Opinion
C. A. 5:22-2743-JFA-KDW
01-26-2024
Jeremiah Martin Gregory, Plaintiff, v. Jay Koon; Mr. Singleton; Captain Currence; Dr. Darby; Correctional Officer Stevens; Correctional Officer Bookman; Sargent Jenkins-Merritt; Deputy Hall; Correctional Officer Scott; Correctional Officer Pough; Correctional Officer Durr; Lieutenant Hare; Lieutenant Felder; Correctional Officer Murphy; Correctional Officer Gantt; Correctional Officer Pickman; Nurse Colon; Lieutenant Bailey; Lieutenant Treaster; Nurse Asia; Nurse Mr. Martin; Nurse Ms. Martin; Correctional Officer Oliver; Nurse Kristy; Nurse JT; Nurse Melissa; Nurse Lockhart; Health Admin Lisa; Nurse Smith; Nurse Practitioner Beth; Ms. Emily Scott; Lexington County Sheriff Dept.; and Wellpath, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jeremiah Martin Gregory (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action against Defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 24, 2023, Defendants Jay Koon, Mr. Singleton, Captain Currence, Officer Stevens, Officer Bookman, Sargent Jenkins-Merritt, Deputy Hall, Officer Pough, Officer Durr, Lieutenant Hare, Lieutenant Felder, Officer Murphy, Officer Gantt, Lieutenant Bailey, Lieutenant Treaster, Emily Scott, and Lexington County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the LCDC Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 124. That same day Defendants Emily Scott, Nurse Practitioner Beth, Dr. Darby, Dr. Jane Doe, Nurse Colon,Nurse Asia, Nurse Mr. Martin, Nurse Ms. Martin, Nurse Kristy, Nurse JT, Nurse Melissa, Nurse Lockhart, Nurse Smith, and Wellpath (collectively, the “Wellpath Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 125. Plaintiff filed Responses to both Motions. ECF Nos. 131; 144. The Wellpath Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 145. Plaintiff named two other Defendants, Officer Pickman and Officer Oliver, in his Complaint. On October 6, 2022, both USM Forms-285 for Defendants Pickman and Oliver were returned unexecuted because these Defendants were unable to be identified. See ECF Nos. 19; 20. Plaintiff has not otherwise attempted to effect service on these individuals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), this Magistrate Judge is authorized to review pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. This Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) is now ready for review.
In their Motion, Defendants believe Plaintiff's reference to Nurse Coland refers to Nurse Colon, who he also alternatively names as Health Admin Lisa. ECF No. 125. Plaintiff did not respond to this fact; therefore, the undersigned assumes Nurse Coland should be spelled Nurse Colon, and is the same individual identified as Health Admin Lisa.
In their Motion, Defendants explain that Nurse Ms. Martin may have been improperly identified by Plaintiff as Nurse Mr. Martin.
I. Factual Background
The following recitation of facts have been derived from Plaintiff's Complaint, unless otherwise noted, and the undersigned has considered any disputed facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Lexington County Detention Center (the “LCDC”) during the events giving rise to Plaintiff allegations regarding a violation of his constitutional rights by Defendants.On or about June 1, 2022, Plaintiff slipped and fell due to “soap and water on the floor with no wet floor sign.” ECF No. 1 at 11; See Deposition of Jeremiah M. Gregory, 50:15-20, attached as Exhibit 1 to the LCDC Defs.' Brief, ECF No. 124-1. Plaintiff alleges he injured his back when he fell and has felt tingling and numbness in his neck, legs, and feet and tingling in his left elbow since this incident occurred. ECF No. 1 at 14-15. During Plaintiff's deposition, he further explained that on June 1, 2022, after MedPass left his pod, he was moving toward the shower and slipped in soapy water. See Gregory Dep., 50:15-20. Defendant Nurse Kristy came over to assist Plaintiff and brought him a wheelchair to use. Gregory Dep. 50:19-22. Plaintiff alleges Defendants have refused him outside medical treatment, medical devices, and medication since June 1, 2022. ECF No. 1 at 17. Plaintiff alleges that the medical staff and prison officials have treated him harshly or otherwise ignored his requests for medical attention. ECF No. 1 at 17. Plaintiff alleges he was also blocked from sending electronic grievances via the kiosks in the prison. ECF No. 1 at 18; Gregory Dep. 63:5-10. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he was punished for seeking medical attention and/or administrative help. ECF No. 1 at 15; Gregory Dep. 57:1-25; 58:20-25.
As a procedural matter, Plaintiff sought and was granted the ability to amend his Complaint on or about December 16, 2022. See ECF No. 63. However, Plaintiff did not seek to amend or clarify additional claims and did not attach a proposed amended complaint to his filing. Instead, he sought to substitute or correct the names of three Defendants. See ECF No. 59. Accordingly, the undersigned will cite to his original Complaint in discussing the factual background comprising Plaintiff's allegations.
Defendants disagree that Plaintiff did not receive adequate medical care or attention related to his fall. Further, the LCDC Defendants dispute that Plaintiff was wholly prevented from filing grievances. The LCDC Defendants have provided exhibits in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. These exhibits include: (1) Plaintiff's deposition; (2) the affidavit of Major Robert Singleton, jail administrator for LCDC; (3) the affidavit of Defendant Brian Currence, Captain of LCDC; (4) incident reports during Plaintiff's incarceration at LCDC; and (5) grievances sent to LCDC staff by Plaintiff during his incarceration. See ECF Nos. 124-1; 124-2; 124-3. The Wellpath Defendants have also provided exhibits, including the affidavit of Clarence Darby, a physician's assistant for Wellpath; the affidavit of Defendant Kristen Marzol; and Plaintiff's medical records. See ECF Nos. 125-1; 125-2; 125-3; 125-4; 145-1.
Attached to Plaintiff's Response to the LCDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are two affidavits. One affidavit appears to be a statement signed by several inmates indicating that Plaintiff was blocked from the ability to submit grievances. See Exhibit A attached to Pl.'s Br. at 131-1. The other affidavit is signed by an individual named Gylian Long, a roommate of Plaintiff's at the LCDC, who states that Plaintiff has had daily struggles and complaints of pain, that Plaintiff's room has an intercom that is ineffective, and that he has personally witnessed problems with legal mail possibly being opened before Plaintiff was able to review the mail. See Affidavit of Gylian W. Long, attached to Pl.'s Br. at 131-1 at 2. As for his response to the Wellpath Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff attached a copy of their filing and annotates what he believes are questions or facts which Plaintiff disputes, either with respect to the affidavits filed by Wellpath, or their recitations of facts in the Motion.
II. Standard of Review
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Discussion
A. LCDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff filed suit against the LCDC Defendants pursuant to § 1983 for violations relating to the alleged lack of proper medical care associated with a slip and fall incident at LCDC. He further alleges the LCDC Defendants blocked his access to filing grievances on the kiosk at the detention center and makes generalized complaints related to his conditions of confinement, such as that a notary refused to notarize his paperwork and that he was rehoused for complaining about the provided medical treatment. The LCDC Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate based on several grounds: (1) immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment; (2) lack of personal involvement on the part of the LCDC Defendants; (3) lack of a stated cognizable claim against the LCDC Defendants; (4) failure to state a claim under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the “SCTCA”; and (5) the LCDC Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 124.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The LCDC Defendants argue they are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment as to any claims brought against them in their official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. Plaintiff does not offer an argument in response to the LCDC Defendants' argument that they are entitled to immunity for claims brought against them in their official capacity. The undersigned agrees that the Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims against state actors in their official capacity. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of the LCDC Defendants as to any of Plaintiff's claims brought against them in their official capacity pursuant to § 1983.
2. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims
The LCDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are legally deficient. First, the LCDC Defendants argue that they were not personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations Plaintiff sets forth in his Complaint. They are argue liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). The LCDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish that they were involved with any of the medical care Plaintiff received. The LCDC Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's generalized complaints regarding conditions of confinement do not establish any conduct that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff's Response to the LCDC Defendants' Motion is brief, and he argues only that these Defendants did not provide him a reason for placing him in confinement, he was denied access to the courts when a notary refused to notarize his documents, and that the blocking of his access to the kiosk grievance system was unconstitutional. Pl.'s Br. at 1-2; ECF No. 131.
The government is obligated to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). A pretrial detainee's claim based upon deliberate indifference to a medical need is properly brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1988)). A pretrial detainee's claim must be evaluated under an objective standard. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). The Fourth Circuit outlines what a pretrial detainee plaintiff must allege to state such a claim: (1) he had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had the condition and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed. Short, 87 F.4th at 611. Under this standard, a plaintiff need not show “that the defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee's serious medical condition and consciously disregarded the risk that their action or failure to act would result in harm.” Id. Instead, it is sufficient to show that the defendant's action or inaction was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)). However, it is still not enough to allege a defendant negligently or accidentally “failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12.
Plaintiff does not allege his medical injury posed a substantial risk of serious harm, but even were this court to assume that this fact was established, in Plaintiff's Response, he does not argue or otherwise refute the LCDC Defendants' contention that they were not involved in or responsible for the administration of Plaintiff's medical care. Therefore, it appears Plaintiff intended to bring this claim against the Wellpath Defendants. Nonetheless, Defendants have brought forth evidence establishing that upon Plaintiff's fall in or near the shower, LCDC officers responded promptly to provide him assistance. Indeed, in Plaintiff's own deposition, he explained that Defendants Darr and Pough “picked me up off the ground and placed me in a wheelchair, against my recommendation.” Gregory Dep. 36:11-15. He further testified that after being put in a wheelchair, he was wheeled to medical observation. Gregory Dep. 50:21-25-51:1. Plaintiff also confirmed that a nurse attended to him immediately after the fall. Gregory Dep. 50:21. In other words, Plaintiff's own testimony supports the LCDC Defendants' version of facts that they did not ignore Plaintiff's need to be assessed for treatment, that they provided him assistance, and that a medical provider came to assess Plaintiff's condition. Plaintiff does not otherwise bring forth any evidence to establish that the LCDC Defendants failed to act to appropriately address his condition.
Plaintiff seems to allude that he did not receive proper care. However, disagreements in medical care do not amount to a § 1983 violation. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, it is clear from the evidence in the record that Plaintiff was attended to soon after he fell, and his medical records establish that he received consistent medical care related to this fall. To bring a denial of medical treatment claim against supervisory defendants, one must show that these named officials were “personally involved” with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with treatment or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, (1994). Here, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff was not denied medical treatment by any of the LCDC Defendants, whether they were officers or supervisory officials. While Plaintiff refutes the type of treatment he did receive and suggests, for example, that he needed an MRI, Plaintiff has not established that the failure to provide him the care he expected rises to the level of a constitutional violation, or that any of the LCDC Defendants were responsibly for determining the type of care Plaintiff received. It is also clear from the evidence provided to the court that Plaintiff consistently filed grievances complaining about the care he received, but he has failed to establish that the care was constitutionally deficient, as discussed below in the analysis of the Wellpath Defendants' Motion. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to the LCDC Defendants as to any claims that they were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care.
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations that the LCDC Defendants blocked his access to the grievance system, these claims are also without merit. First, Plaintiff was able to, and did in fact, file a multitude of grievances mostly related to his perceived inadequate medical care from June 1, 2022 until June 23, 2022. See ECF No. 124-3. Based on the records provided to the court, Plaintiff instituted 12 grievances, some of which he appealed multiple times, from June 2, 2022 through June 23, 2022. Second, the filing of grievances on the kiosk is a privilege that may be temporarily suspended if an inmate abuses the privilege. See Affidavit of Brian D. Currence, attached as Exhibit 3 to the LCDC Defs.' Br at ECF No. 124-3 at 4. Here, Defendant Currence explained that on June 23, 2022, he suspended Plaintiff's kiosk privileges for 30 days because Plaintiff continually filed repetitive grievances and it became unmanageable for the prison employees. Currence Aff., ¶ 25. However, Plaintiff was still able to file hard copy grievances and requests. Currence Aff., ¶ 27. These actions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. First, there is no constitutional right to participate in grievance proceedings. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Further, even though Plaintiff was not able to access the kiosk to electronically file grievances, he was not without recourse. Plaintiff was still able to file hard copy grievances, and while Plaintiff argues that a paper form was not immediately provided to him and was not always accepted by staff members, he does not otherwise argue that this is a constitutional violation for the failure to use the electronic kiosk system. It is clear from the substance of the grievances he filed that he continued to grieve the same issue, that is the perceived lack of adequate medical care and the perceived lack of action on the part of the LCDC Defendants to allow him access to the type of medical care he wanted. See ECF No. 124-3. Plaintiff received responses to his grievances, however inadequate he felt them to be. Moreover, he was receiving medical care, despite his disagreement with the type of care received. Plaintiff has not come forward to refute the facts established by the LCDC Defendants that he was afforded appropriate medical care, and he was able to raise issues surrounding his medical care after the incident. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to the LCDC Defendants on the ground that he was unconstitutionally blocked from filing grievances electronically.
