Opinion
Motion No: 2010-11108 Attorney Registration No. 4026183M123829
08-15-2011
In the Matter of Charlotte T. Watson, an attorney and counselor-at-law. Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District, petitioner; v. Charlotte T. Watson, respondent.
, P.J.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO
REINALDO E. RIVERA
PETER B. SKELOS
MARK C. DILLON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ON MOTION
Motion by the Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District: (1) to suspend the respondent from the practice of law, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.4(l)(1)(i),(ii), and (iii), upon a finding that she is guilty of professional misconduct immediately threatening the public interest based upon her failure to cooperate with the lawful demands of the Grievance Committee, substantial admissions under oath that she committed acts of professional misconduct and/or other uncontroverted evidence of professional misconduct; (2) to authorize the Grievance Committee to institute and prosecute a disciplinary proceeding based upon the allegations set forth in a verified petition dated November 18, 2010; and (3) to refer the issues raised to a Special Referee to hear and report. The respondent was admitted to the Bar at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on March 13, 2002.
Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it is
ORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,
ORDERED that pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.4(l)(1)(i),(ii), and (iii), the respondent, Charlotte T. Watson, is immediately suspended from the practice of law in the State of New York, pending further order of the Court; and it is further,
ORDERED that the respondent, Charlotte T. Watson, shall promptly comply with this Court's rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended, and resigned attorneys (see 22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,
ORDERED that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, during the period of suspension and until further order of this Court, the respondent, Charlotte T. Watson, is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) practicing law in any form, either as principal or agent, clerk, or employee of another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission, or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding herself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and it is further,
ORDERED that the Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District is hereby authorized to institute and prosecute a disciplinary proceeding in this Court, against Charlotte T. Watson, based on the verified petition dated November 18, 2010; and it is further,
ORDERED that Gary L. Casella, Chief Counsel, Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District, Crosswest Office Center, 399 Knollwood Road, Suite 200, White Plains, N.Y. 10603, is hereby appointed as attorney for the petitioner in such proceeding; and it is further,
ORDERED that within 20 days after service upon her of a copy of this order, the respondent, Charlotte T. Watson, shall serve an answer upon the Special Referee and the Grievance Committee, and file the original answer with this Court; and it is further,
ORDERED that the issues raised by the verified petition and any answer thereto are referred to Honorable Arthur J. Cooperman, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court, Queens County, 115-23 Grosvenor Road, Kew Gardens, New York 11418, as Special Referee to hear and report together with his findings on the issues, and to submit a report within 60 days after the conclusion of the hearing or the submission of post-hearing memoranda; and it is further,
ORDERED that if the respondent, Charlotte T. Watson, has been issued a secure pass by the Office of Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith to the issuing agency and the respondent shall certify to the same in her affidavit of compliance pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.10(f).
We find, prima facie, that the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct immediately threatening the public interest based upon her failure to cooperate with the lawful demands of the Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District (hereinafter the Grievance Committee), substantial admissions she made under oath that she committed acts of professional misconduct, and other uncontroverted evidence of professional misconduct.
Complaint of Joseph Attarien
In or about March 2010, the Grievance Committee received a complaint of professional misconduct against the respondent from Joseph Attarien (hereinafter the Attarien complaint). Mr. Attarien alleged that he is the principal of Queens Property Management Corporation (hereinafter QPMC), which is the named plaintiff in a Queens County Supreme Court action entitled Queens Property Management Corp. v. Banks. That action seeks the return of a $55,000 down payment, which was tendered by Attarien, to be held in escrow by the respondent, in connection with Attarien's intended purchase of real property from the respondent's client, Carolyn Banks. While both the respondent and Banks initially appeared in the action, with the respondent serving as counsel for both herself and Banks, they each thereafter failed to file an answer, resulting in a default judgment in favor of QPMC. Subsequent to entry of the judgment, QPMC's attorneys, Ginsburg & Misk, attempted, without success, to contact the respondent and recover the monies from her escrow account.
The Grievance Committee's investigation into the Attarien complaint revealed that, on or about September 23, 2005, Carolyn Banks entered into a contract for the sale of residential real estate owned by her and located at 153-26 109th Road, Jamaica, New York, to QPMC. Under the terms of the contract, the parties agreed upon a purchase price of $549,000, of which $55,000 was entrusted to the respondent as a down payment. The $55,000 was deposited into a Client Benefit Trust Account (hereinafter CBTA) created for the benefit of Carolyn Banks, which was linked to the respondent's Master Escrow Checking Account at Hudson Valley Bank (hereinafter HVB). As the transaction progressed, problems arose and, on or about November 8, 2005, the respondent forwarded a letter to QPMC's attorneys declaring the seller to be "in default." On or about November 9, 2005, QPMC's attorneys objected in writing. In a reply dated November 11, 2005, the respondent wrote:
"In any event, with regards to my obligations as escrow agent, I consider your letter of November 9, 2005 to be an objection to the release of the down payment to Ms. Banks. Accordingly the funds will continue to be held in escrow."In or about late December 2005, the respondent began preparations to close on a sale of the subject property from Banks to another purchaser, Village Plaza Homes, Inc. (hereinafter VPH). That closing occurred on or about January 11, 2006.
