Opinion
January 17, 1936.
March 23, 1936.
Attorneys — Discipline — Misappropriation of funds — Failure to render services after acceptance of fee — Disbarment — Act of April 14, 1834, P. L. 333.
1. On appeal from decree of disbarment, evidence held sufficient to establish that respondent accepted fees for professional services to be rendered in the future, and then failed almost completely to perform such services although he retained the fees; to establish that the respondent misappropriated to his own use funds of an estate; and to support the decree appealed from. [65]
2. Under the Act of April 14, 1834, P. L. 333, section 74, an attorney who retains a client's money after demand therefor will be disbarred. [65]
Before KEPHART, C. J., MAXEY, DREW, LINN and BARNES, JJ.
Appeal, No. 410, Jan. T., 1935, by defendant, from decree of C. P. No. 5, Phila. Co., Sept. T., 1934, No. 4793, in re David R. Griffith, Jr. Decree affirmed.
Petition of Committee of Censors of Bar Association and rule to show cause why respondent should not be disciplined. Before DAVIS, FINLETTER, STERN, SMITH, P. JJ., and KUN, J.
Decree of disbarment entered. Respondent appealed. Error assigned was decree.
David R. Griffith, Jr., P. P., with him Raymond A. White, Jr., for appellant.
Harry Polish, for appellee.
Argued January 17, 1936.
Appellant was disbarred for unprofessional conduct. It will serve no useful purpose to detail at length the evidence in support of the charges lodged against him with the Committee of Censors of the Philadelphia Bar Association, or the explanations which appellant sought to give in justification of his behavior. It is sufficient to state that the three charges examined by the court below, which were not the only complaints lodged against appellant, were amply supported by the evidence.
In substance, they show that in two instances the appellant accepted fees for professional services to be rendered in the future, and then failed almost completely to perform such services, although he retained the fees and his clients were constantly making protests to him. The third complaint, more serious in nature, shows that appellant misappropriated to his own use funds of an estate. Demands were made by the parties entitled thereto, and it was only after appellant's check in payment had been returned because of insufficient funds that these parties received payment through his brother's checks.
The office of an attorney does not permit the attorney's personal pecuniary embarrassments to be solved by unauthorized use of fiduciary funds. Retention of a client's money after demand therefor is ground for disbarment: Act of April 14, 1834, P. L. 333, section 74; In re Graffius, 241 Pa. 222; Dixon v. Minogue, 276 Pa. 562; Wilhelm's Case, 269 Pa. 416.
The decree of disbarment is affirmed.