Opinion
No. A-1-CA-38198
07-21-2020
MELANIE BLYTHE GREENHAM, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SANTIAGO GREENHAM-RODRIGUEZ, Respondent-Appellee.
Melanie Blythe Greenham Los Lunas, NM Pro Se Appellant Lisa A. Torraco Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY
Allen R. Smith, District Judge
Melanie Blythe Greenham
Los Lunas, NM
Pro Se Appellant
Lisa A. Torraco
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
VARGAS, Judge.
{1} Petitioner appeals from the district court's May 25, 2018 and April 26, 2019 orders, dismissing her objections to the dismissal of three petitions for orders of protection and denying reconsideration of the same. In this Court's notice of proposed disposition, we proposed to summarily affirm. Petitioner filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered. Unpersuaded, we affirm.
{2} Although Petitioner filed other petitions for orders of protection in this case, the only three at issue here are those filed October 18, 2017, in D1314-DV2017-00421 ; October 19, 2017, in D1314-DV2017-00422 ; and January 12, 2018,
in D1314-DV2017-00421 . The domestic violence commissioner originally dismissed the October 2017 petitions based on issue preclusion, having found that the issues in those petitions were resolved through the parties' divorce case. [1 RP A 64 ¶ 9] As for the January 12, 2018 petition, the commissioner initially dismissed it without prejudice due to his conclusion that the parties had agreed to address those issues in their divorce case. [1 RP A 66 ¶¶ 3, 6] Petitioner objected to these orders, arguing that the orders from the divorce case were not final for purposes of claim preclusion [1 RP A 69-70] and that the parties did not stipulate to resolve the January 12, 2018 petition in their divorce. [1 RP A 68-83] The district court denied Petitioner's objections in the May 25, 2018 order, reasoning that there was a "lack of service of process" and that "neither [p]etition on [its] face shows any recent evidence of [d]omestic [v]iolence." Although the district court said "neither," it seems to have intended to resolve Petitioner's objections to all three orders. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the May 25, 2018 order , which the district court denied in its April 26, 2019 order [2 RP A 281; DS 1]. In this order, the district court reasoned that "Petitioner's claims have been previously litigated and Petitioner . . . has failed to present new law or evidence sufficient to overturn the [c]ourt's previous ruling." [2 RP A 281 ¶ 3]
{3} In light of the commissioner's original order of dismissal, [1 RP A 64 ¶ 9] the district court's April 26, 2019 order should be read as dismissing the petitions because the issues they raised had been addressed in the divorce case and thus Petitioner was precluded from raising them again in a domestic violence petition. [2 RP A 281 ¶ 3] See generally Ullrich v. Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19, 142 N.M. 835, 171 P.3d 774 ("Collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, prevents a party from re-litigating ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit." (alteration, emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). Thus, in writing that Petitioner had "failed to present new law or evidence[,]" the district court was not imposing any "time limitations," as contended by Petitioner in her memorandum in opposition. [MIO 4] Rather, the district court concluded that because Petitioner did not raise claims other than those that had already been addressed in the parties' divorce case, the petitions in the domestic violence case were barred by issue preclusion. [2 RP A 281 ¶ 3]
{4} Petitioner makes no argument as to issue preclusion on appeal. Petitioner does not challenge the district court's finding that her claims "have previously been litigated[.]" She abandons her argument that any order in the divorce case was not final, [1 RP A 69-70] and she does not offer any other reason for us to reverse the district court's conclusion as to issue preclusion. See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063 ("The presumption upon review favors the correctness of the trial court's actions. [The a]ppellant must affirmatively demonstrate its assertion of error."). We do not address Petitioner's argument that the district court also erred by dismissing her petitions for "lack of service of process" because the district court's dismissal of her petitions was appropriate based on issue preclusion alone. As such, even if we were to find error in the service issue, it would not change the result of the case. See Erica, Inc. v. N.M.
Reg. & Licensing Dep't, 2008-NMCA-065, ¶ 24, 144 N.M. 132, 184 P.3d 444 ("On appeal, error will not be corrected if it will not change the result." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep't of Taxation & Revenue, 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 36, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273 ("A reviewing court generally does not decide academic or moot questions.").
{5} We therefore affirm the district court's May 25, 2018 and April 26, 2019 orders, dismissing Petitioner's objections to the dismissal of three petitions for orders of protection and denying reconsideration of the same.
{6} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
WE CONCUR:
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge