Summary
assuming without deciding that Covid-19 emergency orders grant this court discretion to extend the deadline for filing a notice of appeal but declining to do so when the appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the lengthy delay in filing his notice of appeal
Summary of this case from Robison v. WatsonOpinion
No. 04-21-00032-CV
03-10-2021
Ociele GRIFFIN Jr., Appellant v. VIA METROPOLITAN TRANSIT, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2019CV09061
Honorable J. Frank Davis, Judge Presiding PER CURIAM Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Appellant, Ociele Griffin Jr., attempts to appeal a final judgment signed by the trial court on August 26, 2020. Griffin did not file a motion that extended the appellate timetable and the notice of appeal does not meet the requirements for a restricted appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(d)(7), 26.1(a). Therefore, Griffin's notice of appeal was due September 25, 2020 (thirty days after the judgment was signed), or a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due fifteen days later. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1, 26.3. Griffin's notice of appeal was filed by mail and received by the clerk of the court on February 1, 2021. Griffin's docketing statement states he mailed the notice of appeal on January 21, 2021.
The notice of appeal was filed by mail 118 days—almost four months—after it was due. "[O]nce the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Rule [26.3] has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction." Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (construing predecessor to rule 26). We therefore ordered Griffin to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Griffin filed a timely response in which he generally discusses an order from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that construes the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. According to Griffin, under that order, the public health emergency "automatically constitute[s] good cause for an extension" of time to file a notice of appeal, provided a timely motion for extension of time was filed. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply in this appeal. Moreover, neither Griffin's notice of appeal nor his response to our show cause order was filed within the period allowed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for filing a motion for extension of time. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A).
Griffin's response also states that parts of the Bexar County courthouse were closed because of the COVID-19 public health emergency, requiring proceedings to be conducted remotely. He asserts this "limited me as a Pro se to filling [sic] and resources of information for fillings [sic] timely." However, Griffin does not provide any explanation about how or why this prevented him from mailing his notice of appeal until almost four months after it was due.
Assuming without deciding the Texas Supreme Court's emergency orders regarding the COVID-19 state of disaster grant this court discretion to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal beyond the period specified in Rule 26.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we decline to exercise our discretion to do so in this case because appellant has failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the lengthy delay in filing the notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b) (motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal must state facts relied on to reasonably explain need for extension); see also Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884, 885-88 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam) (discussing requirement that appellant seeking extension of time within fifteen-day grace period in Rule 26.3 must provide reasonable explanation for extension sought); Carrigan v. Edwards, No. 13-20-00093-CV, 2020 WL 6504418, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Nov. 5, 2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) ("[T]he pandemic conditions do not generate a blanket excuse which can be used to extend deadlines indefinitely, especially in the absence of any specific explanation for why such extensions are warranted.").
We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM