Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC

11 Citing cases

  1. Great Normandy LLC v. 4 Queens Homes Inc.

    22 CV 1624 (RPK) (CLP) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023)

    ; Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F.Supp.2d 57, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing to Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. 41-50 78th St. Corp. and entering a default judgment against the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance where plaintiff alleged the NYSDTF's interests were subordinate to plaintiff's).

  2. United States v. Ferri

    19-CV-6921 (CJS) (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Had [ ] the defendant[ ] believed that [its] liens were not subordinate to the [P]laintiff's, [it] would have set forth the[ ] argument in an answer.” Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F.Supp.2d 57, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for default judgment against Midland and Mariner is granted.

  3. Gustavia Home, LLC v. Vaz

    17-CV-5307 (ILG) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2019)   Cited 10 times
    Excusing incomplete compliance with Rule 55.2(c) when plaintiff provided fair notice of the judgment sought

    Nevertheless, courts have held that, even where the mortgagors have responded to the complaint, appointment of a referee is appropriate where the mortgagors "have not produced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial relating to the [m]ortgage foreclosure." Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F.Supp.2d 57, 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); see also U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Dingman, No. 16-CV-1384 (CS), 2016 WL 6902480, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) ("Although section 1321 contemplates a situation where the defendant fails to answer or the right of the plaintiff is admitted, because the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff based on an undisputed showing of default on the mortgage, the procedural posture of the case now is as if the right of Plaintiff has been admitted"). Therefore, the appointment of a referee is appropriate to oversee the sale of the property and to compute the amount owed.

  4. Karmely v. Wertheimer

    737 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2013)   Cited 20 times
    Discussing romanettes in contract language

    32(c), and to deliver to the lender copies of insurance policies, Pledge Agreement ¶ 5(b). Having separately stated requirements to make payments and to perform obligations not requiring payments is not unusual. See, e.g., Abundance Partners LP v. Quamtel, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y.2012); Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F.Supp.2d 57, 60 (N.D.N.Y.2011); In re Cabrini Medical Center, No. 09–14398, 2009 WL 7193578, at *9 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009). We note that subparagraph 7(b) of the Intercreditor Agreement uses the wording “Monetary and Non–Monetary Defaults,” indicating the understanding of the parties to that agreement that there were two distinct categories of defaults, one concerning monetary defaults.

  5. Blue Castle (Cayman) Ltd. v. 1767 TP Ave LLC

    22 Civ. 9577 (DEH) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2024)

    “In defending against a foreclosure action, defendant must provide evidence in admissible form[;] mere conclusions or unsubstantiated assertions are insufficient.” Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F.Supp.2d 57, 62 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).

  6. United States v. Scott

    1:19-cv-1621 (BKS/DJS) (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2022)

    Because the amended complaint contains no allegations with respect to the People of the State of New York or NYSDTF, the Court similarly denies Plaintiff's motion for default judgment to the extent it seeks to extinguish any rights those Defendants may have with respect to the Property. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] party's default is deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability.”); cf. Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F.Supp.2d 57, 65-67 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting motion for default judgment against NYSDTF where the complaint contained “well-pleaded allegations of nominal liability-i.e., that any judgments the defaulting defendant may have against [the mortgagor and personal guarantor] are subordinate to plaintiff's”). D. Monies Owed

  7. U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. v. Dingman

    No. 16-CV-1384 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016)   Cited 24 times
    Appointing a referee to calculate damages and sell the property after awarding summary judgment to a foreclosing plaintiff

    Although section 1321 contemplates a situation where the defendant fails to answer or the right of the plaintiff is admitted, because the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff based on an undisputed showing of default on the mortgage, the procedural posture of the case now is as if the right of Plaintiff has been admitted. See Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (despite answering complaint and opposing summary judgment, defendants had "not produced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial relating to the Mortgage foreclosure," and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a) and RPAPL section 1321, court "appoint[ed] a Referee to ascertain and compute the amount due to plaintiff under the Note and Mortgage").

  8. One W. Bank v. Lynch

    14-CV-158 (JG) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2014)   Cited 4 times

    To defeat a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of fraud, a borrower must come forward with an "affirmative showing" that includes "credible evidence." Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted). Lynch's unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to establish a defense to summary judgment based on fraud.

  9. UFP Atl. Div., LLC v. Route 299 Retail Ctr., LLC

    1:12-cv-00053(MAD/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden and is entitled to an entry of default judgment. See Bank of America, N.A. v. 3301 Atlantic, LLC, No. 10-CV-5204, 2012 WL 2529196, *14 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (holding that "[c]ourts have found that entry of a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 is appropriate where the complaint alleges 'nominal liability—i.e., that any judgments the Defaulting Defendants may have against [the debtor], if liens on the mortgaged property, are subordinate to the [plaintiff's] lien'" (quotation and other citations omitted); see also Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F. supp. 2d 57, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); First Trade Union Bank v. Formerly 8th St., LLC, No. 10-CV-5284, 2011 WL 3877077, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2011); Debcon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Orange Realty Corp., No. 99-CV-270, 2005 WL 1606393, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2005) (citation omitted). The Court notes that Plaintiff "is not seeking an award of money damages" against Defendant M&C. See Dkt. No. 75-1 at ¶ 21. Plaintiff is merely seeking a judgment that Defendant M&C, "and all persons claiming by, through, or under it subsequent to the filing of the notice of pendency of this action, be forever barred and foreclosed of all estate, right, claim, interest, lien, title or equity of redemption of, in, and to the mortgaged premises being foreclosed herein, and each and every part and parcel thereof."

  10. Bank of Am., N.A. v. 3301 Atl., LLC

    10-CV-5204 (FB) (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 29, 2012)   Cited 47 times
    Indicating that neither a date nor notarization is required

    P. 55 is appropriate where the complaint alleges "nominal liability - i.e., that any judgments the Defaulting Defendants may have against [the debtor], if liens on the mortgaged property, are subordinate to the [plaintiff's] lien." Christiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Dalton, 2009 WL 4016507, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2009); see also Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, 817 F. Supp. 2d 57, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); First Trade Union Bank v. Formerly 8th St., LLC, 2011 WL 3877077 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2011); Debcon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Orange Realty Corp., 2005 WL 1606393 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2005); Fed. Home Mortg. Corp. v. 41-50 78th St. Corp., 1997 WL 177862 (E.D.N.Y. April 4, 1997). The case law does not address the precise factual situation in this case as to June Siegel, a defendant who is involved in a state court case and has placed a notice of pendency on the property.