Opinion
Rehearing Denied Aug. 1, 1963.
For Opinion on Hearing, see 37 Cal.Rptr. 194, 389 P.2d 722.
Willard B. Treadwell, County Counsel, C. Ray Robinson and Jonathon H. Rowell, Merced, for appellants.
Ben Curry, Merced, for respondent.
Irving G. Breyer, Gen. Counsel, Calif. School Boards Ass'n, San Francisco, amicus curiae.
RALPH M. BROWN, Justice.
Petitioner, a teacher in the Merced Union High School District, was completing her third year, and if rehired for the ensuing year 1962-63, she would have acquired tenure.
On March 30, 1962, petitioner was served with an accusation relating to her dismissal, as follows:
'Evident unfitness for service in the following items:
'1. Lack of proper self-control in the discipline of pupils or in the presence of pupils.
'2. Lack of courtesy in contacts with pupils and co-workers.
'3. Poor judgment in handling pupil problems.'
Attached to the accusation was a notice that it was the intention of the board of trustees to dismiss petitioner effective June 30, 1962, unless she delivered or mailed a notice of defense within 5 days.
Petitioner did file such a notice, requested a hearing in said proceedings, objected to the accusation on the grounds that it did not state acts or omissions, and to the form of the accusation as being indefinite or uncertain. She requested a written statement of the reasons for the intended dismissal, appointment of a hearing officer, the preparation of subpoenas, reporting of the proceedings by a court reporter, and gave notice of her intention to demand reimbursement for attorney's fees.
The board replied, attached a summary of teacher evaluation reports signed by the principal, advised that the governing board itself would conduct the hearing without a hearing officer pursuant to Education Code, section 13444, that subpoenas would be issued and the proceedings would be reported. To petitioner's request for answers to certain interrogatories pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030, the board furnished petitioner the names and addresses of the principal and vice-principal, and also referred her to the summary of evaluation reports for other answers to her interrogatories.
A writ of prohibition was issued in the trial court as a result of petitioner's petition to advise her of the acts and omissions requested by her and to give her an opportunity to prepare her defense and hold discovery proceedings. In compliance with the order on the above writ, petitioner received an elaboration of the acts covering the 3 subdivisions listed in the accusation under 'Evident unfitness for service' consisting of 19 instances entitled 'Areas of Concern Specific.' (See Addendum.)
The trial court, by its Order for Writ of Prohibition, prohibited the offering of any evidence in support of item Nos. 8 and 15. There was no appeal from this order.
The hearing before the school board began on May 11, 1962. Petitioner's objection to the introduction of the teacher evaluation reports as being hearsay was overruled. These reports were on a form entitled 'Teacher Evaluation Report Merced Union High School District' setting forth the teacher's name, number of years employed in the school, number of classroom visitations and the period of time in which the visits took place, number of conferences, ratings in the areas of personal attributes (3 subdivisions), relationships (5 subdivisions), teaching techniques (3 subdivisions), professional attributes (4 subdivisions), and overall ratings of satisfactory, needs improvement, or unsatisfactory; points meriting commendation, suggestions for improvement, recommendation for reappointment in present assignment, and at the bottom of the form, space for the acknowledgment by the teacher that the evaluation has been discussed with her and the In the first evaluation report for the period September 8, 1959, to December 18, 1959, petitioner received the highest rating, satisfactory, in all areas; the second period, January 4, 1960, to March 18, 1960, showed a satisfactory rating in all areas except in the areas of 'Emotional Stability' under 'Personal Attributes,' and in 'Teacher-Pupil Relationships' she received a rating of 'Needs Improvement'; her overall rating was 'Needs Improvement.' The report of September 6, 1960, to December 16, 1960, shows satisfactory in all items except that she needed improvement in emotional stability under 'Personal Attributes,' in teacher-pupil relationships, and in classroom procedure under 'Teaching Techniques'; her overall rating was 'Needs Improvement,' with the notation under 'Suggestions for improvement' being that she should modify her tone of voice which had a tendency to solicit impudence, should correct tendency to lose temper in class, and should adjust classroom attitude; reappointment was recommenced if an effort was made to modify the above suggestions. In the report for the period ending March 16, 1961, she received a satisfactory rating in all items except a need for improvement in emotional stability, in teacher-pupil and teacher-parent relationships, and in classroom procedure. The overall rating shows a need for improvement. She was commended for doing an excellent job with the National Forensic League and for being congenial, but suggestions for improvement were: tendency to use tone of voice which invites insolence, speaks abruptly, lacks discretion in person-to-person relationships. She was recommended for reappointment with the understanding that considerable change in personal attitude take place if tenure was to be recommended. In the report ending December 14, 1961, the needs for improvement were still the same, and the overall rating was the same. She was commended for doing a fine job with extra-curricular activities. In suggestions for improvement, 'Abruptness of speech has improved somewhat; still question use of discretion with students and parents, although incidents have decreased. Indicates, from time-to-time, a lack of judgment in relations with people.' She was recommended for reappointment 'contingent upon improvement in above areas.' The petitioner, in signing this evaluation report, stated that she did not understand the checks nor the comments which were vague and not specific and that she is physically and emotionally sound.
