Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co.

6 Citing cases

  1. RLM Petroleum Corp. v. Emmerich

    1995 OK 50 (Okla. 1995)   Cited 4 times

    Rather, the oil and gas lease covering a remainder interest will become effective when that interest vests in present possession and enjoyment at the end of the life estate or estate for years. Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959 (1951); 1 E. Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 7.1 (1987). Despite the black letter law prohibiting the holder of a present interest in real property which is limited in duration from creating an estate which will extend beyond the term of the present interest, the Leaseholders assert their oil and gas lease continues even though the term mineral interest expired.

  2. FORD v. RAAB

    744 P.2d 956 (Okla. 1987)   Cited 2 times
    In Ford, we held to the general principles relied on in the resolution of the questions now before us. Ford expressed the rule that an exception in a warranty clause of a mineral interest, including a reversionary interest, is generally not a clear expression of intent to except the mineral interest from the grant.

    This jurisdiction has consistently held that the rule to be applied in such situations is that a deed must clearly express a reservation in the grantor of the right of reversion or it will be deemed to have passed with the conveyance. Kassner v. Alexander Drug Co., 194 Okla. 36, 147 P.2d 979 (1944), Whitman v. Harrison, supra, Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959 (1951) and Jarrett v. Moore, supra. In Kassner v. Alexander Drug Co., supra, it was noted such a rule was highly favored in the law, quoting from Brown v. Bachelder, 214 Cal. 753, 7 P.2d 1027 (1932).

  3. Barber v. Flynn

    1980 OK 175 (Okla. 1981)   Cited 21 times

    It is well settled law in Oklahoma that where possible the intent of the grantor should be ascertained and given effect. Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959; First Nat. Bank Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Price, 204 Okla. 243, 228 P.2d 623. In an effort to ascertain the intent of grantors, the Court considered the recitation in the habendum clause of the deed, and the findings made reference to that recitation:

  4. Bryan v. Everett

    1961 OK 209 (Okla. 1961)   Cited 6 times

    "A grantor in a deed is presumed to have made all the reservations he intended to make and he is not permitted to derogate from his grant by showing that some reservation was intended but not expressed." Also see Kassner v. Alexander Drug Co., 194 Okla. 36, 147 P.2d 979; Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959; Cruzan v. M.K. T. Ry. Co., Okla., 303 P.2d 313, and Whitman v. Harrison, Okla., 327 P.2d 680. Since this court is definitely committed to the so-called "four corners doctrine," in construing the deed, the court must ascertain the grantor's intention from the entire instrument without undue reference to any part; and technical meaning of words must be held to give way to the manifest intent of the parties.

  5. Whitman v. Harrison

    1958 OK 141 (Okla. 1958)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that a grantor who conveyed all of her surface rights in 80 acres subject to prior mineral conveyances covering 75 acres, without "expressly reserving" any interest, conveyed the grantor's reversionary interest in certain unexpired term mineral interests

    "The deed not being ambiguous governs and controls as to intention, * *. There is nothing whatever in this deed to satisfy the rule that the deed must clearly express the reservation in the grantor of the right of reversion or it will be deemed to have passed with the conveyance." This rule was followed in Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959, wherein we quoted and approved the above quoted language from the Kassner case. See also Cruzan v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., Okla., 303 P.2d 313.

  6. Shedden v. Anadarko E&P Co.

    2014 Pa. Super. 53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)   Cited 9 times   1 Legal Analyses

    However, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized and upheld this doctrine in the context of disputes regarding oil and gas leases. See, e.g., Duhig v. Peavy–Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878, 880 (1940); see also Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959, 961, 963 (1951). Although we acknowledge that the pronouncements of sister states are not binding authority on our courts, such decisions may be considered as persuasive authority.