Griffiths v. Morrison

18 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. Garofalo

    180 Misc. 607 (N.Y. Misc. 1943)

    The mortgage, and, of course, the deed in foreclosure, conveyed only so much of the building as was on the land described and without any easement appurtenant thereto of a right to retain possession of so much of the land as was covered by the balance of the dwelling house. ( Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N.Y. 165; Whyte v. Builders' League of New York, 164 N.Y. 429; Wilson v. Wightman, 36 A.D. 41; Ogden v. Jennings, 62 N.Y. 526.) Plaintiff contends that it is obvious that a mistake was made in the description in the mortgage; that the surrounding facts, including the amount of the mortgage indebtedness, clearly indicate that the mortgagor intended to convey and the mortgagee to receive more than the vacant lot as security; that they must have understood that the whole of the dwelling house was within the parcel of land described in the mortgage.

  2. Berbos v. Krage

    2008 S.D. 68 (S.D. 2008)   Cited 7 times

    [¶ 13.] "Where a portion of a building has not been embraced within the description of the land conveyed by the common owner of all the land covered by the building, and where it does not clearly appearfrom the grant that the parties intended the entire building to pass, the cases hold generally that such grantee has no right of ownership in, or right of possession to, the portion of the building on the adjoining land." Podlesny v. Baranko, 82 Pa. D C 281, 284-85 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1953) (emphasis added); see also Adams v. Marshall, 138 Mass. 228, 52 Am.Rep. 271 (1884); Whyte v. Builders' League of New York, 164 N.Y. 429, 58 N.E. 517, 518 (1900); Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N.Y. 165, 12 N.E. 580, 581 (1887); Baker v. Zingelman, 259 Pa.Super. 441, 393 A.2d 908, 910 (1978) (citing Nestico v. Carnucci, 39 Northumberland L.J. 39 (1966)). In the contract for deed here, there is no mention of any buildings, let alone the disputed building.

  3. Clements v. Sannuti

    356 Pa. 63 (Pa. 1947)   Cited 21 times
    In Clements, the owner of adjoining lots 1344 and 1346 erected a brick garage on the rear of the two lots, with the only entrance to the garage being on lot 1346.

    Such right goes beyond a mere incorporeal right and is not a "service or easement" within the meaning of the rule stated. In Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N.Y. 165, 12 N.E. 580, the plaintiff, owner of two adjoining lots, Nos. 141 and 143, conveyed No. 141 to defendant's grantor and retained No. 143. At the time of the conveyance a house stood on the lot conveyed and extended five feet over the line between the two lots. The plaintiff, although she was the grantor, brought an action of ejectment for the five feet and obtained a judgment awarding her possession which was affirmed on appeal. The court rejected defendant's contention that the right to use and occupy the five feet passed to his grantor as an easement appurtenant to the lot conveyed, stating as follows (12 N.E. 581, 582): "There is no suggestion of mistake of measurement in the amount of land intended to be conveyed, and yet a piece of land five feet in addition to that which was actually conveyed, and out of a total of only twenty-two feet, is thus called for to furnish this easement to defendant's premises.

  4. McHugh v. Haley

    237 N.W. 835 (N.D. 1931)   Cited 17 times

    Notice of the existence of an easement by implication must be open and above board readily visible to the purchaser, must be in use and continuous and of such a nature as to indicate a right in an adjoining property. Lampman v. Milks, 21 N.Y. 505; Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N.Y. 165, 12 N.E. 580; Whyte v. Builders League, 164 N.Y. 429, 58 N.E. 517; Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 15 Am. Rep. 80; Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N.E. 188; Lammott v. Ewers, 106 Ind. 310, 55 Am. Rep. 746, 6 N.E. 636; Blake v. Boie (Colo.) 8 L.R.A. 418, 88 P. 470; Sloat v. McDougall, 30 N.Y. 912, 9 N.Y. Supp. 631; Treadwell v. Inslee, 120 N.Y. 458, 24 N.E. 651; Taggart v. Warner, 83 Wis. 1, 53 N.W. 33; Smith v. Lockwood (Minn.

  5. Broadway Realty Co. v. Lawyers T. Ins. T. Co.

    123 N.E. 754 (N.Y. 1919)   Cited 15 times

    Nor can we assume that the words "said building" should be read as if the parties intended them to mean "part of said building." Griffiths v. Morrison ( 106 N.Y. 165) was an action of ejectment. It held that a conveyance by metes and bounds with "the buildings thereon" conveyed only so much of a building as was on the lot described. If the deed had in terms covered the lot and the land on which the building stood, it would doubtless have been effective.

  6. Whyte v. Builders' League

    58 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1900)   Cited 7 times

    But we do not think there was any. In Griffiths v. Morrison ( 106 N.Y. 165) the plaintiff was the owner of two adjoining lots, numbers 141 and 143, and he conveyed to the defendant's grantor No. 141 and retained No. 143. At the time of the conveyance a house stood on the lot conveyed and extended five feet over the line between the two lots and up to a building upon the lot retained by the plaintiff, and the side of the latter building formed the walls of the rooms in the defendant's house; the two buildings, however, were in no wise keyed together. The plaintiff, although he was the grantor, brought ejectment for the five feet and this court sustained his recovery. The court in its opinion mentions the fact that the buildings were not keyed together, and thus one was not needful for the support of the other, but the judgment rested upon the fact that the plaintiff had conveyed no title to the five feet or easement in it. "If," said PECKHAM, J., speaking for the court, "there had been any thought of conveying that portion of the house which stood on land no

  7. Root v. Wadhams

    14 N.E. 281 (N.Y. 1887)   Cited 19 times
    In Root v. Wadhams (107 N.Y. 384), where it was shown that the plaintiff had other means of securing relief, the court said, in defining the word "appurtenance," as follows (at p. 394): "We think no such right passed by the several conveyances to plaintiff and her grantors, which simply conveyed the land by metes and bounds `with the appurtenances thereunto belonging.' Nothing passes by the word appurtenance except such incorporeal easements or rights or privileges as are strictly necessary and essential to the proper enjoyment of the estate granted.

    A mere convenience is not sufficient to thus create such a right or easement. (See Ogden v. Jennings, 62 N.Y. 526; Green v. Collins, 86 id. 246; Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 id 165.) Nor do we think that under the circumstances there was any implied easement which passed to the grantees under the deed from Bradbury.

  8. Kostovetsky v. Rockaway Hunting Club

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 1421 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the plaintiffs do not have a prescriptive easement over certain real property belonging to the defendant. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence establishing that the plaintiffs' claim regarding the disputed property in this matter is based on their possession and occupancy of the property, and therefore is inconsistent with an easement by prescription (see generally DiLeo v Pecksto Holding Corp., 304 NY 505, 511; Griffiths v Morrison, 106 NY 165, 171; Bass v D. Ragno Realty Corp., 111 AD3d 863, 865; Paradise Point Assn., Inc. v Zupa, 22 AD3d 818, 819). Inasmuch as the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to this showing, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the plaintiffs do not have a prescriptive easement over the real property belonging to the defendant (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334).

  9. Broadway Realty Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. T. Co.

    171 A.D. 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916)   Cited 2 times

    This would seem to be a matter of first impression as there is no evidence of any knowledge on behalf of the appellant that the building was not wholly upon the land described, and as the title to the building which is insured must of necessity rest upon the title to the land upon which it stands, it is fair to presume that the insurance of the title to the building was upon the assumption and to the extent only that that building rested wholly upon land specifically described. Further, this interpretation would seem to be supported by the case of Griffiths v. Morrison ( 106 N.Y. 165). (2) The provision that the land, the title to which is hereby intended to be insured, being that on which said building now stands as shown by the survey annexed, makes the survey a part of the contract and upon that survey the building appears to be wholly within the metes and bounds of the land described, and in no way to encroach upon Broadway.

  10. Cohen v. Newman

    91 Misc. 561 (N.Y. App. Term 1915)   Cited 3 times

    But that word does not include an interest in the land in the yard at the rear of 455, since land never passes as appurtenant to land. Doyle v. Lord, 64 N.Y. 432, 437; Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N.Y. 170; Stevens v. Taylor, 111 A.D. 561. Even if previous to and at the time of the demise a right of way across the yard or space here in question was shown to have existed, that right would not pass by the "word 'appurtenances' merely, but there must be particular or general words indicating an intention to grant the way."