Gregory v. Hobbs

6 Citing cases

  1. Reid v. Holden

    242 N.C. 408 (N.C. 1955)   Cited 55 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Implying that proximate cause is required for civil conspiracy claim seeking damages caused by acts done by one or more conspirators

    While distinct causes of action belonging to defined classes may be united in the same complaint, G.S. 1-123, the plaintiff is permitted, not compelled, to do so. Shakespeare v. Land Co., 144 N.C. 516, 57 S.E. 213; Tyler v. Capeheart, 125 N.C. 64, 34 S.E. 108; Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N.C. 1. "Although a plaintiff, having separate and distinct causes of action against the same defendant, may properly join them in one action, he is not required to do so in order to prevent a judgment on one from barring an action on the other." 50 C.J.S. 114, Judgments sec. 668.

  2. Shakespeare v. Land Co.

    57 S.E. 213 (N.C. 1907)   Cited 11 times

    This certainly does not embrace any matters which might have been brought into the litigation, or any causes of action which the plaintiff might have joined, but which, in fact, are neither joined nor embraced in the pleadings." It is well settled that a defendant is not required to set up a counterclaim or set-off which he may have to the subject-matter of a cause of action prosecuted against him. Woody v. Jordan, 69 N.C. 189; Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N.C. 1; Cabe v. Vanhook, 127 N.C. 424; Mauney v. Hamilton, 132 N.C. 303; Bunker v. Bunker, 140 N.C. 18. The facts set forth in the complaint in this action could not have been pleaded as a defense to the former action.

  3. Winders v. Hill

    141 N.C. 694 (N.C. 1906)   Cited 21 times
    In Winders v. Hill, 141 N.C. 694, 54 S.E. 440, in opinion by Walker, J., this Court has this to say: "The function of a complaint is not the narration of the evidence, but a statement of the substantive and constituent facts upon which plaintiff's claim to relief is founded.

    amages growing out of the transaction to which the plaintiff may show himself entitled. It is the object of the reformed procedure to administer full relief in one and the same action, and consequently, if a complaint states facts constituting a cause of action for specific performance and also one for damages for a breach of the contract, a failure as to the first will not prevent a recovery on the second, whatever may be the form of the prayer for relief. Pomeroy Cont., sec. 480; Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N.Y. 12. When the court finds for the plaintiff upon the general equity of the case, but declines in the exercise of its sound discretion to decree specific performance, or when the defendant is unable to comply with this contract, it may award damages, 20 Enc. Pl. and Pr., pp. 482, 488; or specific performance may be decreed, and, in addition, damages may be given for unjustifiable delay in doing what should have been promptly done. Ibid., 490; Clark's Code, sec. 267, and notes; Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N.C. 1; Lumber Co. v. Wallace, ib., 22. Much stress was laid upon this ground of demurrer in the argument, but it cannot be sustained. We do not mean to intimate that the plaintiff has suffered any damages, but only to decide that, if he has, they may be recovered in this action.

  4. Austin v. Austin

    43 S.E. 827 (N.C. 1903)   Cited 1 times

    The estate was not then in a condition for final settlement. We think that the principle upon which Tyler v. Capehart, 125 N.C. 64, is decided is applicable to the facts in this case: "A judgment is decisive of the points raised by the pleadings, or which might properly be predicated upon them, but does not embrace any matters which might have been brought into the litigation, or causes of action which the plaintiffs have joined, but which in fact are neither joined nor embraced in the pleadings" — citing Williams v. (267) Clouse, 91 N.C. 322; Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N.C. 1; Jones v. Beaman, 117 N.C. 259. In the last-mentioned case the Court say: "The judgment can be conclusive only so far as it affects rights presented to the court and passed upon."

  5. Tyler v. Capehart

    125 N.C. 64 (N.C. 1899)   Cited 55 times
    In Tyler v. Capehart, 125 N.C. 64, the Court held: "A judgment is decisive of the points raised by the pleadings, or which might be properly predicated upon them; but does not embrace any matters which might have been brought into the litigation, or causes of action which the plaintiff might have joined, but which in fact are neither joined nor embraced by the pleadings."

    They were not compelled to do so. Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N.C. 1; Lumber Co. v. Wallace, ibid., 26; Code, sec. 267. The allegation in the former action was that the defendants' testator had (69) received from sale of the timber "sufficient" to pay off the trust debt, but whether he had received any, and if so, what amount, over and above the $1,177, which entitled the plaintiffs to a decree for reconveyance, was not actually litigated and was not "such matter as was necessarily implied herein," which is the test laid down in Williams v. Clouse, 91 N.C. 322; Wagon Co. v. Byrd, 119 N.C. 460.

  6. Asher v. Reizenstein

    10 S.E. 889 (N.C. 1890)   Cited 9 times
    In Asher v. Reizenstein, 105 N.C. 213, 10 S.E. 889, the Court held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction of an action for damages for the conversion of a horse where the amount claimed was $125.

    As to it, he might ordinarily bring his own independent action. (217) Woody v. Jordan, supra; Francis v. Edwards, 77 N.C. 271; McClenahan v. Cotten, 83 N.C. 332; Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N.C. 1; Kramer v. Electric Light Co., 95 N.C. 277. It was contended on the argument here that the complaint shows upon its face that the plaintiff intends to waive the tortious conversion and sue for the price realized by the defendant for the horse; that, in that case, the Court of a Justice of the Peace would have exclusive original jurisdiction, and, therefore, this action must be dismissed.