In the last report for the period ending March 7, 1962, she received a satisfactory rating in all items except that she needed improvement in emotional stability and personality under 'Personal Attributes,' in teacher-pupil, teacher-teacher, and teacher-administrator relationships, and the over-all rating was 'Needs improvement'; still merited commendation for doing a good job with the National Forensic League, but in suggestions for improvement it was stated that she lacked discretion in dealings with teachers and pupils, accepted criticism with slight grace, indicated that no one was qualified to comment on her teaching or relations with others and when informed of likelihood of dismissal, criticized all administrators involved. This report did not recommend reappointment; it was signed by the principal, but was apparently not discussed with the teacher as it was not signed by her.
After the introduction of these reports the board proceeded to receive evidence on the specific instances under 'Areas of Concern Specific.' Testimony was given by Mr. Sherlock, the principal, that he had made visits to the classroom and had made observations, that petitioner 'generated hostility' in her students which 'interfered with the learning process.' Mr. Vinckel, the vice-principal, testified regarding specific complaints concerning self-control in the discipline of students, loud and angry reprimands of the class, poor judgment in handling pupil-parent problems. Mr. Guthrie, In due course, petitioner put on her defense in which she denied all of the events set forth in the areas of concern and made her explanations as to what had taken place.
During the hearing the board dismissed various items under 'Areas of Concern Specific' being Item Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 12 and 18.
After the testimony was all concluded, the board retired to a private room to consider its decision. The court reporter was not present during this session, but the board took in with it for a short time before making its decision Mr. Hopkins, the superintendent who is the person who made the original accusation, his secretary, and an attorney, George Murphy, County Counsel.
The board found that the teacher evaluation reports were true and correct and were corroborated by evidence at the hearing, that item Nos. 1, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 17 of the document entitled 'Areas of Concern Specific' were true; that the last charge, item No. 19, was true in that petitioner used persistent sarcastic criticism of a student to a parent in a telephone conversation; that item No. 16 was true in that petitioner interfered with administrative procedure resulting in parent protest; found that from the evidence petitioner has shown lack of proper self-control in the discipline of pupils and in the presence of pupils; that from the evidence she has shown lack of courtesy in contacts with co-workers; that from the evidence she has shown poor judgment in handling pupil problems; and the findings were concluded with the statement,
'From the above findings the Board feels that the causes and reasons for dismissal all relate solely to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereof.'
There was no finding on item No. 3.
The decision of the board was as follows:
'It is the decision of this Board that the services of Alberta Lowrey Griggs will not be required for the ensuing year, 1962-1963. That the Superintendent, Clair A. Hopkins, give notice to Alberta Lowrey Griggs of the decision of this Board and that a copy of this decision shall be delivered to Alberta Lowrey Griggs personally or sent to her by Registered Mail and also to her attorney herein.'
