Opinion
Case No. 4:01-CV-142
February 7, 2003
OPINION
Before the Court is Defendant, AutoZone, Inc.'s ("AutoZone"), Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on Plaintiff, Joan Griffin's ("Griffin"), retaliatory discharge claims under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("ELCRA"), MCL § 37.2101— 37.2804, and the Whistleblower Protection Act ("WPA"), MCL § 15.362— 15.369. Since Griffin has failed to make the required prima facie showing that there was a causal connection between her protected activity and AutoZone's adverse employment action, summary judgment will be granted in favor of AutoZone.
Facts
Griffin, an African-American female, was terminated on May 22, 2001, from her full-time employment at AutoZone store number 2104 in Benton Harbor, Michigan. Griffin asserts that her termination was the result of AutoZone's retaliatory actions following her February 15, 2001, filing of a charge against AutoZone with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights. AutoZone responds that Griffin was terminated in accordance with AutoZone's nondiscriminatory attendance policy due to Griffin's continued tardiness and absenteeism.
In October 1998, AutoZone hired Griffin as a part-time cashier. AutoZone agreed to schedule Griffin after 11:00 a.m. Monday through Friday and late on Saturdays, due to Griffin's lack of personal transportation, her contemporaneous full-time job at Burger King, and her need to care for her young daughter. Griffin would occasionally work on Sundays, when fellow AutoZone employees normally provided her with a ride to work. Griffin quit her part-time job at AutoZone after approximately nine months.
In April 2000, Griffin applied for a full-time senior sales position with AutoZone. Griffin was initially hired on a part-time basis, before she was promoted to a full-time position in July 2000. It is undisputed that Griffin discussed her scheduling limitations with AutoZone management when she was rehired as a part-time employee. AutoZone, however, contends that while it accepted Griffin's scheduling limitations as a part-time employee, Griffin was aware that she was required to be available for any shift as a full-time employee. AutoZone points to Griffin's receipt of AutoZone's Employee Handbook as evidence that Griffin was aware that she may have to work weekday mornings and weekends (Griffin Signature Form of Apr. 13, 2002, Regarding Receipt of AutoZone Handbook, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. C), and Griffin's acknowledgment that it was her responsibility to get to work (Griffin Dep. at 53, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. A).
The AutoZone Handbook extensively addresses employee work schedules and notification of absenteeism. With regard to employee work schedules, the AutoZone Handbook states:
. . . you may be asked to work nights, weekends, holidays and extra hours to meet business needs.
Your manager will explain the weekly store schedule to you and make every effort to announce any changes in your hours as far in advance as possible. However, the hours, shifts, and days of your normal work schedule may not always be the same due to changing business conditions.
(AutoZone Handbook at 58, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. B.) The Employee Handbook also states:
It's important for you to come to work when scheduled. Your fellow AutoZoners depend upon you. Unauthorized and excessive absences or tardiness won't be tolerated by AutoZone and will result in corrective action, up to and including termination.
You need to personally tell your manager as far in advance as possible if you're going to be absent or late. Your manager may request verification for your absence, like a doctor's note. If you discover your absence will be longer than expected, call your manager to explain when you'll return to work. Failure to report to work for two consecutive days without notification is considered, job abandonment, a voluntary resignation and a voluntary quit.
(Id. at 46.)
Griffin claims that on December 30, 2000, she overheard two AutoZone employees, supervisor Tia Green ("Green") and salesperson Darold Foriest ("Foriest"), engage in a verbal exchange. According to Griffin, Green stated: "[S]ince my white shirt means nothing to the black mother fuckers in this store, they don't mean nothing to me." (Griffin Dep. at 80.) While Griffin did not believe the remark was directed at her, (Id. at 81.), nor did she know what was meant by the remark, (Id. at 84), Griffin immediately went into AutoZone's back office and telephoned Assistant Store Manager Teresa Wetmore ("Wetmore") for advice on how to report the incident. Wetmore advised Griffin to telephone Regional Loss Prevention Manager Paul Bastien ("Bastien"). Griffin left a message on Bastien's voice mail regarding the incident and returned to work.
Bastien returned Griffin's telephone call the next day and told her to write down the facts of the incident so that she would not forget the details. Bastien then undertook an investigation of the incident, which included interviewing employees. Upon the completion of his investigation, Bastien turned over all of his evidence to AutoZone Relations, along with his conclusion that there was no independent verification that Green had said anything inappropriate or racist.