On or about April 7, 2006, QPMC instituted suit in Supreme Court, Queens County, against VPH, Banks and the respondent seeking, inter alia, the return of the $55,000 down payment entrusted to the respondent in connection with the Banks to QPMC contract. In lieu of filing answers in the litigation, the respondent and Banks engaged in motion practice that sought to cancel the lis pendens filed by QPMC pursuant to CPLR § 6514, as well as to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR §3211. These motions were denied. By order dated April 24, 2009, the Supreme Court, Queens County, granted QPMC judgment on default against the respondent and Banks. Thereafter, on November 5, 2009, a money judgment was entered against the respondent and Banks in the sum $71,809.95 following an inquest. That judgment appears never to have been vacated or satisfied.
Account records obtained by the Grievance Committee for the respondent's attorney escrow account at HVB reveal that the $55,000 entrusted to the respondent on behalf of QPMC only remained intact until September 29, 2006, despite the fact that the respondent knew or should have known that ownership of the funds was in dispute and that litigation regarding its disposition had been initiated. In fact, the funds were completely depleted by July 2007. Notwithstanding the respondent's testimony on June 7, 2010 that disbursement of the funds was made to Banks, the respondent's account records reflect that more than $11,600 was paid directly to the respondent as attorneys fees in connection with her representation of Banks.
On March 26, 2010, the Attarien complaint was forwarded to the respondent, under a cover letter requesting that she submit a written response within 10 days. At the respondent's request, the response date was adjourned to April 15, 2010. On April 14, 2010, the respondent forwarded to the Grievance Committee a completed background questionnaire, along with a cover letter, wherein she stated that she had just learned of the judgment underlying the Attarien complaint and that she intended to make a motion to vacate the judgment. The respondent requested that the Grievance Committee afford her an opportunity to pursue her legal remedies prior to submitting her response to the complaint. By letter dated April 16, 2010, the Grievance Committee advised the respondent that no further adjournment would be granted. That same letter requested additional information from the respondent regarding the Attarien complaint, on or before May 3, 2010. When no response was received by May 3, 2010, another request was sent to the respondent via certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter was returned to the Grievance Committee "unclaimed." On May 18, 2010, the respondent was personally served with two judicial subpoenas returnable June 1, 2010, along with a letter, dated May 10, 2010, memorializing the history of communications. The respondent's time to appear was subsequently adjourned until June 7, 2010.
During her examination under oath on June 7, 2010, the respondent acknowledged that she still had not addressed the allegations of the Attarien complaint, either verbally or in writing, and that she had not brought to the examination her case file or copies of any bank account records. The respondent admitted that some or all of the $55,000 down payment entrusted to her was disbursed from her Master Escrow Checking Account, pursuant to the default provision of the contract of sale, without any permission or authority having been obtained from QPMC; its principal, Joseph Attarien; the attorney for QPMC; and/or a court of law. The respondent also admitted that she had been sued by QPMC for the return of the down payment. Although the respondent maintained that she had, in fact, filed an answer to the litigation, she was unable to provide proof. Moreover, despite the intentions expressed in her April 14, 2010, letter to the Grievance Committee relative to the default judgment entered against her, the respondent had not yet moved to vacate it. At the conclusion of the respondent's testimony, it was agreed that she would provide the Grievance Committee with all documentation previously requested and/or subpoenaed, including but not limited to her original case file and her escrow records, as well as a written answer to the Attarien complaint, by June 14, 2010. The respondent subsequently received an adjournment until June 15, 2010.
While the respondent did, in fact, appear at the Grievance Committee's offices on June 15, 2010, and delivered her answer to the Attarien complaint, along with copies of some of her attorney escrow account statements, she failed to deliver other documentation requested. A review of the material provided by the respondent revealed that more than 13 months of banking records, including the documents pertaining to the disbursement of funds held in connection with the Banks to QPMC transaction, were missing. By letter dated June 16, 2010, the Grievance Committee identified the items that had not been provided. On June 30, 2010, additional documents were received at the Grievance Committee's offices. However, a review of the documents revealed that some eight months of banking records were still missing. No further communication was received from the respondent after June 30, 2010.
Complaint of Marie Houston
In or about April 2010, the Grievance Committee received a complaint of professional misconduct against the respondent from Marie Houston (hereinafter the Houston complaint). Ms. Houston alleged that she had retained the respondent as her matrimonial attorney on or June 6, 2006. Ms. Houston had agreed to pay the respondent whatever costs were incurred and had paid the respondent a $1,000 retainer fee. On or about June 27, 2007, the respondent prepared and submitted a motion for summary judgment to the court. Thereafter, in or about July 2007, Ms. Houston's husband signed over the deed to the marital residence to Ms. Houston, who tendered it to the respondent for filing. However, the respondent refused to file the deed, advising that she would not do so unless Ms. Houston paid her additional monies. The case ultimately went to trial in February 2008. After the court issued an order in August 2008, and Ms. Houston paid all the court/transcription fees she owed at the time, she provided the respondent with the transcript and order so that she could conclude the divorce action. On several occasions thereafter, Ms. Houston tried to contact the respondent about concluding the matter, without success.