On July 3, 1962, the petitioner filed a petition for alternative writ of mandate alleging that the board had taken evidence with respect to complaints other than those specified in the areas of concern, that the board had taken evidence outside the hearing and he entered the hearing with prejudice against the petitioner and a preconceived idea of petitioner's guilt; that the court reporter had not been present when the board convened to deliberate; that the board allowed the superintendent to participate in its deliberations and decision, he having made the accusation originally; and that the board proceeded contrary to law at the hearing and its findings were not supported by substantial evidence.
At the hearing on this petition the board members filed affidavits stating that it had at no time prior to the hearing taken any evidence concerning the truth of the accusations, that it had conducted the hearing without any participation by Mr. Hopkins who was present only for a short time to help the board in the mechanics of approaching its task, as he was also the secretary of the board of trustees, that no testimony or evidence was presented at this session. Three members of the board testified At the conclusion of this hearing, on July 17, 1962, the court made the following statement:
'Well, I think that this entire hearing has not been a hearing contemplated in law or the kind of a hearing that is provided for in the Educational Code. I think this woman has been deprived of her rights and I think that the action of the Board in permitting people who are not members of the Board to participate in the deliberations--and I find that they did deliberate--by being in there and they did participate by being in there, would vitiate this meeting. Consequently I will order that a writ of mandate issue directing the Board of School Trustees to employ Mrs. Griggs.'
Thereafter, findings and conclusions of law were filed in which the court found that all the allegations of the petitioner were true and denials of the board untrue; that the findings of the board as to accusations are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record; that at the hearing the board had arbitrarily excused the court reporter and had received evidence from Hopkins, the superintendent, and that it had invited Hopkins, his secretary, and George Murphy, the board's counsel, to participate and they did participate in the decision; that petitioner was excluded; that she would be allowed $1,500 attorney's fees and $33.90 costs; that the board had deprived her of a fair trial, had committed prejudicial abuse of discretion, had deprived her of due process, and had acted in an arbitrary manner during the entire proceeding. The conclusions were that petitioner was dismissed arbitrarily and without sufficient cause; that she was denied due process of law and was deprived of a fair trial; that there was prejudicial abuse of discretion in making findings not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record; that the decision of the board should be set aside and nullified and it should reinstate petitioner as a teacher for the ensuing year at a salary no less than that paid to her for the last school year; that petitioner incurred attorney's fees of $1,500 and costs of $33.90, which the board should pay to her; and that she be awarded costs in this proceeding. The judgment ordered that a writ of mandate issue.
The non-salaried members of the school board of a local district are concerned with the school teachers, the other local administrators, pupils, parents and the general taxpayers.
"A board of education is entrusted with the conduct of the schools under its jurisdiction, their standards of education, and the moral, mental, and physical welfare of the pupils during school hours. * * * 'Book learning' is only a phase of the important lessons a child schold learn in a school." (Board of Education v. Swan, 41 Cal.2d 546, 552, 261 P.2d 261, 265 (quoting from Johnson v. Taft School Dist., 19 Cal.App.2d 405, 408, 65 P.2d 912).)
The court stated in Goldsmith v. Board of Education, 66 Cal.App. 157, at page 168, 225 P. 783, at page 787:
'* * * the calling [of a teacher] is so intimate, its duties so delicate, the things in which teacher might prove unworthy or would fail are so numerous, that they are incapable of enumeration in any legislative enactment. * * * But the teacher is entrusted with the custody of children and their high preparation for useful life. His habits, his speech, his good name, * * *, all are involved.'
The right to teach is not a constitutional right and school authorities must certainly have a broad discretion in dismissing 'Because of this dominant public interest, the exercise of such control over the public employee is not only a right but is a duty, and in the discharge thereof a wide discretion is allowed, which will not be disturbed until the point of illegality is reached.' (Board of Education v. Swan, supra, 41 Cal.2d p. 556, 261 P.2d p. 268; Hayman v. City of Los Angeles, 17 Cal.App.2d 674, 679, 62 P.2d 1047).
