Opinion
No. 76-711
Decided June 30, 1977. Rehearing denied July 28, 1977. Certiorari granted October 11, 1977.
Second wife of deceased state employee sought accumulated pension fund deduction from state retirement association, but fund, citing the existence of minor children who would also be eligible for survivors' benefits, refused the refund. District court declared plaintiff entitled to the refund, and state retirement association appealed.
Affirmed
1. PENSIONS — Second Wife — Decedent Public Employee — Sought Payment — Accumulated Deductions — Other Existing Claimants — Survivors' Benefits — Not Defeat Claim. Where, upon the death of a teacher who was a member of the Public Employees Retirement Association, his second wife, pursuant to applicable statutory provisions, requested the payment of decedent's accumulated deductions for contributions to the retirement fund, the fact that there were other persons eligible for the teacher's survivor's benefits under the public employees pension system did not defeat the wife's claim for refund of the accumulated deductions, and therefore, the Public Employees Retirement Association was obligated to make the requested payment.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Gilbert A. Alexander, Judge.
Feder Morris, P.C., Katherine Tamblyn, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, Mary A. Rashman, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants-appellants.
Defendant, the Public Employees' Retirement Association (PERA), appeals the district court judgment declaring plaintiff to be entitled to certain funds held by defendant. We affirm the judgment.
Plaintiff was the second wife of Donald Greene, who, prior to his death was a teacher in the State college system and a member of PERA. As the designated beneficiary of her deceased husband's retirement plan, plaintiff requested payment of decedent's accumulated deductions or contributions pursuant to § 24-51-117(1), C.R.S. 1973. PERA concluded that, inasmuch as the decedent was also survived by the minor children of his former marriage, plaintiff was not eligible for a refund of decedent's contributions, although she would be eligible for an annuity at the age of 62 provided she had not remarried.
Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action for declaratory judgment. The district court held that, in conformance with the applicable statutory provisions, PERA was obligated to make the requested payment. We agree.
Section 24-51-117(1), C.R.S. 1973 provides that a member of PERA may designate one or more beneficiaries under the plan. If the member dies without receiving an annuity, "an amount equal to the total of his accumulated deductions shall be paid in one lump sum to the beneficiaries designated by such members . . . " The member's interest in the fund is deemed to be personal, and his designation of a beneficiary will be given the intended legal effect in accordance with contractual principles analogous to those governing the designation of beneficiaries in life insurance contracts. See, e.g., Caravaggio v. Retirement Board of the Teachers' Retirement System, 36 N.Y.2d 348, 329 N.E.2d 165 (1975); Gunsaulis v. Tingler, 218 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1974); Di Dio v. Board of Trustees of the Milwaukee Public School Teachers' Annuity and Retirement Fund, 38 Wis.2d 261, 156 N.W.2d 418 (1968); see generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 644.
[1] Here, relying on §§ 24-51-803 et seq. C.R.S. 1973, which provides for the payment of annuities to statutorily specified survivors, PERA determined that the existence of other persons eligible for survivors' benefits under the system would defeat plaintiff's claim for a refund of the accumulated deductions. We hold, to the contrary, that plaintiff's claim does not depend on the rights of other potential claimants and that she is presently entitled to the refund.
PERA's construction of § 24-51-117(1) and § 24-51-803, C.R.S. 1973, would render ineffective the plain language of the former provision conferring the benefit on plaintiff. And, there exists no inconsistency in the statutes that would mandate such a substantial and unwarranted change in the meaning of § 24-51-117(1). See Davis v. Conour, 178 Colo. 376, 479 P.2d 1015 (1972).
We presume that the provisions relative to survivors' rights were enacted after due consideration of existing statutes, In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 179 Colo. 270, 499 P.2d 1169 (1972), and we further conclude that § 24-51-117(1) has not been amended by implication. See People v. James, 178 Colo. 401, 497 P.2d 1256 (1972).
PERA maintains that plaintiff's interpretation of the Act will subject PERA to liability for both the refund of a member's accumulated benefits and the payment of survivors' benefits. We are not now determining PERA's obligations to decedent's survivors, who are not parties to this appeal; and should PERA's fiscal integrity be jeopardized, the matter is one properly resolved through legislative measures. Conrad v. City of Thornton, 191 Colo. 444, 553 P.2d 822 (1976). In any event, the situation postulated by PERA is not now before us.
The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE SMITH and JUDGE VAN CISE concur.