Greenville Co. v. Insurance Reserve Fund

4 Citing cases

  1. McMahan v. Intern. Ass'n of Iron Workers

    858 F. Supp. 529 (D.S.C. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    Thus, whether the claims raised in the 1991 suit are barred by res judicata depends on whether they involve "the same claim, demand, or cause of action" as raised in the 1989 suit.Greenville County v. Insurance Reserve Fund, 427 S.E.2d 913 (S.C.Ct.App. 1993). The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do not require joinder of all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. SCRCP 18(a).

  2. Trico Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.

    853 F. Supp. 1190 (C.D. Cal. 1994)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that sudden has temporal component despite differing dictionary definitions because "sudden" and "accidental" would otherwise have the same meaning

    Additionally, at least fifteen other state intermediate appellate courts or federal courts construing state law have adopted a similar interpretation of "sudden and accidental."See, e.g., ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property Cas. Ins., 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1795, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 206 (1993); Barmet of Indiana v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Laudick, 18 Kan. App. 2d 782, 859 P.2d 410, 412 (1993); City of Maple Lake v. American States Ins., 509 N.W.2d 399, 405 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993); County of Fulton v. United States Fidelity Guar., 195 A.D.2d 864, 600 N.Y.S.2d 972, 974 (1993); O'Brien Energy Sys. v. American Employers' Ins., 427 Pa. Super. 456, 629 A.2d 957, 962 (1993); Greenville County v. Ins. Reserve Fund, 427 S.E.2d 913, 917 (S.C.Ct.App. 1993); Smith v. Hughes Aircraft, 10 F.3d 1448, 1452-1453 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying California and Arizona law); Aetna Cas. Sur. v. General Dynamics, 968 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1992) (Missouri law); Hartford Accident Indem. v. United States Fidelity Guar., 962 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir. 1992) (Utah law); A. Johnson Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur., 933 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 1991) (Maine Law); United States Fidelity Guar. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) (Kentucky law), Great Lakes Container v. National Union Fire Ins., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1984) (New Hampshire law); Mustang Tractor Equip. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 91-2523, 1993 WESTLAW 566032, at *12 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 8, 1993) (Texas law); U.S. Fidelity Guar. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617, 622 (M.D.Tenn.

  3. Queen City Farms v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co.

    124 Wn. 2d 536 (Wash. 1994)   Cited 300 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that limiting language, because it was located in definitional clause of insurance policy, operated as a prerequisite for establishing coverage and burden of proof was on insured to show loss was unexpected and unintended

    ansas, New Hampshire, Maine, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Oklahoma and Texas the term "sudden" has temporal meaning and the pollution exclusion clause is unambiguous. ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property Cas. Ins. Co., 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 206 (1993); Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Corp., 636 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1993); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. SCA Servs., Inc., 412 Mass. 330, 588 N.E.2d 1346 (1992); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 438 Mich. 197, 476 N.W.2d 392 (1991); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 480 N.W.2d 368 (Minn.Ct.App.), review denied (Mar. 26, 1992); Petr-All Petroleum Corp. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 188 A.D.2d 139, 593 N YS.2d 693 (1993); Waste Mgt. of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 597 N.E.2d 1096 (1992); Mays v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 103 Or. App. 578, 799 P.2d 653, review denied, 311 Or. 150 (1990); Greenville Cy. v. Insurance Reserve Fund, 311 S.C. 169, 427 S.E.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1993); Gridley Assocs., Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); In re Texas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir. 1994); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), vacated on other grounds on rehearing, 946 F.2d 1489 (1991); A. Johnson Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991); Great Lks. Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984); Gould, Inc. v. CNA, 809 F. Supp. 328 (M.D. Pa. 1992); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. Kansas City Fire Marine Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Okla. 1992); United States Fid. Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437 (D. Kan. 1990); United States Fid. Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). In contrast only the Supreme Courts of Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, West Virginia and Wisconsin have found the term "sudden" is ambiguous while only federal courts applying the law of New Je

  4. Greenville County v. Insurance Reserve Fund

    313 S.C. 546 (S.C. 1994)   Cited 40 times
    Holding the word “sudden” in an exception to a pollution exclusion was ambiguous and should be interpreted as “unexpected”

    CHANDLER, Acting Chief Justice: We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion reported at ___ S.C. ___, 427 S.E.2d 913 (Ct.App. 1993). FACTS