Originally, a probationary teacher under Education Code, section 13443 (formerly § 13582) was entitled to a notice that his services would not be required for the ensuing year, and Education Code section 13444 (1959) required that where the average daily attendance of the school district exceeded 85,000 the teacher could be dismissed for cause only.
In Keenan v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 34 Cal.2d 708, 214 P.2d 382, it was determined that where such a teacher received such a notice under Education Code, section 13582 (now 13443) in a district having in excess of 60,000 average daily attendance under section 13583 (1943--now § 13444, with 85,000 or more pupils) she could be dismissed for cause only, and that such a teacher would be entitled to a nearing.
In 1961 the Legislature enlarged the rights of such probationary teachers by amending Education Code, section 13443 requiring a written statement of the reasons for the dismissal, that the determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the reasons for dismissal shall be conclusive, but the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereof, that no right of judicial review shall exist. In the same session the Legislature also amended Education Code, section 13444 to provide that such probationary employee could be dismissed for cause only and that in districts in excess of 85,000 average daily attendance a hearing officer under the Administrative Code would be required, but, in smaller districts the governing board itself may conduct the hearing without a hearing officer, retaining the former provisions that the determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal shall be conclusive but the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereof and provided all expenses of the hearing, including the costs of the hearing officer, shall be paid by the governing board from district funds.
As set forth in Tucker v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 111 Cal.App.2d 875, 882, 245 P.2d 597, such teachers (in districts of 60,000 or more pupils in average daily attendance) acquired a limited form of tenure which by statute may only be terminated for cause after notice and hearing, that the right of these teachers to such a hearing is not a constitutional right but is one which is granted and may be denied by statute.
The use of the word 'dismissal' in section 13443 and section 13444 is synonymous with the termination of employment of a probationary employee, whether during the school year or at the end of the school year (39 Ops.Atty.Gen. 186, 190; Tucker v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., supra, 111 Cal.App.2d p. 879, 245 P.2d p. 600).
Historically, prior to the 1961 amendments a probationary teacher under Education Code, section 13443 was not entitled to any explanation by the school board as to why she was not being retained as a teacher and she had no benefit of any dismissal procedure until the Keenan case (60,000 average daily attendance). Upon such dismissal the teacher would ordinarily have to apply in other school districts without any official explanation as to her termination and as in the Keenan case, this school district might object to the teacher having diabetes, while other potential school districts might not consider that fact to be an obstacle to her being hired. Thus, the The determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the reasons for dismissal and the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal is conclusive (Ed.Code, §§ 13443, 13444). However, general statements are not reasons (Brown v. State Personnel Board, 43 Cal.App.2d 70, 110 P.2d 497), but reasons shall be given in plain and ordinary meaning and not just a 'charge' (Pack v. Sporleder, 327 Ill.App. 420, 64 N.E.2d 674), and must be somewhat definite and detailed (McKenna v. White, 287 Mass. 495, 192 N.E. 84).
Here, the reasons and cause given by the board were sufficiently amplified by the 'Areas of Concern Specific.' (See Bryant v. State Personnel Board, 96 Cal.App.2d 423, 426, 215 P.2d 512.)
Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, mandamus is an appropriate remedy to test the proper exercise of discretion of a local school district. The superior court as a reviewing court is not authorized to exercise its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence. The superior court's power of review is limited in such cases to determining whether there was substantial evidence before the school board to support its decision and there cannot be a trial de novo nor can the court make its own findings on the evidence. (See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sinclair, 214 A.C.A. 835, 29 Cal.Rptr. 769; Albonico v. Madera Irr. Dist., 53 Cal.2d 735, 739, 3 Cal.Rptr. 343, 350 P.2d 95; La Prade v. Dept. of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47, 53, 162 P.2d 13; Housing Authority v. City Council, 208 A.C.A. 651, 25 Cal.Rptr. 493.) And where the superior court has reviewed the determination of the local district, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with the inquiry whether there was any substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached by the superior court. (See Ballf v. Public Welfare Dept., 151 Cal.App.2d 784, 788-789, 312 P.2d 360; Corcoran v. San Francisco etc. Retirement System, 114 Cal.App.2d 738, 740-741, 251 P.2d 59.) The court does not pass on the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence (Thompson v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal.2d 235, 240, 259 P.2d 649; 3 Witkin, Calfornia Procedure, Extraordinary Writs, page 2489).
