See Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984); Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d at 631; Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tenn.App. 1992). Courts should devise custody arrangements that promote the child's relationship with both parents and that interfere as little as possible with post-divorce family decision-making.
Thus, the original custody decree is considered res judicata, to be disturbed only if the non-custodial parent establishes a material change in circumstances since the initial custody determination. Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W. 300, 301-02 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Therefore, the threshold issue is whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the initial custody determination.
These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. See Doles v. Doles, 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). A court's efforts to fashion an arrangement that will enable divorced parents to maintain a cooperative relationship for their children's best interests are all too often frustrated by the lingering pain, hurt, and anger that parents continue to feel toward each other.
"In making parenting decisions, the court's paramount concern must be the welfare and best interest of the children; parenting decisions must not be made to reward or punish parents." Irvin v. Irvin, No. M2011-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.30, 2012) (citing Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d at 484-85); see also In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d at 742; Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). The trial court's decision appears to be driven primarily by two factors, the tendency of each parent to facilitate the child's relationship with the other parent and continuity for Daughter. On Father's tendency to facilitate and encourage Daughter's relationship with Mother, we are unimpressed with Father's explanation for why he permitted so many years to go by without any parenting time for Mother.
"We therefore review the record de novo in accordance with that presumption, and, absent an error of law, we must affirm, unless we find that the evidence preponderates against such findings." Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Rule 13(d) Tenn. R. App. P.; Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984)).
"In making parenting decisions, the court's paramount concern must be the welfare and best interest of the children; parenting decisions must not be made to reward or punish parents." Irvin v. Irvin, No. M2011-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d at 484-85); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). When presented with a request to modify a parenting arrangement, the existing parenting order is considered res judicata on the facts as they existed at the time the most recent order was entered.
These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. See Doles v. Doles, 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d 482, 484-85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v.Barnhill , 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. SeeDoles v. Doles , 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone , 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).While a parent's misconduct may provide some evidence of his or her fitness to be a child's primary residential parent, this decision is not, and cannot be, used to punish the parent.It is well established that a child's residential schedule is to be made to assure the best interests of the child and not to reward or punish a parent.
Custody decisions are not based on which parent is "perfect," Bah v. Bah, supra; Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 290-91 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1973), or on which parent has been shown to be completely unfit. Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992); Harris v. Harris, 832 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Rather, custody decisions require the courts to determine which of the available custodial alternatives appears to be best calculated to meet the child's needs.
This court has noted that the initial judgment awarding custody "is res judicata and is conclusive in a subsequent application to change custody unless some new fact has occurred which has altered the circumstances in a material way so that the welfare of the child requires a change of custody." Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Thus, the crucial question is whether there has been a "material change" warranting a change of custody.