Based on Plaintiff's deposition, he named several of the LCDC Defendants in this lawsuit because they failed to adequately respond to his grievances. For example, he states he sued Defendant Jay Koon because he wrote Defendant Koon a letter, along with two other requests, and he only received one back. Gregory Dep. 38:23-25; 39:1-6. Similarly, he states he wrote to Defendant Singleton, Defendant Currence, and informed Defendant Murphy and Merritt that he was blocked access to the electronic kiosk to discuss his medical condition. Gregory Dep. 39:11-17. Plaintiff states he sued Defendant Stevens because he failed to address Plaintiff's request to speak to a supervisor. Gregory Dep. 42:5-10. Plaintiff states that Defendant Bookman made jokes about his medical condition and did not call a supervisor when Plaintiff requested he do so. Gregory Dep. 43:12-25. Plaintiff sued Defendant Jenkins-Merritt for his inability to access the kiosk. Gregory Dep. 44:1-6. Plaintiff sued Defendant Hall for refusing to take his request form. Gregory Dep. 44:16-24. These generalized statements are similar to the statements provided by Plaintiff in his Complaint, wherein he alleges certain Defendants would not allow him to turn in certain grievances.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to allege a claim under the SCTCA related to his medical care, these claims also fail for the following reasons. The SCTCA governs all tort claims against governmental entities and is the “exclusive and sole remedy for any tort committed by an employee or a governmental entity while acting within the scope of the employee's official duty.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-200. Under the SCTCA, a governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from . . . “responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has failed to allege any Defendants, either the LCDC Defendants or the Wellpath Defendants, acted in a grossly negligent manner, nor does he put forth any evidence to suggest that the conditions of the jail were such that it created an unsafe environment. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that he slipped in soapy water when he went to shower. Aside from that, the evidence establishes he was then treated for any alleged injuries he received. Thus, any claims Plaintiff attempts to bring under the SCTCA for his slip and fall incident are subject to summary judgment in favor of the LCDC Defendants.
In Plaintiff's Response, he also alleges that he was denied access to the courts because the LCDC Defendants “refused to notarize several documents signed by other inmates related to his lawsuit” and that he was retaliated against when he was “placed on confinement and no report was written as to why he was being confined.” Pl.'s Br. at 1, ECF No. 131. In Plaintiff's deposition, he states that Defendant Bailey was a notary, and she refused to notarize the statements of several inmates related to his lawsuit. Gregory Dep. 31:6-20. However, Plaintiff does not provide any basis for finding a constitutional violation on this ground. Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim on behalf of other inmates; he must establish that it was he who was deprived of a constitutional right. See Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (explaining an inmate is confined to redress for violations of his own personal rights, rather than for all prisoners). If, however, he is alleging that he was denied access to the courts, this claim also fails. To prevail on this type of claim, Plaintiff must show actual injury resulting from the alleged misconduct. Carelock v. Boone, No. 5:19-cv-00116-JMC, 2020 WL 5810408, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (internal citations omitted); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (explaining that for a plaintiff to state a claim for denial of access to courts, he must demonstrate actual injury or prejudice by alleging that his facility's shortcomings have “hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim”); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring the prisoner to “provide some basis for his allegation that the delay or failure in delivering his legal mail deprived him of meaningful access to the courts”). Plaintiff provides no explanation of what these alleged statements from other inmates included or how they would otherwise establish sufficient evidence to provide this court the ability to conduct a meaningful review of this claim. Aside from that point, the court has considered the affidavits of several inmates, attached to Plaintiff's Response, despite any alleged issue with a notary. Accordingly, the LCDC Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to these claims as well.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that he was placed in confinement as punishment and was not provided an explanation as to why he was placed in confinement. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Singleton threatened to confine him, and Defendant Felder placed him in a “more confined area of the facility.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Typically, a pretrial detainee challenging general conditions of confinement is alleging a due process claim. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174 (4th Cir. 2018). The inquiry becomes whether the conditions imposed constitute “punishment.” Id. To prevail, a pretrial detainee must show that the restriction imposed was either: (1) imposed with the expressed intent to punish; or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental objective. Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the LCDC Defendants put him in a certain custody classification due to retaliation for his complaints. However, prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (“[W]e cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause”).
