Opinion
CIVIL 3:CV-05-0017
11-19-2024
MICHAEL GREENE, Plaintiff v. LACKAWANNA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE, ET AL, Defendants
MEMORANDUM
EDWIN M. KOSIK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Michael Greene, an inmate currently confined at the Lackawanna County Prison, Pennsylvania, submitted a typewritten document entitled “Civil Rights Complaint 42 U.S.C. 1983" on January 4, 2005. He has paid the required filing fee in this matter. Named as defendants are the Lackawanna County Public Defenders Office and Public Defenders Matthew Comerford and Donald Dolan; the Lackawanna District Attorneys Office and District Attorney Andrew Jarbola and Assistant District Attorneys Carole Colombo and Eugene Talerico; Lackawanna County Prison employee Jay Ruane; and Attorney David Gnall. In the complaint Greene sets forth allegations against defendants relative to pre-trial proceedings which have occurred thus far in Lackawanna County regarding his arrest on charges of aggravated and simple assault. For the reasons that follow, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
In reviewing the complaint, it does not appear that Greene has yet been convicted of a crime. Rather, he is a pre-trial detainee held on charges of aggravated and simple assault.
I. Background
Plaintiff alleges that on May 4, 2004, he was arrested for aggravated and simple assault. He states that he wanted an attorney to represent him with regard to these charges. His preliminary hearing was originally scheduled for May 11,2004. After two continuances, the hearing was rescheduled to July 19, 2004. Greene states that he received no correspondence from the Office of the Public Defender from May of 2004 until July of 2004, and that the prosecuting attorneys conspired with the defense attorneys to constantly continue his case. On July 19, 2004, the District Attorney ended up withdrawing the case and then refiling the charges against him on July 20, 2004. Letters that plaintiff sent to Public Defender Comerford allegedly “fell on deaf ears” according to plaintiff. Plaintiff's arraignment occurred on July 21,2004 and bail in the amount of $25,000.00 was set. Plaintiff remained confined apparently due to the fact that he did not raise bail as well as pay other fines and costs which had been imposed.
Plaintiff further contends that Assistant District Attorneys Talerico and Colombo conspired with Jay Ruane of the Lackawanna County Prison with regard to a bail modification in an effort to keep him in custody. According to plaintiff a modification never actually existed but the District Attorneys told Ruane that a modification had been issued stating that plaintiff was not to be released unless the bail was posted. He contends that no supporting paperwork was ever faxed to the Lackawanna County Prison.
Plaintiff's preliminary hearing was ultimately conducted on August 16, 2004. Plaintiff's family hired defendant Gnall to represent him. Plaintiff alleges that he never met with Gnall until that morning at the courthouse. Gnall informed plaintiff that he had no habeas corpus claim. At the preliminary hearing, information was introduced with regard to a drug and alcohol screening of the victim. Plaintiff contends that certain information was “blacked out” on the record regarding the screening and that this was done by Assistant District Attorney Colombo.
As of the following day, plaintiff contends that he was forced to start proceeding pro se until November 9, 2004 when he obtained the representation of Donald Dolan, a public defender. Plaintiff claims that Dolan tried to get him to plead without even knowing about the case, and never talked with him about the case.
In a supplemental filing plaintiff submitted to this court on February 4, 2005, he also appears to claim that Judge Barrasse of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County denied his motions during the preliminary hearing, but granted many of the motions filed by the prosecution. (Doc. 7.) He contends that Barrasse's actions deprived him of a fair hearing.
In his complaint, plaintiff does not specify what relief he seeks in filing this action. However, in his supplemental filing of February 4, 2005, he states that he seeks compensatory damages and also requests that the defendants named in this action lose their jobs and that he be discharged from prison. He also requests that the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas rule on various motions he presently has pending before it.
II. Discussion
Plaintiff is seeking to redress what he purports to be violations of his constitutional rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A states, in part: “The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity . . . . On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the Supreme Court stated that a complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 490 U.S. at 325.
It is well established that judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for conduct performed in the course of their official duties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 431 (3d Cir. 1990)(recognizing that a court may dismiss an allegation against a judge based on an exercise of judicial power). In the instant case, the allegations raised by plaintiff against Judge Barrasse are all with regard to actions taken by said defendant during the exercise of his official duties. As such, this defendant is entitled to absolute immunity.
Several claims are also raised in this action against various Lackawanna County Public Defenders. A public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 when performing traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 311 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). This immunity is rooted in the recognition that the indigent defendant who believes he has been wronged will not be left without a remedy. Under Pennsylvania law, a criminal defendant can pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by a motion for a new trial, on direct appeal, or by post-conviction proceedings. He also retains the right to initiate state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. Further, adhering to a principle of immunity for public defenders provides the adequate incentive for public defenders to perform competently and in good faith. In the instant case, because the allegations against the public defenders are premised on the purported ineffective assistance of counsel they provided to plaintiff during the course of his criminal defense thus far, they are entitled to dismissal from this lawsuit.
Plaintiff also raises claims against members of the Lackawanna County District Attorneys Office. Specifically, he contends that certain attorneys in this office acted improperly with regard to his prosecution in terms of filing charges against him, scheduling his preliminary hearing and during the course of his hearing. A state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability from damages under Section 1983 for acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, such as the initiation of the prosecution and the presentation of the state's case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir. 1996). Only qualified immunity, however, is available to prosecutors with regard to allegations based on their administrative and/or investigative duties. See Hawk v. Brosha, 590 F.Supp. 337, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Plaintiff's claims in this case clearly concern matters “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. There do not appear to be any facts alleged with respect to the investigative/administrative duties of these individuals. The claims stem from the initiation of the prosecution, including the bringing of the charges/refiling of charges, as well as the scheduling and presentation of the case at the preliminary hearing. Further, plaintiff's general assertions of conspiracy between the Office of the District Attorney and the Office of the Public Defenders in rescheduling the preliminary hearing are completely conclusory and unsupported.
To the extent plaintiff argues that the district attorneys improperly asserted to the Lackawanna County Prison that a bail modification had been issued by the Magistrate Judge, plaintiff's own exhibits to the complaint defeat his argument as he attaches the actual bail modification as well as a letter dated July 22, 2004, from the office of the District Attorney to Jay Ruane informing him of the modification. (Doc. 1, Comp., Exs. A, B.)
Any ineffective assistance of counsel claim plaintiff attempts to voice against his privately retained attorney, David Gnall, also is not proper in this Section 1983 civil rights action. It is well established that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Gnall was not a state actor, but rather, a privately retained attorney. To the extent plaintiff seeks to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Gnall, he has other remedies available to him for raising these claims as discussed above.
To the extent plaintiff seeks damages for his alleged wrongful incarceration, his claim is also subject to dismissal. First of all, plaintiff has not even been convicted of his crime. He is currently in the midst of proceedings before the Lackawanna County Court, which has jurisdiction over his pending criminal action. Moreover, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional cause of action for damages does not accrue “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” until plaintiff proves that the “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. Clearly, as it appears plaintiff has not yet even been convicted of the charged offenses, it is impossible that he has successfully challenged any conviction.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff's complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous. An appropriate Order is attached.
ORDER
NOW, THIS 28th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2005, in accordance with the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The complaint is dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
3. Any appeal taken from this Order will be deemed frivolous, without probable cause, and not taken in good faith.