Furthermore, at least one Connecticut court has suggested that one who invites comment — as plaintiff in this case did, if only indirectly — is ordinarily in no position to complain if the resulting comment is adverse. See Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109, 112, 251 A.2d 415, 417 (1968); Prosser and Keeton, on the Law of Torts § 114 (5th ed. 1984). The Connecticut courts have held that a conditional privilege exists — and the presumption of good faith arises — under a number of circumstances which might be considered applicable here.
The issue is whether the libel, as published, would have a different effect on the reader than the pleaded truth would have produced. Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109, 111, 251 A.2d 415 (1968), citing Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537 (1934). While at common law, truth was an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the defendant, as a practical matter the burden of proving the falsity of the publication has been shifted to the plaintiff, in light of New York Times Co. and its progeny.
The issue is whether the libel, as published, would have a different effect on the reader than the pleaded truth would have produced. Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn.Supp. 109, 111, 251 A.2d 415 (1968), citing Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537 (1934) (some internal citations and quotations omitted). Goodrich at 112-13.
See generally, Miles, supra, 11 Conn.App., at 589. See also Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn.Sup. 109 (Super.Ct. 1968).Fourth-Seventh Counts (Emotional Distress) CT Page 3465
The issue is whether the libel, as published, would have a different effect on the reader than the pleaded truth would have produced. Grifin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109, 111, 251 A.2d 415 (1968), citing Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537 (1934). (footnote omitted)
The Court held that this privilege extends to "misstatements of fact if made in good faith, without malice and under the honest belief that they are true." Id., 616; see also Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109, 110 (1968). The United States Supreme Court elevated this privilege of fair comment to constitutional stature.
The issue is whether the libel, as published, would have a different effect on the reader than the pleaded truth would have produced. Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109, 111, 251 A.2d 415 (1968), citing Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537 (1934).Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 112 (1982).
The issue is whether the libel, as published, would have a different effect on the reader than the pleaded truth would have produced. Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109, 111, 251 A.2d 415 (1968), citing Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537 (1934). 188 Conn. at 113.
"`A workable test [of the substantial truth of the statement] is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from which the pleaded truth would have produced.'" Griffin v. Clemow, 28 Conn. Sup. 109, 111, 251 A.2d 415 (1968), quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23." "It is not necessary for the defendant to prove the truth of every word of the libel. If he succeeds in proving that "the main charge, or gist, of the libel" is true, he need not justify statements or comments which do not add to the sting of the charge or introduce any matter by itself actionable.