evidence supporting the petition" that rendered it "insufficient to support a finding that the electronic signature was, in fact, 'the act of' Ruiz." (Ibid.)
A year after Ruiz, the reviewing court in Espejo reversed a trial court's order denying an employer's petition to compel arbitration. (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1050-1051.) In rejecting the trial court's finding that the defendants failed to authenticate the employee's purported electronic signature, the Espejo court determined a supplemental declaration by the employer's systems consultant "offered the critical factual connection that the declarations in Ruiz lacked." (Id. at p. 1062.) The reviewing court explained: "[The systems consultant] detailed [the employer's] security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant's unique username and password, as well as the steps an applicant would have to take to place his or her name on the signature line of the employment agreement and the [arbitration agreement]. Based on this procedure, she concluded that the 'name Jay Baniaga Espejo could have only been placed on the signature pages of the employment agreement and the [arbitration agreement] by someone using Dr. Espejo's unique user name and password.' " (Ibid.) Notwithstanding the employee's assertion that he "did not recall ever signing" the arbitration agreement (id. at p. 1054), the Espejo court held the details in the system administrator's declaration "satisfactorily meet the requirements articulated in Ruiz and establish that the electronic signature on the [arbitration agreement] was 'the act of' Espejo." (Id. at p. 1062.) Thus, the declaration "provide[d] the necessary factual details to properly authenticate the document." (Ibid.)
As explained above, when an appeal turns on the appellant's failure of proof, a reviewing court can reverse only if the record shows " 'the appellant's evidence was (1) "uncontradicted and unimpeached" and (2) "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding." ' " (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466, italics added.) Espejo presented just such a record. Unlike Griggs's unequivocal denial here, the employee's mere failure to recall electronically signing the agreement in Espejo did not contradict or impeach the employer's showing that he had in fact done so. And, because the employer's evidence filled the " 'critical gap' " identified in Ruiz, it left no room, absent a contrary showing, for determining it was insufficient to support a finding that the electronic signature was the " 'act of' " the employee. (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1061-1062.) Indeed, the employer's uncontradicted evidence was so comprehensive as to leave no room for "the possibility" that the employee's signature was " 'merely populated onto the [arbitration agreement] once Plaintiff signed the Employment Agreement.' " (Id. at p. 1062, fn. 6.) That "suggestion," the Espejo court observed, was "inconsistent with [the system administrator's] description of the online review and signature process for each of the two documents." (Ibid.)
Because its security protocols largely match those described in Espejo, Guess argues its showing was "sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the electronic signature was the act of Griggs" under UETA. This is true of course, and had the trial court found Guess authenticated the electronic signature as the act of Griggs, we would be compelled to conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the finding. (See NORCAL, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 71; Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) But that is not what the trial court found, and it is a fundamental principle of appellate review that a mere showing that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding the trial court did not make is insufficient to countermand the factual finding the trial court did make. "[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court." (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874.)
Finally, we reject Guess's assertion that the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied the standard for authentication under UETA by considering the Bayuk declaration. As the trial court observed in its order, under UETA, an electronic signature "is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person" and the "act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable." (§ 1633.9, subd. (a).) The court's consideration of Bayuk's declaration did not contravene this standard, because Bayuk's declaration addressed the critical factual issue—namely, "the efficacy of [Guess's] security procedure." (Ibid.) More to the point, nothing in the trial court's order suggests the court interpreted UETA to require the security protocols Bayuk described to establish the authenticity of an electronic signature. On the contrary, a fair reading of the order leaves no doubt that the primary evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling was not Bayuk's declaration; it was Griggs's unequivocal assertion that she did not electronically sign the arbitration agreement. The trial court credited Griggs's denial as was its province. (See Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 972; Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 413-414.) In view of this conflict in the evidence, we cannot hold the trial court erred in concluding Guess failed to meet its burden of proof. (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Guess?, Inc.'s petition to compel arbitration is affirmed. Plaintiff Debra Lynn Griggs is entitled to her costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J. We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
LAVIN, J.