Opinion
H025914.
11-25-2003
HAROLD GRIFFITH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Harold W. Griffith brought a taxpayer suit against defendant County of Santa Cruz (hereafter County) challenging Countys 7 percent utility tax, effective March 1, 1991, as having been enacted without the voter-approval provisions of Proposition 62. (Gov. Code, §§ 53720-53730.) The trial court consolidated the suit with a later suit brought by plaintiffs Harold W. Griffith and William B. Miller against defendants City of Scotts Valley (hereafter City) and Gary Knutson (Countys Auditor-Controller), which challenged on the same basis Citys 4 percent utility users tax, adopted July 1, 1992. It later rendered judgment in favor of defendants on certain legal grounds. On appeal, we essentially held that those grounds provided no defense. (Griffith v. County of Santa Cruz (Dec. 5, 2001, H019505) [nonpub. opn.].) But we remanded for trial on other defenses advanced by defendants that the trial court had not reached. After trial, as to County, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Griffith but held that he was barred by laches from most of the relief sought; as to City and Knutson, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of City and Knutson on the grounds of mootness and laches. On appeal from the judgment in favor of County, Griffith makes an unfocused argument complaining about the lack of complete relief; he also appeals from a minute order denying his motion for private-attorney-general attorney fees (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5), this time rearguing outside the scope of review.
On appeal from the judgment in favor of City and Knutson, plaintiffs make no coherent argument for reversal. We will therefore summarily review this case and affirm the judgments and order.
plaintiffs showing on appeal
Plaintiffs are representing themselves on appeal. Under the law, one may act as his or her own attorney if he or she chooses. But when a litigant appears in propria persona, he or she is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure and evidence as an attorney-no different, no better, no worse. (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639; Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Co. (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 156, 160-161.)
A rule that applies to all litigants is that "The reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment. It is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration." (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 594, p. 627.) And, relevant to this appeal, "[a]rguments should be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review." (Sebago,Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1388.) Failure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.) " `[I]t is an attempt to place upon the court the burden of discovering without assistance from appellant any weakness in the arguments of the respondent. An appellant is not permitted to evade or shift his [or her] responsibility in this manner. [Citations.]" (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 102.) Furthermore, a point is deemed abandoned when it is entirely unsupported by argument or reference to the record. (Renden v. Geneva Development Corp. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 578, 591.) And briefs must provide a summary of the significant facts in the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(2)(C).) Finally, an attack on the evidence without a fair statement of the evidence is entitled to no consideration when it is apparent that a substantial amount of evidence was received on behalf of the respondent. (Estate of Palmer (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 428, 431.) Absent compliance with these rules, we presume that the judgment of the trial court is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
judgment in favor of county
Proposition 62 amends the Government Code to require voter approval of any general or special tax. The electorate approved the proposition in November 1986. Shortly thereafter, two appellate courts declared that the voter-approval requirements were unconstitutional. (See City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623 (Westminster) [provision that voters must ratify general taxes enacted during a window period preceding effective date of proposition was unconstitutional]; City of Woodlake v. Logan (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1058 (Woodlake) [provisions requiring submission of new local taxes to voters and authorizing withholding of a local governments share of property taxes as a penalty for the failure to do so were unconstitutional].)
County enacted its utility tax without voter approval in 1991. But the Supreme Court ultimately held that the voter-approval requirements of Proposition 62 were constitutional. (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220.)
Griffith filed this action in 1998 seeking a refund of taxes he paid since 1991. County asserted a laches defense, among others. After the remand, it submitted its evidence on the issue. The trial court agreed with County in part and held that laches barred the refund remedy from 1991 until 1997, one year before the filing of this action (County allows claims for tax refunds to be filed within one year after payment). But it held that this action and a prior claim for personal injuries filed by Griffith were insufficient to put County on notice that Griffith was claiming a tax refund. It therefore allowed Griffith to only claim a refund for taxes paid between 2000 (one year before Griffith filed a supplemental claim seeking a tax refund) and 2002 (the date County repealed the tax).
Concerning the laches finding, the trial court explained that Griffith had unreasonably delayed in filing this action because the challenge came seven years after enactment of the tax. It added that County was prejudiced by the delay because County had (1) acted in the good-faith belief that voter approval was not necessary, and (2) expended funds, incurred obligations, and contracted in reliance on the continued collection of the tax.
In this appeal, Griffith makes an unfocused discourse that nowhere mentions the dispositive laches issue, states a scope of appellate review for a laches issue, or summarizes the significant facts that were tried on that fact-specific issue. He has therefore waived his appellate claim, conceded that the claim lacks merit, and abandoned the claim. The closest he comes to a reasoned point is an argument that County did not enact the tax in good faith because it enacted the tax before Woodlake. He fails to explain, however, why the existence of Westminster would not support Countys good faith. We decline to search for error and presume that the judgment is correct.
attorney fee order
Though he represented himself throughout most of the proceedings against County, Griffith filed a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (court may award attorney fees to a successful party in an action that results in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if certain conditions exist). He claimed that attorney Brad Holbrook "invested 588 hours in this case between approximately April 20th and November 12, 1998" and "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association invested 75 hours in this case between December 15, 1997 and November 12, 1998." Griffith submitted no supporting evidence except his own declaration. The trial court rejected Griffiths evidence. The order denying Griffiths motion explains (1) "There is no credible showing of an attorney-client relationship between Harold Griffith and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association during the period of time covered by the claim for attorneys fees; and there is no documentation for attorneys fees claimed by Harold Griffith for any legal services of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association during the period of time covered by the claim for attorneys fees," and (2) "There is no adequate documentation to support any award of attorneys fees for legal services provided by Attorney Bradley Holbrook. The moving papers failed to include any documentation from Attorney Bradley Holbrook for legal services, and the reply papers filed by Harold Griffith only included a purported attorney fee agreement dated March 6, 2003; and a purported statement of legal services provided by Bradley Holbrook. Based on the court files, the Court does not find the claim for attorneys fees for Bradley Holbrook credible."
In this appeal, Griffith pays lip service to the abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review of orders stemming from attorney fee motions. But he makes no argument within the confines of that standard and simply reargues his motion. In any event, he could not make such an argument since it is apparent that the trial court decided against him because it did not believe his evidence. (Oldenburg v. Sears,Roebuck & Co. (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 733, 742 [trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and can reject evidence as unworthy of credence]; Hicks v. Reis (1943) 21 Cal.2d 654, 659-660 [trial court is entitled to reject in toto the testimony of a witness, even if that testimony is uncontradicted].)
judgment in favor of city and knutson
City enacted its utility users tax without voter approval in 1992. In 2002, Citys voters approved the tax and specifically ratified the imposition and collection of the tax for the prior years. The trial court therefore held that the action was moot. And it also held that laches completely barred the action.
Plaintiffs argue without citation of authority that the judgment is void because the trial court accepted evidence of mootness, which had ripened after our remand for trial. The point is therefore waived. Plaintiffs also fail to mention the independently dispositive laches issue. We would therefore affirm in any event.
disposition
The judgment in favor of County is affirmed. The order denying Griffiths motion for attorney fees is affirmed. The judgment in favor of City and Knutson is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J. --------------- Notes: The minute order is, of course, nonappealable. (Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 304.) However, it directs counsel to prepare an order and an order denying Griffiths motion was entered after Griffith filed his notice of appeal. Under the circumstances, we will construe the notice of appeal as referring to the appealable order. (Conservatorship of Starr (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1390, 1393.)