Greene v. Helms

3 Citing cases

  1. Gaffron v. Marta

    229 Ga. App. 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times

    See Harris v. Cates, 105 Ga. App. 178, 182 (6) ( 123 S.E.2d 703) (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 217 Ga. 801 ( 125 S.E.2d 649) (1962) (failure of a pedestrian to look at all or to look at a given time for oncoming vehicles may, under some circumstances, constitute negligence). In Greene v. Helms, 115 Ga. App. 447, 451 ( 154 S.E.2d 892) (1967), this court held that even though vehicles were required to yield to pedestrians crossing the street within a crosswalk, and thus the pedestrian was entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle would obey the rules of the road and yield the right of way to the pedestrian, a pedestrian may still be negligent in failing to look for vehicles. According to Greene, questions regarding comparative negligence are peculiarly for determination by the jury.

  2. Jackson Atlantic v. Wright

    129 Ga. App. 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 15 times
    Affirming a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff who fell into a hole created by an open floor safe after the store manager asked her to "move back"

    [Cit.]." Greene v. Helms, 115 Ga. App. 447, 451 ( 154 S.E.2d 892). (2) "Where reasonable minds might disagree as to whether the alleged negligence of the plaintiff is of a character to preclude her recovery and to stand itself as the proximate cause of her injuries, this is a matter for the jury to determine." Lassiter v. Poss, 85 Ga. App. 785 (1b) ( 70 S.E.2d 411); Stapleton v. Amerson, 96 Ga. App. 471, 473 ( 100 S.E.2d 628).

  3. Taylor v. Crawford

    167 S.E.2d 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 10 times

    " Russell v. Corley, 212 Ga. 121 (1) ( 91 S.E.2d 24). The city ordinance in question was in the language of Code Ann. § 68-1657: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway," as to which statute this court held in Wells v. Alderman, 117 Ga. App. 724, 733 ( 162 S.E.2d 18): "But the rule as to the duty of pedestrians crossing at places other than at a crosswalk is stated in Code Ann. § 68-1657, which is different from that indicated in this charge, and for this reason the charge was error." In Wells, as here, the charge excepted to was taken from O'Dowd v. Newnham, 13 Ga. App. 220 ( 80 S.E. 36). This differentiates the case from Greene v. Helms, 115 Ga. App. 447 ( 154 S.E.2d 892) (where the plaintiff was crossing at a crosswalk); Shelton v. Rose, 116 Ga. App. 37, 39 ( 156 S.E.2d 659) (where it appeared that the point of impact was within city limits and at an intersection, and the crosswalk question did not arise, but the court held: that "the equal rights referred to are rights as dictated by applicable traffic regulations, including those pertaining to right of way") and from Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545 ( 103 S.E.2d 745), which involves a different problem relating to the relative rights of vehicular traffic and pedestrians forced by an excavation in the sidewalk to step into the street in order to skirt the blocked-off area. The appellee contends that because the plaintiff was in the street first, and because he was facing in a direction opposite to that from which the defendant was approaching, his right was equal or superior to that of the defendant, and accordingly the charge was not error as against the latter.