Opinion
SC: 164930
05-19-2023
GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner-Appellee, v. David CHARRON, Respondent-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Zahra, J. (concurring).
I write only to highlight that contrary to respondent's claim, this Court does not derive its power to regulate and discipline attorneys from the Legislature, or more specifically, from § 904 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.904. Rather, Const. 1963, art. 6, § 5 vests in this Court—not the Legislature—exclusive authority to regulate and discipline the members of the bar of this state. Grievance Administrator v Lopatin , 462 Mich. 235, 241, 612 N.W.2d 120 (2000). If the Legislature enacted a statute of limitations that applied to attorney-discipline proceedings, it would raise serious separation-of-powers concerns. While respondent claims that the Legislature did just that when it enacted MCL 600.5813, that statute applies only to "personal actions." Attorney-discipline proceedings do not qualify as "personal actions" because they are not " ‘brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of a contract or to recover for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for an injury to the person or property.’ " Attorney General v Harkins , 257 Mich App 564, 570, 669 N.W.2d 296 (2003), quoting 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, § 32, p. 744, overruled on other grounds by Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health Servs , 472 Mich. 263, 283-285, 696 N.W.2d 646 (2005).