Patterson therefore cannot apply to the Southwest case in which the private litigant raises precisely the same legal claim litigated by the public agency. In Stuart v. Winslow Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 1966, 100 Ariz. 375, 414 P.2d 976; and Greene v. Art Institute of Chicago, 1957, 16 Ill.App.2d 84, 147 N.E.2d 415, cert. denied, 1958, 358 U.S. 838, 79 S.Ct. 62, 3 L.Ed.2d 74, members of the public were precluded from relitigating issues previously tried by public authorities. Because the private parties claimed no interest in the outcome besides their interests as citizens and taxpayers, perhaps they lacked standing to sue.
Id. See also Greene v. Art Institute of Chicago, 16 Ill.App.2d 84, 147 N.E.2d 415 (1957); Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 41(d) (1980); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4458 at 512-520 (1981).
The homeowners were held to have been represented by the city in the previous suit. See also Price v. Sixth Dist. Agricultural Assn., 201 Cal. 502, 514 (1927) (taxpayers bound by suits brought by the mayor and the board of supervisors); Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Central Forwarding, Inc., 535 S.W.2d 412, 415-416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (motor carriers held represented in prior proceedings by the Attorney General); Burnsville v. Bloomington, 264 Minn. 133, 145 (1962) (determination of the rights of the annexing municipality and of the other town will be res judicata on all the residents of the governmental units involved); Red Wing v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light Power Co., 139 Minn. 240, 245 (1918); Greene v. Art Inst. 16 Ill. App.2d 84, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958) (Art Institute bound as it was represented as a member of the public in prior litigation by the Attorney General); Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 50 Ohio St.2d 27 (1977); Hoffman v. Public Employees' Retirement Bd., 31 Or. App. 85 (1977). Also cf. Aerojet-Gen.