Where the administrative agency has statewide jurisdiction, the trial court is authorized to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence (Beach v. Contractors State License Board, 151 Cal.App.2d 117, 311 P.2d 51; Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301; Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal.2d 790, 795, 136 P.2d 304).
Respondent has objected to introduction of the evaluation reports as being hearsay and states that they should not be admitted or considered. But these reports which were made in the ordinary course of business are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule (Fox v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 111 Cal.App.2d 885, 891-892, 245 P.2d 603).
The respondent further complains that she did not receive a fair hearing or due process, but we think that respondent did receive a fair hearing. The board presented its evidence and the respondent was given ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and produce her own witnesses.
The requirements of due process are discussed in Ungar v. Seaman, 8 Cir., 4 F.2d 80 (overruled on another point in Joong Sui Noon v. United States, 8 Cir.,
'Indispensable requisites of a fair hearing, according to these fundamental principles, are that the course of proceedings shall be appropriate to the case and just to the party affected; that the accused shall be notified of the nature of the charge against him in time to meet it; that he shall have such an opportunity to be heard that he may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness against him; that he shall have time and opportunity, after all the evidence against him is produced and known to him, to produce evidence and witnesses to refute it; and that the decision shall be governed by and based upon the evidence at the hearing.'
The respondent, further, had more than sufficient notice by the accusation to enable her adequately to prepare a defense.
In Mast v. State Board of Optometry, 139 Cal.App.2d 78, 90-91, 293 P.2d 148, 156, the court stated:
'A mere reading of the accusation demonstrates that it adequately advised petitioner of the 'nature of the conduct asserted to be improper' and sufficiently acquainted him with the acts with which he was charged to enable him 'to prepare his defense.' To require, as petitioner argues, that the accusation must state particular individuals were referred by Lt. Roth to petitioner at specific times, and that in return for such referrals Roth was paid specific sums at specified times would be unreasonable and impractical * * *.'
Though Education Code, section 13444 provides that, '[t]he determination of the board as to the sufficiently of the cause for dismissal shall not be subject to judicial review,' both parties concede that substantial evidence is required to justify any action of dismissal by the board. Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, subdivision (c), the board's order of dismissal cannot be overturned by the superior court if substantial evidence is shown to have been presented and considered by the board in reaching its decision.
In Riggins v. Board of Education, 144 Cal.App.2d 232, 237, 300 P.2d 848, 851, the court observed:
'Appellant concedes 'that the substantial evidence' rule, Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (c), applies herein and that he must show that there is no substantial evidence in the record in order to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the school district. He further concedes that the school district may select any basis for dismissal of a probationary employee with the limitation that the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof; that the board does not have to prove that the cause is sufficient, but having determined that the cause for dismissal exists, the board must prove that it relates to the welfare of the schools and the pupils.'
The phrase 'relates solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof' is a matter to be determined by the board at its hearing. The Attorney General has so ruled in volume 39, Attorney General's Opinions, page 186, at page 191, as follows:
'In brief, if the probationary employee requests, the governing board must give that employee a written statement of the reasons for its decision not to re-employ him. * * * The reason for the governing board's decision not to re-employ must however relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof. The employee has a right to an administrative hearing but inasmuch as the sufficiency of the reasons for the dismissal are conclusive, the issues at the administrative hearing should properly be confined to determining whether those reasons given by the school board for not re-employing the probationary employee relate solely to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereof * * *' There is in the record substantial evidence that the respondent showed evident unfitness for service, lacking proper self-control in the discipline of pupils, in courtesy in contacts with pupils and coworkers, and in poor judgment in handling pupil problems, all substantiated by careful perusal of the areas of concern which were not dismissed by preliminary court orders and action by the school board.
