Due to the latently deadly nature of electricity, a person, either individual or corporate, maintaining a line carrying high voltage electricity is required to provide protection which will safely guard against any contingency, combination of circumstances, or accidents which a person of ordinary intelligence would have foreseen as probable to happen. 29 C.J.S. Electricity, § 39; 18 Am. Jur., Electricity, § 48; Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co., 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320; International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854; Royal Indemnity v. Midland Counties Pub. Serv. Corp., 42 Cal.App. 628, 183 P. 960; Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc., 388 Pa. 1, 130 A.2d 123. The extent of the duty of the landowner to members of the public, and the standard of care he must conform to is measured in terms of the foreseeability of injury from the situation created by him.

As we understand its argument, Oncor contends that the guy-wire system could pose a danger only as it stood if someone dug up the anchor and that such an occurrence is unforeseeable as a matter of law. Oncor cites three cases from other jurisdictions to support its position: Hercules Powder, Co. v. Disabatino, 188 A.2d 529 (Del. 1963), Rank v. Metro. Edison Co., 87 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1952), and Greenwald v. N. States Power Co., 32 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1948). We reject Oncor's argument for four reasons.

The degree of care which will satisfy this requirement varies with the danger which will be incurred by negligence and must be commensurate with the danger involved and that may otherwise be expressed as the utmost care and prudence consistent with the practical operation of its plant. Interstate Power Co. v. Thomas, 8 Cir., 51 F.2d 964, 84 A.L.R. 681; Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co., 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320. But while defendant was required to exercise that degree of care and skill commensurate with the danger involved it was not an insurer of the safety of plaintiff.

We do not intimate that use of the horse with holes exposed was necessarily negligent, for we hold only that where reasonable minds might differ with respect to whether the harm was one which the teacher should reasonably have anticipated, the question of negligence is one of fact for the jury. Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co., 226 Minn. 216, 221, 32 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1943). Similarly, the credibility of plaintiff's testimony and the likelihood that the accident happened as plaintiff described are questions for the jury to resolve.

The degree of care which will satisfy this requirement varies with the danger which will be incurred by negligence and must be commensurate with the danger involved and that may otherwise be expressed as the utmost care and prudence consistent with the practical operation of its plant. Interstate Power Co. v. Thomas, 8 Cir., 51 F.2d 964, 84 A.L.R. 681; Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co., 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320."

2. Where a chattel is safe for the use for which it is intended, ordinary care does not require the manufacturer to anticipate its improper use. Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst, 229 Minn. 436, 40 N.W.2d 73; Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co. 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320; Hartmon v. National Heater Co. 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804. 3. A manufacturer who has actual or constructive knowledge of dangers to users of his product has the duty to give warning of such dangers.

To establish negligence there must be a risk reasonably foreseeable. Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co. 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688; Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253; Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co. 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320. In the Lovejoy case a farm manager sustained injuries in the operation of a tractor pulling a load of hay.

The jury having rendered a verdict for the plaintiff must have first determined that there was negligence on the part of the defendant that was a proximate cause of the accident and ensuing injury. The defendant challenges that determination and asserts that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support it. While a distributor of high voltage electricity is not an insurer it does have a duty in erecting and maintaining its transmission lines to exercise care commensurate with the dangers involved. Keep v. Otter Tail Power Co., 201 Minn. 475, 277 N.W. 213; Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co., 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320; Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519, 159 P.2d 931; 18 Am.Jur., Electricity, Sec. 48. Care commensurate with the danger involved includes reasonable inspection. Polk v. City of Los Angeles, supra; Holmes v. Southern California Edison Co., 78 Cal.App.2d 43, 177 P.2d 32; Vannett v. Michigan Public Service Co., 289 Mich. 212, 286 N.W. 216; Dansbery v. Northern States Power Co., 188 Wis. 586, 206 N.W. 882. The duty to inspect is not confined to areas of dense population but applies as well to transmission lines over agricultural land.

Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst, 229 Minn. 436, 40 N.W.2d 73. Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co. 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320. 7. The parties are in substantial agreement as to the applicable law but differ widely as to the application of the law to the facts in this case.

This court has heretofore disapproved of interference by ultimate consumers in electric companies' installations. Beery v. Northern States Power Co. 239 Minn. 48, 57 N.W.2d 838; Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co. 226 Minn. 216, 32 N.W.2d 320. The record here shows affirmatively that the plaintiff had little or no knowledge of electricity and had no experience with electrical appliances or wires except as he had worked with a brother-in-law, an electrician, in setting up the pole at the home of the plaintiffs and installing the wires that led into the basement.