It is to be noted that in the notice involved in this case, the notice states with respect to location or place, "while in performance of his duties as a city employee collided with a building owned by H. Winter Metal Company, Inc." In Greene v. City of Chicago (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 502, 363 N.E.2d 378, aff'd (1978), 73 Ill.2d 100, 382 N.E.2d 1205, this court held a notice sufficient that identified the place where the accident occurred as 105th and Wentworth, when in fact, the accident occurred one block away. The court in Meisenheimer v. City of Chester (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 1088, 305 N.E.2d 322, reversed a trial court's decision to the contrary and held sufficient a notice that described the location of the accident therein as Route 3 in Chester; Route 3 actually ran the entire length of the City of Chester. Additionally, in Brooks v. City of Chicago (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 459, 435 N.E.2d 1182, this court affirmed a trial court's determination that a notice was sufficient where it stated that the accident occurred "at or near the public sidewalk," rather than on the street where the accident did in fact occur.

The court stated that defendant's exact conduct need not be entirely foreseeable to constitute the legal cause of plaintiff's injury. In Greene v. City of Chicago (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 502, aff'd (1978), 73 Ill.2d 100, the plaintiff was hit by an intoxicated driver after the former's car stalled near an unlighted city intersection. In finding the city could be held liable to plaintiff for failure to ensure working street lights at the intersection, the court stated that it was unnecessary that the precise nature of the occurrence be foreseeable.

The trial court gave two reasons for this holding: (1) the notice stated that the accident occurred "at or near the public sidewalk" of 7945 South Ridgeland rather than on the street; and (2) the plaintiff did not call all the physicians listed in the notice. In Greene v. City of Chicago (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 502, 363 N.E.2d 378, aff'd (1978), 73 Ill.2d 100, 382 N.E.2d 1205, an alleged defect in the notice was that the location of the accident was listed as "105th and Wentworth" instead of the actual intersection of 104th and Wentworth. We held that plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice requirements of section 8-102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 85, par. 8-102) because the city had received actual as well as statutory notice of the exact location of the accident.

The basis of liability under both of plaintiff's theories is the "good samaritan doctrine" as enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) and adopted by the Illinois courts. Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Ill.2d 204, 210, 35 Ill.Dec. 530, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979) ("In assessing [the inspector's] duty in tort owed to Pippin as a result of its contract with the Authority, we find section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to be apposite."); Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 82 Ill.2d 313, 317, 45 Ill.Dec. 121, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980); Chisolm v. Stephens, 47 Ill.App.3d 999, 1005, 7 Ill.Dec. 795, 365 N.E.2d 80 (1st Dist. 1977); Green v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill.App.3d 502, 504, 6 Ill.Dec. 696, 363 N.E.2d 378 (1st Dist. 1976). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A provides as follows:

In addition, neither the inadvertance, mistake nor absence of prejudice alleged by the plaintiff amounts to the showing of "good cause" required under Supreme Court Rule 183 to extend the six-month time limit. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110A, Section 183; Greene v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. App.3d 502, 6 Ill.Dec. 696, 363 N.E.2d 378 (1977); McClure Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Winter, 84 Ill. App.3d 231, 39 Ill.Dec. 580, 405 N.E.2d 28 (3d Dist. 1980). Nor is the "relations back doctrine" of Ill.Rev.Stat. 110, Section 2-616 applicable in this case. The purpose of that statute is to cure "technical deficiencies of timely-filed complaints."

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court: Following a bench trial in this action to recover damages for personal injuries, the circuit court of Cook County entered judgment in the amount of $750,000 in favor of plaintiff, James Greene, and against defendants, the city of Chicago (hereafter defendant) and Timothy J. Ferm. Defendant appealed, the appellate court affirmed ( 48 Ill. App.3d 502), and we allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. The facts are adequately stated in the appellate court opinion and will be reviewed here only to the extent necessary to discuss the issues. On December 12, 1970, at approximately 11:30 p.m., while plaintiff was driving south on Wentworth Avenue, his automobile stalled and came to a stop a short distance north of the intersection with 104th Street.

The trial court also found that Anderson's explanation for how the bicycle handlebar impacted the window at a much higher height was not supported by the evidence and ultimately concluded that Meshulam's testimony was more credible and supported by the evidence. See Greene v. City of Chicago , 48 Ill.App.3d 502, 506, 6 Ill.Dec. 696, 363 N.E.2d 378 (1976) (the trial court is in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the conflicts in evidence). ¶ 103 Additionally, our review of the record reveals that Meshulam's opinion testimony did not amount to mere speculation.

Mistake, inadvertence, or simple attorney neglect cannot constitute the sole basis for a good cause determination. See Greene v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 502, 513 (1976), aff'd, 73 Ill. 2d 100, 382 N.E.2d 1205 (1978); Floyd v. United States, 900 F.2d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1990). We affirm the circuit court's judgment on this issue.

Inadvertence, mistake, or absence of prejudice to the opposing party or inconvenience to the trial court does not constitute "good cause." Greene v. City of Chicago (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 502, 513, aff'd (1978), 73 Ill.2d 100. The trial court acted correctly in striking plaintiff's successor counsel's amended motion filed prior to his entering an appearance.

That theory, espoused in section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), has been applied in Illinois in various contexts. ( Greene v. City of Chicago (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 502, 363 N.E.2d 378, aff'd (1978), 73 Ill.2d 100, 382 N.E.2d 1205.) Section 323 provides: