Greenman v. Ralston Purina Co.

Full title: CAROLYN GREENMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RALSTON PURINA CO., a/k/a…

Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Date published: Jun 14, 2002

645 N.W.2d 653 (Mich. 2002)

466 Mich. 879

Opinion

No. 120430.

June 14, 2002.

COA: 227269, WCAC: 98-000661

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal from the November 2, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

Kelly, J., dissents and states as follows:

The question in this worker's compensation case is whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its scope of review under Mudel v Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich. 691 (2000). Mudel limits judicial review to the any-evidence standard. The judiciary does not review findings of fact de novo, but, rather, treats the WCAC's factual findings as conclusive in the absence of fraud. Because I believe that, by assessing the evidence, the Court of Appeals exceeded its scope of review, I would vacate that part of its decision.

The question before the lower tribunals was whether plaintiff's wage loss was causally related to her disability. The complicating fact here is that plaintiff accepted a severance package under which she agreed to relinquish her employment rights. While the Court of Appeals found this determinative, the magistrate and the WCAC did not. They concluded that there was a causal connection between the injury and wage loss, reasoning that plaintiff was unable to fully perform the job before she signed the severance agreement. Two panel members of the Court of Appeals reasoned that plaintiff did not quit working because of the disability and, therefore, that the resulting wage loss was not attributable to the injury.

I believe that the Court of Appeals majority evaluated the findings of the WCAC under a de novo standard. It concurred with the finding that plaintiff was not able to fully perform her work duties, but differed in concluding that this was not the cause of her wage loss. I agree with the dissenting judge's conclusion that the Court of Appeals majority thereby exceeded its scope of review under Mudel.

Considering the magistrate's and the WCAC's decisions in context, I think the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the determination that there was a causal relationship between the injury and wage loss. I would vacate that part of the Court of Appeals decision and remand for consideration of the issue not reached by the Court, whether plaintiff established a new wage earning capacity.

Cavanagh, J., concurs in the statement of Kelly, J.