Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-3113 (NHP).
September 2, 1999.
Abraham S. Alter, Esq., LANGTON ALTER, Rahway, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff
Barbara L. Spivak, Chief Counsel, Region II, Karen G. Fiszer, Assistant Regional Counsel Office of General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FAITH S. HOCHBERG, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant
THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER OPINION IS ON FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff William J. Griffin ("plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act seeking review of the final determination issued by the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits. For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 4, 1994, plaintiff filed an application forDisability Insurance Benefits. He alleged an inability to work as of December 30, 1989 due to a back injury. The claim was denied initially and denied again upon reconsideration.
On July 18, 1996, a hearing was held before the Honorable Gerald J. Ryan, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). In his January 25, 1997 Opinion, Judge Ryan concluded that on the date plaintiff's insured status expired, plaintiff had no impairment or combination of impairments "severe" in nature within the meaning of the Social Security Regulations. Accordingly, the Judge concluded that he was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations.
On April 28, 1998, the Appeals Council determined that there were no grounds for review.
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is made applicable to SSI cases by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
A . Standard of Review
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) establishes the limitations that this Court must adhere to in reviewing said appeals. In accordance with the statute, a court may review the factual findings of the Commissioner only to determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence for such findings. This Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. If there is substantial evidence in the record to maintain the Commissioner's findings, they are conclusive; and as a result, the court is not empowered, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to conduct a de novo review. Instead, the court's role must be viewed as narrowly-tailored, with considerable deference to the Commissioner's fact-finding. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (West 1999). This Court's inquiry must be directed to finding whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence in a Social Security case as "more than a mere scintilla" and as that evidence which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The fact that the record contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for the decision in the record. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992). Consequently, this Court must review the record and the ALJ's findings and conclusion within the narrow confines of its limited scope of review. See id.
B . Substantial Evidence
With regard to the findings made by the ALJ in a disability benefits proceeding, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence, and where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusions that must be upheld. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (West 1999); see also Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. Welfare, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975). However, the ALJ's ruling should clearly explain the foundation upon which it rests. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ is charged with the responsibility of analyzing all the relevant evidence and explaining why certain evidence was considered relevant while other evidence was dismissed.See Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978). Although administrative decisions are accorded a certain level of deference, it is the responsibility of this Court to closely sift through the record in order to determine whether the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence.
In order for a claimant to be deemed disabled, and thus entitled to benefits under the Act, he must comply with all relevant statutory requirements. To comply, the claimant must first meet the insured status requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) and the resource and income restrictions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) and (b) in order for SSI to be paid. Secondly, the claimant must establish that he is not "engage[d] in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(c)(3)(A). Finally, the claimant must show that he is disabled within the meaning of the statute.
An individual is determined to be under a disability "only if his physical or mental impairment(s) are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2)(B)(d) and
§ 1382(c)(3)(B). Thus, plaintiff must have a medically determinable impairment and this impairment must cause a functional limitation which negates plaintiff's ability to do any kind of work which exists in the national economy.
In this matter, plaintiff has satisfied the first two requirements in that plaintiff was insured on December 30, 1989 through December 31, 1993 and has not "engaged in substantial gainful activity" since December 30, 1989. The issue before this Court is whether the ALJ's ruling denying the plaintiff "disabled" status is supported by substantial evidence.
The Social Security Act prescribes a five-step sequential analysis that must be satisfied in order for a claimant to be entitled to benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1995). First, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that she is not currently employed or engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1995); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n. 5 (1987). Second, the plaintiff must also prove that she is inflicted with a severe medical impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1995); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Third, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (1995). Fourth, the claimant is under an obligation to prove that she cannot return to the particular type of work the claimant has previously performed if the claimant's impairment does not meet the criteria set forth in the list of impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995);see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Failure to prove this requisite will result in a denial of benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995). Fifth, if the claimant has proven that she is unable to perform prior occupational duties, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is able to work in some other occupation in the national economy.See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1995). If the Commissioner is unable to carry this burden, the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id.
The type of physical or mental impairment necessary to prove the existence of a disability has been defined as "[a]n impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(3) and 1382(a)(3)(c). Although Congress requires the Commissioner to develop a complete medical record and make every reasonable effort to obtain all medical evidence, Congress nonetheless places the burden upon a plaintiff to show his or her entitlement to disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(H) ("An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the [Commissioner] may require.").
In the present matter, this Court must look to the factual record developed at the July 18, 1996 hearing. Judge Ryan employed the sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in order to conclude that plaintiff was not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on December5 30, 1989, the date the claimant stated he became unable to work, and has acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured only through December 31, 19993.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 30, 1989.
3. On December 31, 1993, the date his insured status expired, the claimant had lower back pain.
4. The claimant's statements concerning his impairment and its impact on his ability to work on the date his insured status expired are not credible.
5. On December 31, 1993, the date his insured status expired, the claimant did not have any impairment which significantly limited his ability to perform basic work-related functions; therefore, the claimant did not have a severe impairment.
6. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through December 31, 1993, the date his insured status expired.
The ALJ determined, based on the lack of any medical evidence provided by plaintiff, that plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period of time. Consequently, plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act, given his age, education, and work experience. A careful review of the entire record of this case, including all of the medical records attached as exhibits, reveals that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, it is the determination of this Court that the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.
This case is closed.