Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-CV-00257
06-01-2021
AKEEM TYREE GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA et al., Defendants.
(BRANN, J.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presently before the Court is a Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Akeem Tyree Gregory (hereinafter referred to as “Gregory”) on February 10, 2021. (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Gregory alleges that Defendants Judge Hugh Jones, Judge Paige Rosini, Warden Bruce Kovach, Deputy Warden Jim Smink, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania violated his right to a speedy trial, silenced him during a virtual hearing, and are detaining him without bail. (Doc. 1, at 2-6). On February 16, 2021, Gregory filed a Motion to File an Amended Complaint which the Court granted on February 19, 2021. (Doc. 6; Doc. 7). In his amendment, Gregory added two additional Defendants: Michael Finn and Brianne Herring. (Doc. 6, at 12). At the time he filed his Complaint, Gregory was a pretrial detainee at the Northumberland County Prison, located in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 1-2). Gregory seeks compensatory and punitive damages along with the dismissal of his criminal charges, immediate release from pre-trial detention, and the dismissal of any remaining charges. (Doc. 1, at 8, 15).
The Court has conducted its statutorily-mandated screening of the Complaint and the amendment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 1; Doc. 6). For the reasons provided herein, the Court finds that Gregory's Complaint (Doc. 1) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is respectfully recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. (Doc. 1).
I. Background and Procedural History
Gregory, proceeding pro se, initiated the instant action by filing a Complaint in this matter on February 10, 2021. (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Gregory alleges that he is being detained without bail, contrary to his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1, at 4). Additionally, Gregory states that he was silenced during a virtual hearing by Judge Rosini and is being denied his right to a speedy trial. (Doc. 1, at 5-6). On February 16, 2021, Gregory filed a Motion to File an Amended Complaint in which he outlines claims against Defendants Finn and Herring regarding their statements, Gregory's right to a speedy trial, and his right to bail. (Doc. 6, at 2). Gregory states that he has suffered from emotional distress, a lack of confidence, discouragement, monetary expenses, injustice, mental health issues, PTSD, loss of money and time with his family, and unhappiness. (Doc. 1, at 8).
Concurrently with his Complaint, Gregory filed a certified motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis along with a prisoner trust fund account statement which the Court grants by separate order. (Doc. 2; Doc. 3).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is statutorily required to review the complaint of a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis prior to service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' ....” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. The complaint appears to challenge the validity of Plaintiff's confinement.
To the extent that Gregory is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, the proper avenue is a petition for writ of habeas corpus; prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of confinement through a § 1983 action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). if a prisoner desires to challenge the validity of confinement, the proper avenue is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. A prisoner may challenge the fact or duration of confinement through a § 1983 action only after it has already been “reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
To determine if the fact or duration of confinement is, in fact, being challenged, the court must ask whether a win for the prisoner on the § 1983 action would necessarily imply that his confinement is invalid. Williams, 453 F.3d at 177. The Third Circuit has stated that “a § 1983 action is not the appropriate action for claims challenging bail, a conviction and/or a sentence.” Bucano v. Sibum, No. 3:12-CV-606, 2013 WL 2456009, at *12 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 2013) (quoting Learner v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). Additionally, this Court has found that claims pertaining to the right to a speedy trial “contest [a plaintiff's] continued confinement . . . [and are] not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” because they “are barred by the favorable termination rule announced in Heck.” Lora v. Baylor, 1:20-cv-1787, 2020 WL 6047580, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2020) (pretrial detainees' claims regarding violations of their right to a speedy trial were barred by the favorable termination rule); see also Frantz v. Kingston Police Dept., Civ. Action No. 3:15-cv-0402, 2015 WL 1951582, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2015). “The Heck bar applies whether [a plaintiff is a] pretrial detaine[e] or whether [he or she has] been convicted of the charges for which [he or she is] currently incarcerated.” Lora, 2020 WL 6047580, at *3. Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus alleging improper revocation of bail and a right to a speedy trial have been heard by this Court. See Owens v. Beard, 829 F.Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Perry v. Pennsylvania, No. 4:13-CV-01039, 2013 WL 3789097, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2013). Gregory challenges his denial of bail, the timeliness of his trial, and Judge Rosini's ability to silence him during a virtual hearing. (Doc. 1, at 4-6). In addition, Gregory seeks dismissal of charges and immediate release. (Doc. 1, at 8). Gregory's challenges and desired outcomes all address the constitutionality of his detention and imply that the nature of his confinement is invalid. (Doc. 1, at 4-6, 8). Therefore, because Gregory challenges the validity of his confinement, he must pursue these claims through a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500 .
The favorable termination rule provides that “‘harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid' is not cognizable under § 1983, unless the conviction or sentence was ‘reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.'” Lora, 2020 WL 6047580, at *2 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87).
C. Leave to amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.'” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Products Liab. Litig., 564 Fed.Appx. 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). Here, Gregory's claims must be brought through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Therefore, amendment would be futile as to his claims, as they are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Nottingham v. Butts, No. 4:18-CV-02003, 2019 WL 2078995, at *8 (M.D. Pa. March 13, 2019). It is recommended that leave to amend be denied as Plaintiff's claims are more properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
III. Recommendation
As it stands, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 1). The Court respectfully recommends that all claims against the Defendants sounding in habeas corpus be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, without leave to amend, as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the appropriate avenue for such relief.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated June 1, 2021. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.