28 Ruling Case Law, § 27, p. 440. That the completeness of this protection removes the privilege of silence is exemplified in the declaration of Presiding Judge Davidson, of this court, in writing the opinion in the case of Griffin v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 428, 66 S.W. 782, referring to a statute, wherein he said: He cannot plead that rule of evidence which does not permit a witness to incriminate himself, because when he testifies he is exonerated from punishment, and the incriminating testimony can never be used against him.
' In Griffin v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 428, 66 S.W. 782, this Court, relying upon what is now Art. 639 P.C., held that the defendant should have been allowed to offer proof that he had been summoned and had testified before the grand jury regarding the transaction upon which his prosecution was based. This language used by Judge Davidson in Griffin v. State is appropriate here:
Thos. R. Bond, and Wynne Wynne, for appellant. — On question of immunity of witness: Griffin v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 428. On question of search and seizure: Alderson v. State, 11 S.W. Rep., 412; Meyers v. State, 108 id., 392.
In the other cases cited by Judge Davidson in his dissent the question of whether a witness can be compelled to answer when given immunity from prosecution is not mentioned nor discussed, and have no bearing on that question. In the case of Griffin v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 428, article 391 of the Penal Code is quoted, this court saying: "This article provides 'Any court, officer or tribunal having jurisdiction of the offenses enumerated in this chapter or any district or county attorney may subpoena persons and compel their attendance as witnesses to testify as to violations of any of the provisions of the foregoing articles. Any person so summoned and examined shall not be liable to prosecution for any violation of said articles about which he may testify and for any offense enumerated in this chapter a conviction may be had upon the unsupported evidence of an accomplice or participant.
See also Secker v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 479. The Day case was approved in Griffin v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 428. In the Day case the court said: "Appellant proposed to prove a material fact by several witnesses; the State objected upon the ground that the proposed witnesses were incompetent.
The case cited by the majority is inapposite. For example, in Griffin v. State, 109 Tenn. 17, 70 S.W. 61, 65 (1902), it is pointed out that on a prosecution for taking any female from her father, etc., without his consent, for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage, an accused may discharge the burden on him of showing the unchastity of the female by introducing enough testimony to raise a reasonable doubt as to her chastity. Although not altogether clear from that opinion, it seems some proof as to the chastity of the female in question was introduced in Griffin so as to provide a basis for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that that woman was chaste.
It includes a purely voluntary surrender for the prohibited purpose. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450, 70 A.2d 273 (1950); State v. Morton, 144 S.C. 116, 142 S.E. 245 (1928); Griffin v. State, 109 Tenn. 17, 70 S.W. 61 (1902); Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1969). We interpret RCW 9.79.050(1) to require nothing more than a proof of taking, which can be mere transporting, of a girl under 18 years of age for one of the prohibited purposes.