Griffin v. Stone

42 Citing cases

  1. Geiger v. Boyle

    Appeal No. 01A01-9809-CH-00467 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 16, 1999)   Cited 11 times
    Stating that a material change in circumstances requires proof “that the child's circumstances have materially changed in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the original custody decision”

    See Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984); Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d at 631; Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tenn.App. 1992). Courts should devise custody arrangements that promote the child's relationship with both parents and that interfere as little as possible with post-divorce family decision-making.

  2. Hepler v. Hepler

    No. M2004-00530-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005)

    Thus, the original custody decree is considered res judicata, to be disturbed only if the non-custodial parent establishes a material change in circumstances since the initial custody determination. Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W. 300, 301-02 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Therefore, the threshold issue is whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the initial custody determination.

  3. Adelsperger v. Adelsperger

    970 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 252 times
    Holding that a single incident of fallible behavior does not supply a strong enough reason to re-adjudicate custody

    These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. See Doles v. Doles, 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). A court's efforts to fashion an arrangement that will enable divorced parents to maintain a cooperative relationship for their children's best interests are all too often frustrated by the lingering pain, hurt, and anger that parents continue to feel toward each other.

  4. In re T.R.Y.

    No. M2012-01343-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2014)   Cited 16 times

    "In making parenting decisions, the court's paramount concern must be the welfare and best interest of the children; parenting decisions must not be made to reward or punish parents." Irvin v. Irvin, No. M2011-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.30, 2012) (citing Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d at 484-85); see also In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d at 742; Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). The trial court's decision appears to be driven primarily by two factors, the tendency of each parent to facilitate the child's relationship with the other parent and continuity for Daughter. On Father's tendency to facilitate and encourage Daughter's relationship with Mother, we are unimpressed with Father's explanation for why he permitted so many years to go by without any parenting time for Mother.

  5. Fakes v. Zahorik

    No. M2012-00817-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 2013)

    "We therefore review the record de novo in accordance with that presumption, and, absent an error of law, we must affirm, unless we find that the evidence preponderates against such findings." Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Rule 13(d) Tenn. R. App. P.; Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984)).

  6. Williams v. Singler

    No. W2012-01253-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2013)   Cited 23 times
    Vacating the finding of contempt and remanding for "factual findings as to specific instances of contempt during the relevant time period, including factual findings to support a holding of willfulness"

    "In making parenting decisions, the court's paramount concern must be the welfare and best interest of the children; parenting decisions must not be made to reward or punish parents." Irvin v. Irvin, No. M2011-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d at 484-85); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). When presented with a request to modify a parenting arrangement, the existing parenting order is considered res judicata on the facts as they existed at the time the most recent order was entered.

  7. S.A.M.D. v. J.P.D.

    No. W2011-01256-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012)   Cited 7 times

    These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. See Doles v. Doles, 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d 482, 484-85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

  8. Hyde v. Bradley

    No. M2009-02117-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010)   Cited 44 times
    Explaining that the court considers whether modification of the current parenting schedule is in the child's best interests only after a determination that there has been a material change in circumstance

    These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v.Barnhill , 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. SeeDoles v. Doles , 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone , 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).While a parent's misconduct may provide some evidence of his or her fitness to be a child's primary residential parent, this decision is not, and cannot be, used to punish the parent.It is well established that a child's residential schedule is to be made to assure the best interests of the child and not to reward or punish a parent.

  9. Leopold v. Leopold

    No. M1999-00602-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May. 6, 2003)   Cited 1 times
    Concluding that a trial court was left with "no alternative" than to use the median income amount where the husband failed to produce reliable evidence of his income such as income tax returns, his testimony was unhelpful, and he did not file an income and expense statement

    Custody decisions are not based on which parent is "perfect," Bah v. Bah, supra; Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 290-91 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1973), or on which parent has been shown to be completely unfit. Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992); Harris v. Harris, 832 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Rather, custody decisions require the courts to determine which of the available custodial alternatives appears to be best calculated to meet the child's needs.

  10. Shannon v. Shannon

    No. E2002-00518-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002)   Cited 1 times
    In Shannon we were reviewing a trial court's order that changed custody from a mother to a father based upon the mother's numerous moves to declining neighborhoods.

    This court has noted that the initial judgment awarding custody "is res judicata and is conclusive in a subsequent application to change custody unless some new fact has occurred which has altered the circumstances in a material way so that the welfare of the child requires a change of custody." Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Thus, the crucial question is whether there has been a "material change" warranting a change of custody.