As a result of Bastien's investigation, Green was issued a Corrective Action Review for allowing her boyfriend, a non-employee, access inside AutoZone before the store was opened for business.
The day after the alleged incident, a Sunday, Griffin elected not to depend on Green for a ride to work as had been previously planned. Griffin instead arranged for another assistant manager to pick her up. The other assistant manager failed to pick up Griffin as scheduled, and Griffin was late to work. Green issued Griffin a Corrective Action Review ("CAR") for her tardiness.
On February 15, 2001, Griffin filed a discrimination and retaliation charge against AutoZone with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights ("MDCR"). (Charge of Discrimination, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. O.) On March 8, 2001, Griffin and AutoZone entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby Griffin withdrew her discrimination and retaliation charge against AutoZone in exchange for AutoZone's nullification and removal of "[a]ll disciplinary actions up to and including 3/01/2001 regarding attendance" from Griffin's personnel file. (Settlement Agreement, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. H.) The MDCR subsequently dismissed Griffin's charge on March 14, 2001.
In mid-March 2001, following the dismissal of Griffin's MDRC charge, AutoZone management held a diversity and harassment training session for all of its Benton Harbor store employees. Griffin attended the meeting. During the meeting, AutoZone management discussed the issue of tardiness and absenteeism, and presented all employees, including Griffin, with a copy of the respective employee's absenteeism report for the employee's review and signature. AutoZone management stressed that it would begin strictly enforcing its tardiness and absenteeism policies and reiterated that AutoZone's policy requires full-time employees to be available to work any shift. At the conclusion of the meeting, AutoZone management invited questions and told the employees in attendance that management would be available to entertain questions until 1:00 p.m. the following day. Griffin did not ask any questions at the meeting or during the designated question period. Griffin states that she believed that her scheduling limitations would remain in effect, thus she did not feel the need to ask any questions.
Almost immediately following the meeting, Griffin began receiving numerous CARs for violating AutoZone's tardiness and absenteeism policy. Griffin received seven CARs from March 17, 2001, through May 22, 2001, before she was terminated for continued absenteeism and tardiness. (CARs, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Exs. Q-X.) Griffin's signature appears on each of her CARs. (Id.) The CARs were issued to Griffin as follows:
(1) On Saturday, March 17, 2001, Griffin was issued a "verbal warning" CAR as she called AutoZone at 10:30 a.m. stating that she had overslept. (CAR of Mar. 17, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. Q.) According to the CAR, Griffin said that she had to make childcare arrangements, so she would call the store back by 12:30 p.m. to inform them of when she would report to work. (Id.) The CAR states that Griffin never called back. (Id.)
(2) On Saturday, March 24, 2001, Griffin was issued a "first written warning" CAR as she overslept and arrived at AutoZone at 10:30 a.m. for her 7:30 a.m. shift. (CAR of Mar.24, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. R.)
(3) On Sunday, April 1, 2001, Griffin was issued a "second written warning" CAR as she was scheduled to work at 9:00 a.m. and called AutoZone at 8:50 a.m. stating that she did not make arrangements for transportation to work. (CAR of Apr. 1, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. S.) On the CAR, Griffin noted: "Have no ride on Sundays! Management knows that." (Id.) AutoZone management recommended that Griffin "[t]ry locating a ride the day before your shift starts." (Id.)
(4) On Tuesday, April 3, 2001, Griffin was issued a "serious violation" CAR as she was scheduled to begin her shift on Saturday, March 31, 2001 at 9:00 a.m. and clocked in at 9:55 a.m. (CAR of Apr. 3, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. T.)
(5) On Monday, April 9, 2001 Griffin received a "serious violation" CAR as she was scheduled to arrive to work at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 7, 2001, and she did not clock in until 12:41 p.m. due to childcare issues. (CAR of Apr. 9, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. U.)
(6) On Saturday April 28, 2001, Griffin was issued a "serious violation" CAR as she was scheduled to begin her shift at 7:30 a.m. and clocked in at 8:30 a.m. (CAR of Apr. 28, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. V.) The CAR also states: "Notice: Should your performance not improve or should this same violation recur, the following action will be taken: Termination." (Id.) This was a change from Griffin's prior CARs, which listed the potential penalty as "up to and including termination." (CARs, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Exs. Q-U.)