All of this evidence sufficiently supports the findings and conclusion of the board that the cause conclusively found to exist relates solely to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereof. (See Riggins v. Board of Education, supra, 144 Cal.App.2d at page 237, 300 P.2d at page 851.)
Respondent, in her brief, claimed that it was reversible error to permit the superintendent to be in with the board when it was deliberating, but in oral argument, to a question as to the propriety of this, respondent's counsel conceded, 'No, I don't think that was improper here,' but said, 'That's part of the whole record.'
The trial court was in error in allowing petitioner $1,500 attorney's fees. This order was made on the basis of Education Code, section 13444 to the effect that 'All expenses of the hearing, including the cost of the hearing officer, shall be paid by the governing board from the district funds.' Code of Civil Procedure, section 1021 provides for costs and does not include attorneys' fees except as specifically provided for by statute. Attorneys' fees are not recoverable unless specifically provided for by statute (Los Angeles Trust etc. Bank v. Ward, 197 Cal. 103, 107, 239 P. 847; 13 Cal.Jur.2d § 36, p. 258). Attorneys' fees, unless particularly provided for by statute, are left to agreement of the parties. (See City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, 129 Cal.App. 144, 151, 18 P.2d 785.)
Therefore, 'all expenses of the hearing' does not include attorneys' fees.
In this case the board of trustees has acted in good faith and within the limits of the authority given it by law. The conduct of the respondent certainly is in contravention not only of the spirit of the laws governing the public school system, but of that essential policy according to which the public school system should be maintained in order that it may serve its purpose in the highest degree.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the dismissal and the allowance of attorney's fees.
CONLEY, P.J., and STONE, J., concur.
ADDENDUM
'AREAS OF CONCERN SPECIFIC
'1. Lack of proper self-control in the discipline of pupils or in the presence of pupils.
' ITEM: Audible shouting at class in loud, shrill, high-pitched, angry tone of voice of several minutes duration, at such a pitch that it could be heard throughout wing.
'WITNESSES: Mr. William Stevenson, 2505 Third Avenue, Merced; Mr. Eugene Vinckel, 781 Robinson Drive, Merced.
'TIME: Winter 1959. 'WITNESSES: Mr. Eugene Vinckel, 781 Robinson Drive, Merced, through student reports of students Lonnie Schertz, 1044 W. 24th Street, Merced, and Bob Puglizevich, 720 E. 21st Street, Merced, and Tom Hunt, 662 N. Easy, Merced.
'TIME: Winter 1959.
' ITEM: Demand addressed to student messenger sent from Principal's office to inform Mrs. Griggs of confirmed doctors' appointment, that student leave class and not return. Student returned in tears.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. Helen Caudle, 1765 Shirley Street, Merced.
'TIME: Winter 1960.
' ITEM: Losing temper to the point of extreme anger in class with Carol Theis when student asked if youngsters couldn't take more responsibility with production of paper, resulting in deeply concerned parental complaint.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. Alvin Theis, Carol Theis, 3045 West Bailey Avenue, Merced.
'TIME: October 1961.
' ITEM: Shaking, shouting at, slapping at Cathy Collins in disagreement over giving oration at tournament. Calling same student 'little liar' at National Forensic League Picnic.
'WITNESSES: Cathy Collins, 2635-5th Avenue, Merced.
'TIME: January--February 1960.
' ITEM: Shaking, shouting at, using objectionable language to Carol Turner at speech function at Bishop Armstrong High School.
'WITNESSES: Carol Turner, 250 E. 19th Street, Merced, Jill Boyd, 205 E. 23rd Street, Merced, Cathy Collins, 2635-5th Avenue, Merced.
'TIME: Winter 1960.
' ITEM: Demand addressed to student messenger sent from Attendance office in normal routine of school business that student leave class and not return. Student returned in tears. Subsequent statement to secretary that student should not again be sent to class.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. Virginia Rowe, 1726 N. Buhach Road, Atwater.