Plaintiff has not provided any support for a finding that any rehousing or change in classification operated as an atypical hardship for him or was instituted as punishment.Nor does the undersigned find, that to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a procedural due process violation, he has established a constitutional violation occurred. See Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 2524th Cir. 2016) (holding that a pretrial detainee is entitled to procedural due process in connection with any “punishment” imposed on him by a facility). To the contrary, the LCDC Defendants have provided not only Plaintiff's disciplinary history over the course of several months while at LCDC but also numerous grievance requests. See Exhibit A and B, attached to Currence Affidavit at ECF No. 124-3. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit approximately two months after the initial slip and fall occurred. Within his own grievance requests, Plaintiff acknowledges some of his behavior during the time in question. For example, he states, “I didn't do anything except return rudeness for rudeness,” and “I cussed, I didn't threaten him or anything like that,” when referring to his interactions with other officers. Exhibit B to Currence Aff.; ECF No. 124-3 at 33. Further, in response to one of Plaintiff's grievances, Defendant Treaster writes, “you are not being punished[,] medical tried to see you and treat you however you became argumentative and refused to cooperate with medical's request.” Exhibit B to Currence Aff.; ECF No. 124-3 at 29. Another incident report, dated July 5, 2022, indicates a change in housing occurred (to A-pod) due to the fact that Plaintiff was complaining about the distance it took to walk him to medical. Exhibit A to Currence Aff.; ECF No. 124-3 at 20. The incident report references the decision was made by medical for Plaintiff's safety, and he would also not have to walk as far to the restroom. ECF No. 124-3 at 20. In response to Plaintiff filing a grievance asking why he was housed in A-pod, he was informed that he was placed there at medical's request because Plaintiff stated he could not walk, and they would have footage of any injuries he may incur. Exhibit B to Currence Aff.; ECF No. 124-3 at 61-62. It can further be assumed from the affidavits and the incident reports provided to the court that Plaintiff was housed in a cell with a roommate. Records, for example, indicate that on July 8, 2022, Plaintiff was seen “standing for long periods of time talking to other inmates outside of his room.” Exhibit A to Currence Aff.; ECF No. 124-3 at 18. On July 12, 2022, an incident report indicates that his roommate asked for a nurse to check on Plaintiff, which she did. Exhibit A to Currence Aff.; ECF No. 124-3 at 17. In response, Plaintiff has come forward with no evidence to support his allegation that he was re-housed as punishment, nor has he rebutted the evidence establishing he was re-housed due to a legitimate, penological interest (due to his medical issues). Further, vague accusations fail to demonstrate that an alleged retaliatory act violates an inmate's constitutional rights or constitutes punishment. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996).
Some evidence in the record established that Plaintiff alleges he was “threatened” with confinement, rather than being placed in confinement. See Exhibit B to Currence Aff., ECF No. 124-3 at 46.
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that the LCDC Defendants retaliated against him by placing him in a different pod for filing grievances, Plaintiff has failed to establish such a claim. The First Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits abridging freedom of speech. U.S. CONST. amend I. Pretrial detainees have a right to be free from retaliation by prison officials for filing grievances. Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 855 F.3d 533, 546 (4th Cir. 2017); Gowen v. Enochs, No. 7:20-cv-00247, 2021 WL 960702, at *8 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2021). To establish this claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected First Amendment activity; (2) the defendant took an action that adversely affected that protected activity; and (3) there was a causal relationship between the plaintiff's protected activity and the defendant's conduct. Booker, 855 F.3d at 537. The claimant must show that “but for” the protected expression, the prison official would not have taken the alleged retaliatory action. Huang v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N. Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, while Plaintiff may be able to establish the first element, Plaintiff has failed to establish that any adverse action, namely being moved to a different housing location, prevented him from filing grievances or that a causal relationship existed between filing grievances and his re-housing classification. First, Plaintiff was not wholly prevented from filing grievances; he remained able to file physical copies of grievances during the time he was unable to electronically file grievances. Plaintiff was able to once again file electronic grievances even after he was moved to A-pod. Second, Plaintiff has failed to show a causal connection between the filing of grievances and the transfer in housing. The only evidence before the court reveals that Plaintiff was moved to different housing based on his complaints that he was having trouble walking, and the transfer in housing would place him closer the medical area and the restroom. Indeed, this information was explained to Plaintiff via a grievance response. Thus, even viewing the facts presented in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to the LCDC Defendants on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
Smith v. Demory, No. 9:21-cv-02915-JMC-MHC, 2022 WL 4181264, at *10 (D.S.C. June 24, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:21-CV-02915-TMC, 2022 WL 3644099 (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2022) (stating that a plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected First Amendment activity by filing grievances).