(7) On Monday, May 7, 2001, Griffin was issued a "serious violation" CAR as she was scheduled to begin her shift at 9:00 a.m. and clocked in at 9:16 a.m. (CAR of May 7, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. W.) "Termination" was again listed as the potential result of her continued tardiness and absenteeism. (Id.)
(8) On Tuesday, May 23, 2001, Griffin was issued her final "serious violation" CAR as she was scheduled to begin her shift on May 22, 2001, at 12:00 p.m. and clocked in at 12:32 p.m. (CAR of May 23, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. X.) The CAR stated: "You have received numerous corrective actions in the past regarding your attendance/tardiness. We are left with no other alternative but to terminate your employment with the company." (Id.)
The decision to terminate Griffin was made by AutoZone on the advice of LaJeune Rose ("Rose"), an African-American woman who works as a staff attorney in the AutoZoner Relations department of AutoZone's corporate office. Part of Rose's duties is to be involved with and provide advice on personnel decisions, primarily to ensure that AutoZone's policies are uniformly applied. Before making her recommendation to terminate Griffin, Rose reviewed all of Griffin's CARs, spoke with AutoZone's Regional Human Resource Manager, and was aware that Griffin had previously filed an MDCR complaint. In her deposition, Rose stated that she would have recommended Griffin's termination regardless of Griffin's MDCR complaint. (Rose Dep. at 20, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. P.)
Following her termination, Griffin submitted information to the MDCR alleging that her termination was caused by retaliation as a result of her filing her previous MDCR charge against AutoZone. Griffin, however, did not ultimately file a charge of retaliation with the MDCR or the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The MDCR informed Griffin that it could not pursue the information she submitted, because Griffin declined to file a charge. (Letter of May 11, 2001, from Thomas to Griffin, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. H.)
Procedural History
Griffin filed the instant suit against AutoZone in Berrien County Circuit Court on August 20, 2001, alleging: (1) racial discrimination and retaliatory discharge in violation of the ELCRA; and (2) violation of the WPA. On September 7, 2001, AutoZone removed the suit to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332. AutoZone moved for summary judgment on November 1, 2002. In her response to AutoZone's Motion for Summary Judgment, Griffin consented to voluntarily dismiss her racial discrimination claim. (Pl.'s Br. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 9.) Thus, the two issues that remain before the Court are Griffin's claims for: (1) retaliatory discharge under the ELCRA; and (2) violation of the WPA.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id. The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)).
Discussion
Griffin's argument is that after the MDCR complaint was resolved, AutoZone set up a strict attendance policy with the knowledge and intent that Griffin could not meet the policy, thus giving AutoZone a seemingly valid reason for terminating Griffin. Griffin says that AutoZone knew in mid-March 2001 that Griffin would have tardiness and attendance problems because she was dependent upon others in order to get to work.
I. Retaliation Under the ELCRA
AutoZone has moved for summary judgment on Griffin's retaliation claim under the ELCRA. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ELCRA, Griffin must show: "(1) that [Griffin] engaged in a protected activity, (2) that this was known by [AutoZone], (3) that [AutoZone] took an employment action adverse to [Griffin], and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 245 Mich. App. 306, 315, 628 N.W.2d 63, 70 (2001). "To establish causation, [Griffin] must show that [her] participation in activity protected by the [EL]CRA was a `significant factor' in [AutoZone's] adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal link between the two." Id. In interpreting the ELCRA, a court may consider the way in which federal courts have interpreted the counterpart federal statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Id. at 314, 628 N.W.2d at 69. While a court is not bound by federal Title VII precedent, "those precedents analogous to questions presented under the [EL]CRA are persuasive and will be afforded substantial consideration," unless they are contrary to the intent of the Michigan Legislature. Id. at 314, 628 N.W.2d at 70.
It is uncontested that Griffin engaged in a protected activity when she made an internal complaint to AutoZone management on December 30, 2000, and when she subsequently filed her February 15, 2001, discrimination and retaliation charge with the MDCR. Griffin thus satisfies element one. AutoZone also does not dispute that it was aware of Griffin's internal complaint and MDCR charge when AutoZone terminated Griffin's employment. Griffin thus satisfies elements two and three.
