Opinion
CIVIL NO. SA-03-CA-0136-EP
July 24, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In this application for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Jonah Griffie, an inmate in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), challenges his 2001 state court conviction for aggravated robbery. Respondent has filed an answer. (Docket no. 12). Having considered the petition, the answer, the state court records and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion this habeas petition should be denied.
Background
Griffie was indicted in the 22nd Judicial District Court of Comal County, Texas for aggravated robbery, cause no. CR2000-072. On July 30, 2001, he pled guilty and was sentenced to serve 25 years in prison. Griffie did not appeal. He filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on January 15, 2003.
In this federal habeas application, Griffie contends that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to discuss the strength of the State's case and potential defenses with him, telling him the judge was known to give life sentences for similar offenses, failing to inform him of his right to have a jury assess punishment, misinforming him that the complainant had made a positive identification of him, and telling Griffie he was guilty and should plead guilty. He asserts that his attorney's errors rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Respondent concedes that Griffie exhausted his state court remedies on these claims.
Analysis
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a state prisoner may not obtain relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law, as announced by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A decision is contrary to clearly-established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409. It is not enough that the state court applied clearly-established federal law incorrectly. Id. at 411. Habeas relief can be granted only if the correct legal principle was unreasonably applied by the state courts to the facts of the petitioner's case. Id. at 413.
1. Guilty Plea
Although procedural default has not been raised by respondent, the Court believes that Griffie is precluded from challenging the his guilty plea in this Section 2254 proceeding. A challenge to the voluntary and knowing nature of a guilty plea must ordinarily be raised on direct appeal. Bousley v. United States , 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). If a petitioner fails to raise this issue on direct appeal, he may seek collateral review only if he establishes either cause and prejudice for his procedural default or actual innocence. Id. at 622-23. Griffie did not appeal his conviction and presents no cause for his failure to do so. Nor does he argue that he is actually innocent.
Had Griffie challenged only his guilty plea, his petition would be resolved on the procedural default issue. However, he also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the voluntariness of his guilty plea bears upon the prejudice element of that issue, the Court shall discuss whether Griffie's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be intelligent and voluntary. Bousley v. United States , 523 U.S. at 618. To be voluntary, a guilty plea must not be produced by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant or of state-induced emotions so intense that the defendant was rendered unable to weigh rationally his options with the help of counsel. Matthew v. Johnson , 201 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2000). For a guilty plea to be intelligently entered, the defendant must be competent, have notice of the nature of the charge against him, and understand the consequences of a guilty plea, including the nature of the constitutional protection he is waiving. Id. at 364-65. To understand the consequences of a guilty plea, the defendant must know the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged. United States v. Guerra , 94 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996).
The state court records establish that Griffie's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. In documents signed by Griffie, his attorney, the prosecutor and the state trial judge, Griffie acknowledged that he understood the nature of the charge against him, which carried a possible penalty of 5-99 years or life in prison. In a negotiated plea, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of 25 years. Griffie conceded that he was mentally competent and was aware of his rights, including the right to a jury trial, which he chose to waive. He also stated that: his guilty plea was entered freely and voluntarily without persuasion, and that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. The state trial judge found that Griffie's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that the evidence substantiated the admission of guilt.
"Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); Matthew v. Johnson , 201 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2000). The representations made by the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at a plea hearing, as well as the findings made by the trial judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier to any subsequent collateral attack. Id. at 73-74; Montoya v. Johnson , 226 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2000). Plea documents signed by the defendant are entitled to "great evidentiary weight." See United States v. Abreo , 30 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1994).
Ordinarily, a defendant will not be heard to refute his testimony given under oath when pleading guilty. United States v. Cervantes , 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998). The statements of a defendant at a guilty plea hearing can be contradicted only by specific factual allegations with independent indicia of the likely merit of his contentions, such as the affidavit of a reliable third person. Davis v. Butler , 825 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Fuller , 769 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1985). His own statements are not alone sufficient to vitiate his guilty plea. See Davis v. Butler , 825 F.2d at 894; United States v. Frontero , 452 F.2d 406, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1971). Griffie offers no evidence to substantiate his claim that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. Although the state habeas courts did not make an express finding regarding this issue, their implicit determination that Griffie's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered is not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To obtain habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate that his counsel was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order to establish that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, a convicted defendant must show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland 466 U.S. at 687-88. In so doing, a convicted defendant must carry the burden of proof and overcome a strong presumption that the conduct of his trial counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689-91. The courts are extremely deferential in scrutinizing the performance of counsel and make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. Id. at 689. Tactical and strategic decisions of counsel, based on informed and reasoned practical judgment, will not be second-guessed. Ransom v. Johnson , 126 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1997).
"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 691. "Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution." Id. at 692. In the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
The mere possibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to prove prejudice. Johnson v. Cockrell , 301 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1901, 155 L.Ed.2d 830 (2003). The petitioner must prove that counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Lockhart v. Fretwell , 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of the trial, the petitioner must show a "reasonable probability" that the jury would have otherwise harbored a reasonable doubt concerning guilt. United States v. Mullins , 315 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2002).
In making its findings on Griffie's state habeas application, the state trial judge considered the affidavit of Griffie's counsel, Edward Camara. That affidavit establishes that Camara thoroughly investigated the facts, including reviewing of the prosecutor's file and interviewing potential witnesses, family members, and codefendants. He did discuss the facts of the case with Griffie and provided him with police reports and witness statements. Camara denies telling Griffie that the victim had identified him. He did state that a codefendant had agreed to testify against Griffie at trial. Camara also advised Griffie that he could have a jury trial and be sentenced by a jury, and discussed the pros and cons of that option. He further testified that the only contradictory statements were those of codefendants who attempted to minimize their own involvement. Griffie also made a written statement to police. Based upon all of these considerations, Griffie chose to plead guilty.
The state trial judge adopted the testimony of Camara in his findings." . . . [A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). Griffie has provided no evidence controverting the findings of the state courts. The determination by the state habeas courts that Griffie was not denied the effective assistance of counsel is not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law.
Recommendation
It is, therefore, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that Griffie's Section 2254 habeas application be DENIED.
Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Appeal/Object
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation on all parties either by (1) certified mail, return receipt requested, or (2) facsimile if authorization to do so is on file with the Clerk. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., any party who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation within 10 days after being served with a copy unless this time period is modified by the district court. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties and the Magistrate Judge. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. See Thomas v. Am , 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Additionally, any failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in this Memorandum and Recommendation within 10 days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association , 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).
ORDER
All matters for which this case was referred to the Magistrate Judge having been considered and acted upon;
It is ORDERED that the above-entitled and numbered cause be, and it hereby is, RETURNED to the District Court for all purposes.