3. Qualified Immunity
The LCDC Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). When a qualified immunity defense is raised, the courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor make out a violation of one's constitutional rights, and second, whether the violated right was clearly established at that time. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)). The Fourth Circuit employs a split burden of proof for the qualified immunity defense. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the first prong, and the [officer] bears the burden on the second prong. Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233 (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007)). Here, the undersigned has determined that Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation on the part of the LCDC Defendants. Thus, the undersigned recommends finding that the LCDC Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
B. Wellpath Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has also filed suit against the Wellpath Defendants pursuant to § 1983 for violations related to the alleged lack of proper medical care associated with a slip and fall incident at LCDC. The Wellpath Defendants include a physician, nurses, and other medical providers who treated Plaintiff prior to and after the slip and fall that occurred in June 2022. These Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate based on several grounds: (1) Wellpath is not amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983; (2) Plaintiff fails to establish a cognizable claim against the Wellpath Defendants; (3) the Wellpath Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff failed to comply with the SCTCA as to any alleged medical malpractice claim. ECF No. 124.
1. Wellpath is not a Person Pursuant to § 1983
The Wellpath Defendants argue that Defendant Wellpath should be dismissed as a matter of law because Wellpath is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relief may be sought when a plaintiff alleges the violation of a right secured by the Constitution by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Askins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is well-settled law that detention centers and medical facilities cannot be sued under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating “[t]he medical department of a prison may not be sued, because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983”); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at * 1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (“Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to establish that Defendant Detention Center, as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983”). Specifically, in a previous case in this district, the court determined that a medical provider “whose medical staff provides health care services to businesses, institutions, and individuals is not a ‘person' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Vinson v. Cannon, No. 2:10-3214-HFF-BHH, 2011 WL 1624962, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2011), report and recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 1627953 (D.S.C. Apr. 28, 2011). Therefore, Plaintiff may not bring a claim against Wellpath, as it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.
Defendant Wellpath also asserts that summary judgment is appropriate, even if Plaintiff were to sue Wellpath as employer of individually named medical providers, because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are inapplicable in § 1983 actions. To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff ordinarily must show that the defendant was personally involved in the violation. In Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities can be liable only for their own illegal acts. In other words, the doctrine of vicarious liability does not apply in § 1983 claims. Monell, 436 U.S. 691; See LoveLane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Other courts have stated that “a corporation under contract with the state cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under those theories,” referring to the theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Mitchell v. Correct Care Solutions, No. CV 13-248-RGA, 2015 WL 1517399, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2015). Instead, a plaintiff must provide evidence of a policy or custom on the part of the defendant, and that the policy caused the complained of constitutional violation. Id. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Wellpath is liable due to the enforcement or enactment of a policy or custom. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to any claims against Defendant Wellpath.
2. Plaintiff's Deliberate Indifference Claim
The Wellpath Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to establish deliberate indifference on the part of any of the Defendants sufficient to support a demonstrable claim. Thus, the Wellpath Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate. The undersigned has reviewed the arguments and evidence provided by all parties, viewing this information in a light most favorable to Plaintiff as is appropriate in analyzing a summary judgment motion.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relief may be sought when a plaintiff alleges the violation of a right secured by the Constitution by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Askins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). As previously explained in this R&R, a pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference to a medical need claim must be evaluated under an objective standard. Short, 87 F.4th at 611. Plaintiff must allege: (1) he had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had the condition and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed. Id. Under this standard, a plaintiff need not show “that the defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee's serious medical condition and consciously disregarded the risk that their action or failure to act would result in harm.” Id. Instead, it is sufficient to show that the defendant's action or inaction was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). It will not suffice for a detainee to allege a defendant was negligent. Id. at 611-12.