The Court must next determine whether Griffin has shown a prima facie case for a causal connection between her protected activity and AutoZone's adverse employment action. To establish the element of causation in a retaliation claim, a "plaintiff is required to `proffer evidence "sufficient to raise the inference that [the] protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action."'" EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Since Griffin concedes that she does not present any direct evidence that her termination was causally connected to her internal complaint or MDCR charge, the Court must examine whether Griffin's circumstantial evidence makes the required prima facie showing.
Evidence of temporal proximity and other circumstantial evidence may be used by a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of a causal connection. Generally, "`temporal proximity alone will not support an inference in the face of compelling evidence' that the defendant company encouraged complaints about the relevant grievance," Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Moon v. Transport Drivers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1987)), unless "the temporal proximity is `very close,'" Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511 (2001) (citing with approval a Tenth Circuit case in which the court found that absent additional evidence, three months is insufficient to create a triable issue of causation); see also Barrett v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 00-4458, 2002 WL 1272116, at *6 (6th Cir. June 6, 2002) (per curiam) (finding absent additional evidence, two and one-half months is insufficient to create a triable issue of causation); Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that absent additional evidence, two to five months is insufficient to create a triable issue of causation). Although, "temporal proximity considered with other evidence of retaliatory conduct is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a causal connection." Little v. BP Exploration Oil Co., 265 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999); Harrison v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville Davidson County, Tenn., 80 F.3d 1107, 1118-19 (6th Cir. 1996)).
The additional circumstantial evidence accompanying a showing of temporal proximity must, however, be strong. For example, in Harrison, the plaintiff offered evidence that three of the plaintiff's fellow employees feared retaliation from their supervisor for testifying at the plaintiff's hearing, the plaintiff's supervisor made repeated comments that indicated that he would run employees out of his department, the plaintiff's activities were "scrutinized more carefully than those of comparably situated employees," and the "defendants took every opportunity to make [the plaintiff's] life as an employee unpleasant." Harrison, 80 F.3d at 1119. In Moore, the plaintiff offered evidence that he received more frequent disciplinary citations for trivial matters than other employees, and that he received unwarranted criticism for his work from his supervisors. Moore, 171 F.3d at 1080. Finally, in Little, the plaintiff presented the affidavit of a coworker that recounted how the coworker and other fellow employees were told in meetings with supervisors to make false claims of theft and harassment against the plaintiff or lose their jobs, and evidence "tending to show that he was disciplined, in fact suspended and later terminated, for not wearing his uniform pants while other workers were not so disciplined." Little, 265 F.3d at 365.
AutoZone terminated Griffin's employment on May 22, 2001, slightly more than three months after Griffin filed her discrimination and retaliation charge with the MDCR on February 15, 2001, and almost five months after Griffin filed her December 30, 2000, internal complaint. These time periods exceed those rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Barrett, 2002 WL 1272116, at *6, and Hafford, 183 F.3d at 515, as insufficient to create a triable issue of causation without additional evidence. Griffin must therefore show additional evidence to support causation.
Griffin asserts that following the March 8, 2001, settlement of her MDCR charge with AutoZone, under which her record of tardiness and absenteeism was wiped clean, AutoZone began scheduling her to work shifts that conflicted with the scheduling limitations that she and AutoZone agreed upon when she was rehired as a part-time employee in April 2000. Griffin claims that AutoZone made these scheduling changes in retaliation for Griffin's MDCR charge and as a pretext to terminate her, because AutoZone knew that Griffin's lack of independent transportation would result in Griffin being tardy or absent from work. However, Griffin does not provide any evidence of these scheduling changes, other than a statement in her affidavit.
AutoZone counters that Griffin was terminated for a legitimate business reason: Griffin's seven cited instances of tardiness and absenteeism. In mid-March 2001, following the settlement of Griffin's MDCR charge, AutoZone management convened a meeting of all of its Benton Harbor store employees, including Griffin. (Griffin Dep. at 143, Def.'s Reply Mem. Ex. A.) Multiple AutoZone employees stated in their respective depositions that AutoZone's management reiterated AutoZone's tardiness/absenteeism policy as contained in AutoZone's Employee Handbook and stated that these policies would be strictly enforced. (Whitfield Dep. at 21-22; Bastien Dep. at 38-40; Miller Dep. at 52-53, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. Ex. E, G, J.) Following the meeting, AutoZone management made itself available to answer questions concerning AutoZone's reiterated tardiness/absenteeism policy. (Id.) The AutoZone Employee Handbook, which Griffin received when she was hired, states that employees may be scheduled at any time to meet store needs. (AutoZone Handbook at 58.) While Griffin does not recall the content of the meeting, she neither contests that AutoZone's tardiness/absenteeism policy was discussed, nor that she did not ask any questions. (Griffin Dep. at 143-46.) Rather, Griffin contends that she did not think that the scheduling policy applied to her, because she had previously been allowed to designate her hours since the time she was hired as a part-time employee.