'TIME: School year 1959-60. '2. Lack of courtesy in contacts with pupils and co-workers.
' ITEM: Use of derisively challenging remarks in classroom to students inviting insolence and impertinence. Such remarks are usually accompanied by a difficult-to-describe hostile contraction of facial muscles.
'WITNESSES: Mr. Eugene Vinckel, 781 Robinson Drive, Merced, through student reports; Mr. Ralph Sherlock, 1630 Echo Avenue, Merced, through class observations.
'TIME: School year 1959-60. September 20, 1960, March 16, 1961.
' ITEM: Castigation of teacher in Merced High for his alleged incompetency following loss of lists at speech tournament and subsequent discussion of teacher's asserted incompetency with other teachers.
'WITNESSES: Mr. Gail Sherwood, 390 East 20th Street, Merced.
'TIME: January 16, 1961.
' ITEM: Castigation of teacher in classroom following failure of newspaper to be printed at time specified, and subsequent reporting of incident to principal in loud, angry tones with accompanying arm-waving.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. Ida Clarke, 1304 West 20th, Merced, Mr. Ralph Sherlock, 1630 Echo Avenue, Merced.
'TIME: Winter 1962.
' ITEM: Questioning, in responding to administrative request, right of administrator to request her presence at conference in Principal's office.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. Gladys Hartzell, 150 West 18th Street, Merced.
'TIME: February 1962.
' ITEM: Shaking students, reacting in such upset fashion to student problems in class that entire class hours were spent on single incidents.
'WITNESSES: Connie DeWing, 250 E. 23rd Street, Merced.
'TIME: Various.
' ITEM: Criticized teacher in front of students in angry, loud voice after going to his classroom and admonishing him in the presence of students.
'WITNESSES: Mr. Joseph Guthrie, 3140 Erie Avenue, Merced.
'TIME: January--February 1962. '3. Poor judgment in handling pupil problems.
' ITEM: Late arrival at parent conference in Merced High School where solution to pupil problem had been amicably and satisfactorily arrived at by administrator. Angry denunciation by teacher of right of student to own automobile resulted in breakdown of cooperation with parent since that time.
'WITNESSES: Mr. Eugene Vinckel, 781 Robinson Drive, Merced, Mrs. Ted Schuman, 230 East 21st Street, Merced, Miss Elodie Wright, 2037 O Street, Merced.
'TIME: Spring 1960.
' ITEM: Loud, angry, blunt remarks made to students in class, creating such hostility in students toward teacher that subsequent administrative disciplining became extremely difficult. The trivial was magnified to the point of crisis.
'WITNESSES: Mr. Eugene Vinckel, 781 Robinson Drive, Merced.
'TIME: Various.
' ITEM: Sent delegation of students to principal to find out what principal proposed to do about cheating incident, thus improperly interfering with administrative procedure and resulting in parent protest.
'WITNESSES: Mr. Ralph Sherlock, 1630 Echo Avenue, Merced, Mr. Eugene Vinckel, 781 Robinson Drive, Merced, Mrs. Gladys Hartzell, 150 West 18th Street, Merced, Mrs. H. Brodie, 1220 West 21st, Merced.
'TIME: Spring 1962.
' ITEM: Involved herself in student disciplinary problem over smoking incident where involvement was unnecessary and complicated administrative procedure. By her presence she precipitated a clash between teachers during parent conference.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. Gladys Hartzell, 150 West 18th Street, Merced, Mr. J. Guthrie, 3140 Erie Avenue, Merced.
'TIME: February 19, 1962.
' ITEM: Use of comment 'All your teachers are talking about you' when engaged in disciplining students.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. Gladys Hartzell, 150 West 18th Street, Merced, Carol Theis, 3046 West Bailey Avenue, Merced, Cathy Collins, 2635-5th Avenue, Merced.
'TIME: Various.
' ITEM: Using persistent criticism of student to parent in telephone conversation. Repeating other teachers' remarks to parent.
'WITNESSES: Mrs. C. DeWing, 250 E. 23rd Street, Merced.
'TIME: March 1961.'