Danforth v. City of Yankton, 1946, 71 S.D. 406, 25 N.W.2d 50; Security State Bank v. Breen, 1938, 65 S.D. 640, 277 N.W. 497. The objective of the act is to prevent actual invasions of rights and to establish guidelines for parties' actions so they may keep within lawful bounds, avoid expense, bitterness of feeling, the disturbance of orderly pursuits and to foster judicial economy. Merkel v. Long, 1962, 368 Mich. 1, 117 N.W.2d 130; Greene v. Wiese, 1955, 75 S.D. 515, 69 N.W.2d 325. Within the bounds of the remedial act's command of a liberal construction and liberal administration is found its ultimate goal of allowing "`the courts [to be] more serviceable to the people.'" Nims v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 1949, 326 Mich. 371, 40 N.W.2d 188; Larkin v. Bontatibus, 1958, 145 Conn. 570, 145 A.2d 133. The achievement of peace through the avoidance of predictable conflict permeates as the Act's main function, Trossman v. Trossman, 1960, 24 Ill. App.2d 521, 165 N.E.2d 368.
22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 29 (1988). We adopted this rule in Greene v. Wiese, 75 S.D. 515, 519, 69 N.W.2d 325, 327 (1955): "A declaration will not be made in a matter where the interest of the plaintiff is merely contingent or in anticipation of an event that may never happen." The trial court was correct in the factual findings relating to Stofferahn's unalterably closed mind, bias and prejudice and the judgment declaring that Stofferahn should be disqualified in cases pending at the time of the entry of the declaratory judgment.
Controversies and disputed questions of fact do not preclude a case from declaratory procedures. Greene v. Wiese, 75 S.D. 515, 69 N.W.2d 325 (1955). Declaratory and coercive relief may both be granted upon proper grounds.
300 U.S. at page 242, 57 S.Ct. at 465. While there are decisions to the contrary, such as Ennis v. Casey, 72 Idaho 181, 283 P.2d 435, 28 A.L.R.2d 952, and Central Mut. Ins. Co. v.Lutz, 414 Pa. 137, 199 A.2d 442, in our judgment, the conclusion reached in Aetna is more consistent with the terms and spirit of the act. It has been followed in numerous decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e. g., Ohio FarmersIndem. Co. v. Chames, 170 Ohio St. 209, 163 N.E.2d 367; Greene v. Wiese, 75 S.D. 515, 69 N.W.2d 325; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Willrich, 13 Wn.2d 263, 124 P.2d 950, 142 A.L.R. 1. The act provides that all persons shall be made parties to an action for declaratory relief "who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration.
The judgment entered will, in advance of additional litigation, remove the uncertainties which now confront each of the parties concerning the claims asserted by the injured parties. This holding we feel is in harmony with the declared legislative objective of our Declaratory Judgment Act and satisfies the requirements of an action thereunder as announced by this court in Greene v. Wiese, 75 S.D. 515, 69 N.W.2d 325; Danforth v. City of Yankton, 71 S.D. 406, 25 N.W.2d 50; State of North Dakota ex rel. Strutz v. Perkins County, 69 S.D. 270, 9 N.W.2d 500. The essential facts are not in serious dispute.