Thus, before passage of the "occupational disease" statute, it was held in Meade Fiber Corporation v. Starnes, 147 Tenn. 362, 247 S.W. 989 (1923) that a disease caused by breathing dust caused by the work of moving sacks containing a chemical used in the employer's business is not a compensable "injury" because it did not result from an accident. Accord: Gabbard v. Proctor Gamble Defense Corporation, 184 Tenn. 464, 201 S.W.2d 651 (1947); Greener v. E.I. duPont deNemours Co., 190 Tenn. 105, 228 S.W.2d 77. Secondly, there can be no recovery for "aggravation" of an occupational disease which pre-existed the current employment.

A detailed statement of the testimony would serve no useful purpose here in view of our holdings that if there is material evidence to support the finding of the trial court, the judgment will not be disturbed. In Greener v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 190 Tenn. 105, 228 S.W.2d 77, 79, the Court said: "Where this is true, we have repeatedly held in compensation cases that we do not look to the preponderance of the evidence, but examine the record to see if there is material evidence to support the findings of the trial judge. McBrayer v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 178 Tenn. 135, 156 S.W.2d 408; Wright v. Armstrong, 179 Tenn. 134, 163 S.W.2d 78; Tipton v. North American Rayon Corp., 181 Tenn. 434, 181 S.W.2d 619; Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87.