AutoZone states that Griffin, like all other full-time employees, was assigned to work shifts on weekends and weekday mornings. In accordance with the policies stated in AutoZone's Handbook, Griffin was cited with CARs in progressive severity for her seven documented instances of tardiness and absenteeism from March 17, 2001, through May 22, 2001. (AutoZone Handbook at 46.) During this two-month period, Griffin filed no complaints to AutoZone management or the MDCR regarding AutoZone's alleged retaliatory scheduling. This stands in stark contrast to the internal complaint that Griffin filed the same day that she allegedly overheard the discriminatory statement on December 30, 2000. In short, Griffin had opportunities to question or contest her employment conditions and Griffin failed to utilize them.
Many of Griffin's seven incidents of tardiness or absence were due to reasons totally within Griffin's own control, such as oversleeping (CAR of Mar. 17, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. Q) and failure to make timely arrangements for transportation (CAR of Apr. 1, 2001, Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Behalf Def. Ex. S). Additionally, the fact that AutoZone employees had previously provided Griffin with gratuitous transportation to work does not bind AutoZone's employees to continue to provide Griffin with timely transportation. Accordingly, the circumstantial evidence Griffin offers with respect to her scheduling changes, considered in conjunction with the temporal proximity of her internal complaint and MDCR charge to her termination, fails to show a prima facie case for retaliation.
Griffin also claims that she was cited for her tardiness while other AutoZone employees were not. The only example Griffin offers of her disparate treatment was the testimony of Eugene Miller ("Miller"), a part-time employee, who was not cited for arriving late. (Pl.'s Br. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 13.) Miller, however, was a part-time AutoZone employee who was therefore not similarly situated to Griffin, a full-time employee. (Miller Dep. at 20.) Miller's treatment thus does not bolster Griffin's prima facie showing.
Griffin offers no additional evidentiary support to bolster her temporal proximity evidence. Griffin has thus failed to make the required prima facie showing of a causal connection between her protected activity and AutoZone's adverse employment action. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of AutoZone on Griffin's claim for retaliatory discharge under the ELCRA.
II. Violation of the WPA
AutoZone has also moved for summary judgment on Griffin's WPA claim. Section 2 of the WPA, MCL § 15.362, states:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.
Id. Since the WPA is substantially similar to the retaliatory discharge portions of the ELCRA, actions under the WPA are analyzed using a similar framework. Anzaldua v. Band, 216 Mich. App. 561, 580, 550, N.W.2d 544, 552-53 (1996). Under the WPA, like the ELCRA, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Hopkins v. City of Midland, 158 Mich. App. 361, 378, 404 N.W.2d 744, 751 (1987). To establish a prima facie case under the WPA, Griffin must show that: "(1) [s]he was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) [AutoZone] discharged h[er], and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge." Chandler v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 456 Mich. 395, 399, 572 N.W.2d 210, 212 (1998). If Griffin succeeds in establishing a prima facie case under the WPA, "the burden shifts to [AutoZone] to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." Hopkins, 158 Mich. App. at 378, 404 N.W.2d at 751. Finally, if AutoZone "carries [its] burden, [Griffin] must have an opportunity to prove that the legitimate reason offered by [AutoZone] was not the true reason, but was only a pretext for discrimination." Id.
Based on the rationale the Court elucidated in its discussion of why Griffin failed to make the required prima facie showing of a causal connection between her protected activity and AutoZone's adverse employment action under the ELCRA, Griffin's WPA claim will also fail. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of AutoZone on Griffin's claim for retaliatory discharge under the WPA.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, AutoZone's Motions for Summary Judgment on Griffin's claims for retaliatory discharge under the ELCRA and the WPA will be granted on the grounds that Griffin has failed to make the required prima facie showing that there was a causal connection between her protected activity and AutoZone's adverse employment action.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.