Opinion
No. 13-04-191-CV
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed February 17, 2005.
On appeal from the 343rd District Court of San Patricio County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices HINOJOSA and RODRIGUEZ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an interlocutory appeal. Appellant, Gregory-Portland Independent School District (GPISD), filed a summary judgment motion against appellees, Judy Upton-Allen and Reynaldo Mata, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied appellant's motion, and this appeal ensued. Because we find that appellant is immune from liability as a matter of law, we reverse the decision of the trial court and render summary judgment in favor of appellant.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 51.014(a)(5) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury lawsuit for damages arising from an automobile accident. Judy Upton-Allen sued GPISD and its employee, Alvaro Ortiz, for Ortiz's alleged negligence in operating a school bus. Upton-Allen sought to hold GPISD liable on the basis of respondeat superior. Intervenor, Reynaldo Mata, sought recovery for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of the same accident and based upon the same theory of liability as Upton-Allen.
Ortiz first filed a motion for summary judgment against Upton-Allen asserting that he was entitled to official immunity as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that Upton-Allen take nothing against Ortiz. Ortiz then filed a motion for summary judgment against Mata asserting that he was entitled to official immunity as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that Mata take nothing against Ortiz.
Based on the court's rulings with respect to Ortiz, GPISD filed a motion for summary judgment against Upton-Allen and Mata asserting immunity. The trial court denied GPISD's motion.
II. GPISD'S IMMUNITY
By its sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because GPISD is immune from liability as a matter of law. We agree.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that when a governmental entity's liability is based on respondeat superior for an employee's negligence, the governmental entity is not liable under section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act when the employee has no liability because of official immunity. Dewitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 653-54 (Tex. 1995). Because the trial court found GPISD's employee possessed official immunity, we conclude GPISD retains its sovereign immunity. See id. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for summary judgment. Appellant's issue is sustained.
III. ORDERS GRANTING ORTIZ'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
By one cross-point, appellees argue that the trial court erred in granting Ortiz's motions for summary judgment based on his official immunity as an employee of GPISD. However, we do not have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order that grants a motion for summary judgment.
Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Kaplan v. Tiffany Dev. Corp., 69 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). There is no statute allowing an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a motion for summary judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (allowing interlocutory appeal from order denying motion for summary judgment based on assertion of immunity); see also id. § 51.014(a)(6) (allowing interlocutory appeal from order denying motion for summary judgment based on media First Amendment defense).
Appellees attempt to create interlocutory appellate jurisdiction by bootstrapping the unappealable orders to appellant's appealable order. Appellees rely on Letson v. Barnes for the proposition that a non-appealable order may be considered on appeal to the extent the subject matter of the non-appealable order affects the validity of the appealable order. See Letson v. Barnes, 979 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding trial court's alleged lack of jurisdiction to enter temporary injunction could be addressed in appeal from injunction). However, Letson does not apply to the facts of this case. The orders appellees would like us to review pertain only to Ortiz's defense of official immunity. The orders do not affect the trial court's authority or jurisdiction to enter the appealable order. See Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores, 127 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tex.App.-Ft. Worth 2004, no pet.). Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to review the orders granting Ortiz's motions for summary judgment.
V. Conclusion
Because we conclude GPISD is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render summary judgment in favor of appellant.