Plaintiff's allegations can be summed up as follows: he argues these Defendants failed to provide him the medical care he felt was appropriate. As pointed out by the Wellpath Defendants, Plaintiff argues that these Defendants denied him the ability to be taken to the hospital after his fall on June 1, 2022; failed to allow Plaintiff to undergo an MRI, which he believed was needed; and failed to provide him the appropriate medication after the incident in question. Plaintiff's Response is comprised of his arguments that the affidavits provided by the Wellpath Defendants contain hearsay and various inaccuracies. However, Plaintiff does not bring forth his own evidence to contradict many of the established facts, particularly the information detailed within Plaintiff's own medical records. In their Reply, the Wellpath Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the affidavits of both Defendant Darby and Defendant Marzol are based on their direct involvement in Plaintiff's care, recounting treatment or care provided, as well as discussing information that is buttressed by Plaintiff's own medical records. The Wellpath Defendants also provided additional medical records recounting Plaintiff's care, attached to the Reply, to support these affidavits. See Exhibits A and B, attached to the Wellpath Defs.' Reply; ECF No. 145-1 and 145-2.
Plaintiff testified that immediately after he slipped and fell, Defendant Nurse Kristy came over to provide him assistance and provided him a wheelchair. Gregory Dep. 50:17-22. However, it is Plaintiff's contention that he should have immediately been taken to the hospital instead. Plaintiff does not provide any support for his argument that a hospital visit was required, nor does he refute the fact that he was provided medical care almost immediately after the incident in question. Plaintiff's complaints support the assertion that he was clearly dissatisfied with the medical treatment he was provided, or that he was dissatisfied with the failure on the part of the medical providers to follow his desired course of treatment. However, a claim based only upon a difference of opinion related to the quality of care provided an inmate is insufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional claim. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
Similarly, Plaintiff argues that he should have received an MRI. His support for this assertion is that he alleges a doctor told him that if Plaintiff had gone to see him “on the street that he would have been gave me an MRI, but due to the cost and my situation, that I wasn't getting an MRI.” Gregory Dep. 55: 15-19. Defendant Dr. Darby provided the court an affidavit, detailing the treatment provided to Plaintiff after he fell. Specifically, Defendant Darby states that prior to the incident, Plaintiff arrived at LCDC the day after a motor vehicle accident in April 2022. Affidavit of Clarence Darby, P.A., ¶ 7(c), attached to the Wellpath Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 125-2. He states that Plaintiff had been treated, presumably for the motor vehicle accident, at Lexington Medical Center and undergone CT scans and x-rays, none of which showed signs of an injury. Darby Aff., ¶ 7(c). Plaintiff refused to attend a follow-up visit at Lexington Medical Center. Darby Aff., ¶ 7(c). On June 1, 2022, Defendant Darby explained that after Plaintiff's fall, medical staff noticed no discoloration of Plaintiff's skin, no swelling or lacerations, and Plaintiff was able to hold up his head and neck. Darby Aff., ¶ 7(d). Plaintiff was taken by wheelchair from where he fell to a medical holding cell for monitoring. Darby Aff., ¶ 7(d). Defendant Darby stated that the attending nurse spoke to him that evening, explained Plaintiff's condition, and Defendant Darby instructed her to treat Plaintiff with over-the-counter pain medication and to continue monitoring Plaintiff until the next day. Darby Aff., ¶ 7(d). Defendant Darby detailed the treatment received by Plaintiff, including an x-ray on June 6, 2022, which revealed normal results. Darby Aff., ¶ 7(h). As to the specific contention that Defendant Darby refused Plaintiff an MRI, Defendant Darby explained that after Plaintiff asked about the ability to undergo an MRI, Defendant Darby explained to Plaintiff that in the correctional healthcare setting, an MRI is only available when it is medically advisable, and it was not in this case. Darby Aff., ¶ 8. Similarly, Defendant Marzol outlined the medical care provided to Plaintiff. Defendant Marzol specifically indicated that soon after the incident, Plaintiff was able to move all of his extremities, but he complained that they did not provide him “real pain medication.” Affidavit of Kristin Marzol, ¶ 9, attached to the Wellpath Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 125-3. Finally, Plaintiff's medical records support these affidavits in that they show Plaintiff was provided extensive treatment, and that, at times, Plaintiff refused certain prescribed medication. See Plaintiff's medical records, attached to the Wellpath Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 125-4 and the Wellpath Defs.' Reply at ECF No. 145-1.