The Houston complaint was forwarded to the respondent on April 7, 2010, along with a background questionnaire, under a cover letter requesting that the respondent submit an answer to both within 10 days of receipt. The letter advised the respondent that a failure to timely respond constitutes "professional misconduct," independent of the underlying merits. When no response was received by April 27, 2010, a second request was sent to the respondent via certified mail, return receipt requested. However, the letter was returned to the Grievance Committee "unclaimed."
On May 18, 2010, the respondent was personally served with two judicial subpoenas returnable June 1, 2010, along with a letter, dated May 10, 2010, memorializing the history of communications. The respondent's time to appear was subsequently adjourned until June 7, 2010.
During her examination under oath on June 7, 2010, the respondent acknowledged that she still had not addressed the allegations in the Houston complaint, either verbally or in writing, and that she had not brought her case file as requested. Moreover, the respondent testified that, although she had received the deed to the marital residence, she had not recorded the deed inasmuch as Ms. Houston had never paid her the fees or costs required to do so. Since that time, the Houston matter has lain dormant, in the absence of any further payment from Ms. Houston. The respondent admittedly failed to make a motion to withdraw from the matrimonial action and is now exercising a retaining lien on the Houston file. The respondent agreed to furnish a written answer to the Houston complaint by June 14, 2010. After a further extension until June 15, 2010, the respondent finally delivered her written answer to the Grievance Committee.
Complaint of Jamal Murphy, Esq.
In or about August 2010, the Grievance Committee received a complaint of professional misconduct against the respondent from Jamal Murphy, Esq. (hereinafter the Murphy complaint). Mr. Murphy alleged that, in or about February 2010, he began representing Carmen E. Wilson in her prospective purchase of a cooperative apartment at 400 Lincoln Place, Brooklyn, N.Y. The respondent represented the prospective seller, Andre Daughtry. In or about May 2010, Mr. Murphy was advised by Nakia Rosario, a Bank of America Richmond Centralized 1st Mortgage Fulfillment Loan Representative, that the respondent had called Bank of America and misrepresented herself as being Ms. Wilson's attorney (as well as Bank of America's closing attorney), in an attempt to gain access to personal and private information about Ms. Wilson. The respondent's actions were carried out without Mr. Murphy's knowledge and/or permission. When contacted by the Grievance Committee, Nakia Rosario corroborated Mr. Murphy's allegations. The respondent provided the Grievance Committee with nothing more than a general demurrer.
Failure to Re-Register
At her examination under oath on June 7, 2010, the respondent admitted that her attorney registration for 2010-2011 had been due for renewal on or before April 21, 2010, but that she had not yet completed the process. Although the respondent was directed to re-register as an attorney forthwith, she failed to do so until on or about December 13, 2010. The proposed petition annexed to the Grievance Committee's motion contains 16 charges of professional misconduct alleging, inter alia, conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud and/or misrepresentation, misappropriation, failing to safeguard funds, failing to satisfy or otherwise seek relief from a monetary judgment, failing to pay monies to a third party entitled to receive same, failing to cooperate with the lawful demands of the Grievance Committee, failing to seek the lawful objectives of a client, failing to carry out a contract of employment, prejudicing and/or damaging a client during the course of the professional relationship, neglecting a legal matter entrusted to her, and failing to timely re -register as an attorney. Although the respondent opposes an interim suspension, and denies any failure to cooperate with the Grievance Committee, she admits that she unilaterally declared a default in connection with QPMC/Attarien's failure to close. Without regard to her letter agreeing to hold the down payment in escrow, the respondent acknowledges that she disbursed the QPMC/Attarien down payment "at the direction and with the consent of [her client]." The respondent does not address either the lawsuit initiated by QPMC and/or her failure to satisfy or vacate the judgment entered against her. The respondent also admits that, in the absence of payment, she failed to complete the services for which Ms. Houston retained her. She asserts, without more, that her client "discharged" her. Finally, the respondent denies that she contacted Bank of America in any capacity other than as attorney for Mr. Daughtry. She states that the Grievance Committee's assertions to the contrary are founded on "hearsay."
Based upon the foregoing, the Grievance Committee's motion is granted, the respondent is immediately suspended from the practice of law, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.4(l)(1)(i),(ii), and (iii), pending further order of this Court, the Grievance Committee is authorized to institute and prosecute a disciplinary proceeding against her, and the matter is referred to a Special Referee to hear and report.
PRUDENTI, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, SKELOS and DILLON, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Matthew G. Kiernan
Clerk of the Court