Opinion
NUMBER 2012 CA 0839 NUMBER 2012 CA 0840
12-28-2012
PAULA HORN GREENLAND v. RICHARD L. GREENLAND RICHARD L. GREENLAND v. PAULA HORN GREENLAND
Craig J. Robichaux Mandeville, LA Roy S. Lilley Covington, LA Richard L. Greenland Covington, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Paula Horn Greenland Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Richard L. Greenland In proper person
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Twenty-Second Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
State of Louisiana
Docket Numbers 2004-11189 and 2008-16125
Honorable William J. Crain, Judge
Craig J. Robichaux
Mandeville, LA
Roy S. Lilley
Covington, LA
Richard L. Greenland
Covington, LA
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Paula Horn Greenland
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Richard L. Greenland
In proper person
BEFORE: CARTER, C J., GUIDRY, AND GAIDRY, JJ.
GUIDRY , J.
Appellant, Richard Greenland, appeals from a judgment of the trial court dismissing his rule to terminate permanent spousal support, or alternatively, to nullify the spousal support provision of a matrimonial agreement. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Richard Greenland and Paula Greenland were divorced by judgment dated August 23, 2004. On August 25, 2004, Richard and Paula executed a matrimonial agreement partitioning community property and settling claims between the parties. The agreement was approved by the trial court on August 27, 2004, and the community property acquired during the marriage was partitioned in accordance with the parties' agreement. Included among the provisions in the matrimonial agreement is the following clause:
The parties later executed an addendum to the matrimonial agreement on December 1, 2006, amending the agreement, and pursuant to the joint motion of the parties, the addendum was approved by the trial court.
In addition to the foregoing and as additional consideration it is agreed between the parties that:
* * *
12. Richard is to pay Paula $1,900.00 per month, $1200.00 spousal support and $700.00 per month for insurance payment for number 11 above, until she reaches age 65, at which time the amount will reduce to the amount of the insurance policy. The spousal support is only able to be terminated by death or remarriage and can not be modified except for the permanent disability of Richard.
On August 8, 2007, Richard filed a rule to terminate his obligation to pay spousal support as provided in the matrimonial agreement, or in the alternative, to have the matrimonial agreement declared null based on Paula's alleged act of living in open concubinage. Richard later filed a supplemental and amending rule, or in the alternative, petition to declare the matrimonial agreement null, wherein he alleged that his consent was vitiated by fraud because Paula misrepresented her means of support, Paula peremptorily excepted to Richard's rule, raising the objections of prescription and no cause of action. Following a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining the exceptions and dismissing Richard's rule. Thereafter, Richard appealed the trial court's decision to this court, and in Greenland v. Greenland, 08-2568 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/9/09), 29 So. 3d 647, writ denied, 10-0004 (La. 3/5/10), 28 So. 3d 1011, this court reversed the trial court's judgment sustaining the exceptions of prescription and no cause of action and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
On August 12, 2011, Richard filed a first supplemental and amending petition in reconvention, asserting that at the time he bargained for the spousal support, he was not aware that Paula was receiving financial support from Jay Furca, and as a result of Paula's bad faith, Paula received alimony to which she was not entitled. Richard prayed that the spousal support portion of the matrimonial agreement be declared null and void and that judgment be entered ordering Paula to pay Richard $145,444.66.
Following a trial, the trial court signed a judgment dismissing Richard's rule to terminate spousal support and in the alternative to have the matrimonial agreement of the parties declared null. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court found the parties intended the spousal support obligation to be inextricably linked to the division of the community property and that Richard's knowledge of Paula's relationship with Jay would not have affected his consent, as the significant and primary cause for Richard entering into the agreement was to get the property and the businesses. The trial court also found that neither the fact Paula may have been in a romantic relationship nor that she was receiving de minimis support from Jay concerned the cause for which Richard made the spousal support agreement, nor did it involve a circumstance that substantially influenced his consent to pay spousal support. Richard now appeals from the trial court's judgment.