A review of these affidavits, along with Plaintiff's medical records, show that Plaintiff received consistent medical care, albeit care that Plaintiff felt was insufficient according to his own determination of what his medical ailments included. Plaintiff's filed grievances reflect an ongoing course of treatment, however dissatisfied Plaintiff felt with the treatment provided. Even assuming Plaintiff's argument to be that an MRI would have revealed some additional back issue, the Fourth Circuit has previously concluded that a missed diagnosis does not automatically equate to a deliberate indifference claim. Overman v. Wang, 801 Fed.Appx. 109, 112 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations that he was not provided medications is rebutted by the medical records provided within the record. Finally, even were the court to construe Plaintiff's allegations to support a finding that on at least one occasion, Plaintiff was prescribed Tylenol, to which he was allergic, negligence is not enough to show that a defendant “failed to do right by the detainee.” Short, 87 F.4th at 611-12.Further, Plaintiff does not provide any support for a finding that the medical providers in question knew Plaintiff had such an allergy.
Within at least one of Plaintiff's grievances that he filed, he indicated that during MedPass he was told he could not get Tylenol, even though it was ordered days before. ECF No. 124-3. In other words, while Plaintiff states he is allergic to Tylenol, at least some evidence suggests he was requesting this medication. Exhibit B, attached to Currence Affidavit, ECF No. 124-3 at 39.
This case boils down to Plaintiff's apparent disagreement with the medical care provided; however, Plaintiff cannot allege in a conclusory fashion that he did not receive adequate medical care, without supporting this contention with evidence beyond his own lay opinion. This is particularly true when, as here, Defendants have provided ample support in the form of affidavits and medical records, to support their contention that Plaintiff did, in fact, receive consistent and appropriate medical treatment for a slip and fall accident, despite the fact that Plaintiff does not come forward with evidence to suggest that he suffered an injury. Still, even accepting that Plaintiff experienced back pain and nerve pain, and assuming he was not provided certain treatment that Plaintiff felt was necessary, Plaintiff does not provide any support for the assertion that this caused any damage. Put simply, Plaintiff has not shown that the Wellpath Defendants' actions in this case were objectively unreasonable. See Short, 87 F.4th at 611. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of the Wellpath Defendants.
3. Qualified Immunity
The Wellpath Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry, 652 F.3d at 531 (en banc). When a qualified immunity defense is raised, the courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor make out a violation of one's constitutional rights, and second, whether the violated right was clearly established at that time. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th at 233 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)). The Fourth Circuit employs a split burden of proof for the qualified immunity defense. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the first prong, and the [officer] bears the burden on the second prong. Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233 (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007)). Here, the undersigned has determined that, much like the LCDC Defendants, Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation on the part of the Wellpath Defendants, Thus, the undersigned recommends finding they are entitled to qualified immunity.
4. Medical Malpractice Claim
Finally, the Wellpath Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiff brings any claims of medical malpractice, Plaintiff failed to comply with South Carolina law for bringing a medical malpractice claim under § 15-79-125 et seq. Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not file the required Notice of Intent to Sue or provide an affidavit from a qualified expert setting forth the applicable standard of care, how it was violated, and how Plaintiff was damaged by such violation.
South Carolina law provides that, “prior to filing or initiating a civil action alleging injury or death as a result of medical malpractice, the plaintiff shall contemporaneously file a Notice of Intent to File Suit and an affidavit of an expert witness.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-79-125(a). Defendants argue, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff failed to accomplish this prerequisite to filing suit. Aside from these filing requirements, it is not entirely clear what conduct Plaintiff considers to be malpractice, other than his general contentions that he was not afforded the medical care he requested and/or that he was not sent to undergo an MRI. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring any state law tort malpractice claims, the undersigned agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff did not comply with South Carolina law for bringing a medical malpractice claim under § 15-79110 et seq., and therefore recommends that any claims attempted to be asserted as a medical malpractice claim should be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation
The undersigned has carefully considered the arguments made by all parties in this case. After considering these arguments, it is recommended that the LCDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 124, be granted as to all claims, and the Wellpath Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 125, be granted as to all claims.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).