Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd); see also Johnson v. State, 365 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, no pet.)
Code § 545.051(a). Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd); see Johnson v. State, 365 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012, no pet.); Bracken v. State, 282 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd); Doyle v. State, 265 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd); see also Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Chang, 994 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (explaining that "drift[ing] over the white line adjoining two lanes of traffic flowing the same direction" implicates section 545.060, while "cross[ing] over the yellow line into a lane designated for oncoming traffic" implicates section 545.051). In this case, Deputy Sepeda testified that he observed the tires of Marrero's vehicle "touch the double yellow line" on the roadway and that this action caused Sepeda to have to "swerve" out of the way of Marrero's vehicle.
Traveling across the yellow line is a traffic violation in itself and does not require the additional element of unsafe maneuver as does section 545.060. See Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd); see also Chang, 994 S.W.2d at 878. Based on his observations, McCandless had reasonable suspicion a traffic offense had been committed, and he was therefore justified in stopping appellant.
The Defendant asserts that failing to maintain a single lane of traffic is not valid grounds for initiating a stop because "Texas courts have interpret[ed] this statute to mean that there will be no traffic violation if a motor vehicle operator drives his vehicle a few times over the white line dividing lanes of traffic going in the same direction or even cross[ing] the shoulder line as long as it was safe to do so." Dkt. # 58, p. 6 (citing Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001)). However, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Zucco upheld the same traffic violation as sufficient grounds for making a traffic stop. 71 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1995).
A centerline is a solid-yellow road surface marking that runs along the leftmost lane of traffic, indicating that traffic on the other side moves in the opposite direction. See Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.051 (West 1999) (entitled "Driving on Right Side of Roadway")).
at a driver's failure to maintain a single lane triggered a reasonable suspicion that the driver had violated section 545.060, the failure to drive in a single lane was coupled with some other factor that indicated danger or a lack of safety, such as the driver's leaving a bar, driving in heavy traffic, crossing into a lane of oncoming traffic, or weaving over an extended distance or time. See, e.g., Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745, 746 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when police stopped driver after anonymous tip of erratic driving and weaving in heavy traffic on Thanksgiving weekend); Cook v. State, 63 S.W.3d 924, 926-27 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when car sped out of bar parking lot, suspiciously pulled into gas station for ten to fifteen seconds, then drove "all over" two unmarked roads before "constantly" crossing into other lane for about two minutes on marked lane-divided road); Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 821 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when, after receiving informant tip that defendant would be carrying heroin, officer saw defendant's car cross yellow line into lane of oncoming traffic); Martinez v. State, 29 S.W.3d 609, 610 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when car drifted onto shoulder for only a few seconds, but on freeway during busy traffic); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Bell, 11 S.W.3d 282, 282-83 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when car crossed into shoulder of lane of oncoming traffic); Gajewski v. State, 944 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when on two-lane highway, one-third of car crossed into oncoming lane two to three times). In this case, there is no evidence that Appellant's failure to drive in a single lane was unsafe.
Violation of a traffic law in an officer's presence is sufficient authority for an initial stop. Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 822-23 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd). At a suppression hearing, the trial court observes the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses and is in a better position than the appellate court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
B. When a Stop is Justified Violation of a traffic law in an officer's presence is sufficient authority for an initial stop. Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 822-23 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd). Generally, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law.
We note, because of the mobility of a vehicle and the lessened expectation of privacy, an officer may stop and search a moving vehicle without a warrant if probable cause has been developed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd). However, the vehicle in this case was parked on private property.
Those courts that have found unsafe weaving to raise a reasonable suspicion of the violation of Section 545.060 have so found when they were faced with weaving' done in conjunction with other facts indicating danger, such as leaving a bar, driving in heavy traffic, crossing into a lane of oncoming traffic, or weaving over an extended distance or time. See, e.g., Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stopped after anonymous tip of erratic driving and weaving in heavy traffic on Thanksgiving weekend); Cook v. State, 63 S.W.3d 924 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (car speeding out of bar parking lot, suspiciously pulling into gas station for ten to fifteen seconds, then being driven "all over" two unmarked roads, before "constantly" crossing into other lane for about two minutes on marked lane-divided road); Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (after receiving informant tip that defendant would be carrying heroin, officer saw defendant's car cross yellow line into lane of oncoming traffic); Martinez v. State, 29 S.W.3d 609 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (car drifted onto shoulder for only few seconds, but on freeway during busy traffic); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Bell, 11 S.W.3d 282 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (car crossed into shoulder of lane of oncoming traffic); Gajewski v. State, 944 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (on two-lane highway, one-third of car crossed into oncoming lane two to three times). Unlike the foregoing cases in which evidence of weaving was paired with evidence of other dangerous conduct or circumstances, there was no evidence here that Curtis crossed into a lane of oncoming traffic, interfered with heavy — or any — traffic on the road, or sustained his weaving for an extended length of time or distance.