DISCUSSION
Richard assumed the obligation to pay spousal support in the same agreement wherein the parties partitioned the community property acquired during their marriage. A contract is formed by the consent of the parties. La. C.C. art. 1927. However, consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress. La. C.C. art. 1948. Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. La. C.C. art. 1953. Fraud may also result from silence or inaction. La. C.C. art. 1953. Perot v. Perot, 46,431, p. 3 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 8/10/11), 71 So. 3d 1123, 1125, writ denied, 11-2263 (La. 11/23/11), 76 So. 3d 435. In order to establish that a party's consent has been vitiated due to fraud, the error need not concern the cause of the obligation, but it must concern a circumstance that has substantially influenced the party's consent. La. C.C. art. 1955; Greenland v. Greenland, 08-2568, pp. 4-5 (La. 12/9/09), 29 So. 3d 647, 651, writ denied, 10-0004 (La. 3/5/10), 28 So. 3d 1011. A trial court's finding of fraud vitiating consent is a question of fact, which will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. See Hickman v. Bates, 39,178, p. 6 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 12/15/04), 889 So. 2d 1249, 1253.
In examining the matrimonial agreement partitioning community property, the preamble states that the parties "now desire to settle and liquidate the community which formerly existed between them." After delineating the items that Paula was to receive, the agreement provided "[i]n addition to the foregoing and as additional consideration" that Richard is to pay Paula $1,900.00 per month, $1,200.00 in spousal support and $700.00 for life insurance payment, until she reaches age 65. Additionally, Richard agreed to pay Paula $100,000.00 in cash for her equity in the family home.
The agreement further provided that Richard was to receive the family home, assuming the mortgage debt attached thereto, as well as his law practice, title company, marine company, and retirement accounts. Finally, the agreement provided:
As a result hereof, the parties hereto discharge each other from any further accounting to each other or to the community which formerly existed between them, the same being fully liquidated as set forth above. The parties further agree that the portion received by each, considering the obligations assumed, is equal in value to the portion received by the other.
The trial court found, after examining the agreement, that the parties intended that the spousal support obligation be inextricably linked to the division of the community property, noting that if the spousal support obligation had been eliminated in the negotiations, all of the other assets in the agreement would have been reallocated. From our review of the record, we find this to be a reasonable interpretation.
We likewise find no error in the trial court's determination that Richard failed to establish that his consent to enter into the matrimonial agreement was vitiated by fraud. First, we agree with the trial court that any support received by Paula from Jay was de minimis in comparison to the assets involved in the community property settlement. Further, after reviewing the deposition testimony of Mary Devereaux, Paula's attorney at the time the matrimonial agreement was confected, who stated that in negotiating the agreement. Richard wanted the house and his businesses (assets) and Paula wanted money (income), we find no error in the trial court's determination that the significant and primary cause for Richard entering the agreement was to get the property and the businesses, and to accomplish that, he agreed to provide spousal support. The trial court's finding, that neither Paula's romantic involvement with Jay nor her receipt of de minimis support from him concerned the cause for which Richard agreed to pay the spousal support, nor did the relationship or support from Jay involve a circumstance that substantially influenced Richard's consent to pay spousal support, is reasonably supported by the record. Considering this evidence, together with the acknowledgment by Richard that he was aware that Paula had approximately $157,000.00 in cash that was her separate property, we agree with the trial court that contrary to Richard's assertion, Richard did not agree to pay spousal support to Paula because he believed her to be in necessitous circumstances. Accordingly, based on our review of the record in this matter, we find no error in the trial court's determination that the matrimonial agreement is not void due to fraud.
Richard also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to find duress in the formation of the addendum to the matrimonial agreement. According to Richard, he was forced by Paula to sign the addendum in order to obtain insurance proceeds to repair the family home, which proceeds were directed to both Richard and Paula as insureds on the policy. However, even if Richard were under duress to sign the addendum, the nullity of the addendum does not render the whole matrimonial agreement null unless, from the nature of the addendum or the intention of the parties, it can be presumed that the matrimonial agreement would not have been made without the null provision. See La. C.C. art. 2034. Because the agreement to pay spousal support was part of the original matrimonial agreement, and the addendum, in addition to resolving other unrelated matters, merely clarified the date on which the monthly payments were to be made, it cannot be presumed that the original matrimonial agreement would not have been made without the addendum.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Richard's rule to terminate permanent spousal support and in the alternative to have the matrimonial agreement of the parties declared null. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Richard Greenland.
AFFIRMED.