Moreover, "'[a] district court has the power to enforce summarily, on motion, a settlement agreement reached in a case that was pending before it.'" BCM Dev., LLC v. Oprandy, 490 F. App'x 409, 409 (2d Cir. 2013); accord, e.g., Goldstein v. Solucorp Indus., Ltd., 11 Civ. 6227, 2017 WL 1078739 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2017), R. & R. adopted, 2017 WL 1067792 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017); Grgurev v. Licul, 15 Civ. 9805, 2016 WL 6652741 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016). II. THE EMAILED OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE BETWEEN COUNSEL FOR SCHEINMANN AND DYKSTRA FORMED A BINDING SETTLEMENT CONTRACT
See Benicorp Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Med. Health Card Sys., Inc., 447 F.Supp.2d 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); accord Grgurev v. Licul, No. 15-CV-09805 (GHW), 2016 WL 6652741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016).
Grgurev v. Licul, No. 15 Civ. 9805 (GHW), 2016 WL 6652741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016). Settlement agreements are contracts and therefore are analyzed under principles of contract law.
” Grgurev v. Licul, 2016 WL 6652741, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted) (quoting Nieves v. Cmty. Choice Health Plan of Westchester, Inc., 2011 WL 5531018, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011)).
The cases cited by Zaful in support of its argument on the third Winston factor are easily distinguished. In Grgurev v. Licul, No. 15-CV-9805 (GHW), 2016 WL 6652741 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016), for example, "none of the initial emails exchanged . . . detailed — or even mentioned — the scope of release." Id. at *6
"The party seeking to enforce a purported settlement bears the burden of proving that such a binding and enforceable agreement exists." Grgurev v. Licul , No. 15-CV-9805 (GHW), 2016 WL 6652741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016). Summary order (quoting Meetings & Expositions Inc. v. Tandy Corp. , 490 F.2d 714, 717 (2d Cir. 1974) ).
“To have partial performance, there must be some actual performance of the contract, such that the party asserting the existence of the contract conferred something of value upon the party disclaiming existence of the contract, which the latter party accepted.” Grgurev v. Licul, 2016 WL 6652741, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted) (quoting Nieves v. Community Choice Health Plan of Westchester, Inc., 2011 WL 5531018, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011)). This factor is neutral on the facts here.
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017). “The party seeking to enforce a purported settlement agreement bears the burden of proving that such a binding and enforceable agreement exists.” Grgurev v. Licul, No. 15-CV-9805, 2016 WL 6652741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016); see also Fleming v. Ponziani, 24 N.Y.2d 105, 111 (1969) (“[P]laintiff, in undertaking to prove the contract upon which his action is based, had cast upon him the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was a good and valid contract . . . .”). As Judge Reyes pointed out, the Second Circuit has not decided whether federal common law or New York law applies when determining the enforceability of oral settlement agreements in federal court, but it has concluded that there is no material difference between the two.
, they subsequently executed the written Settlement Agreement and Release memorializing the same. “As with any contract, a settlement agreement is binding . . . if there is an offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual assent, and intent to be bound.” Grgurev v. Licul, No. 1:15-CV-9805 (GHW), 2016 WL 6652741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016). All of these criteria have been satisfied in this case.
The party seeking to enforce the purported agreement bears the burden of proving that the parties entered into a binding agreement. See Grgurev v. Licul, 15-cv-9805 (GHW), 2016 WL 6652741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that the parties agreed to all material terms when their counsel submitted a revised draft proposal signed by Grace Macnow to Plaintiff's counsel on November 1, 2019.