"The legislature may make classifications * * * without infringement of the equal protection guarantee, and its discretion in this regard is broad and will not be disturbed." Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers, Local 1532, Amer. Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Helsby, 41 A.D.2d 329, 342 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1973). IV. Future Proceedings and Discovery

Decided July 3, 1973 Appeal from (3d dept.: 41 A.D.2d 329) APPEALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS

This outcome perhaps inevitably follows whenever a decision hinges on the adoption of one of several alternative tests; it seems particularly unfortunate when constitutional issues of immense importance hang in the balance. There are signs that the Supreme Court is retreating from the use of all three tests (Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, pp ___, 2658-2659 [claim of gender-based discrimination]; Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230-234 [claim of mentally ill patients for Social Security benefits]; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, ___, 101 S Ct 2434, 2442 [claim that right to travel was violated]) to return to the standard of persons similarly situated under law receiving dissimilar treatment, a standard adhered to in the past by our courts (see, e.g., Matter of Engelsher v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 374; Matter of Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers v Helsby, 41 A.D.2d 329, 330-331 [COOKE, J.]). Nevertheless, I am in accord with Justice LAZER'S conclusion that presently the three tests exist concurrently.

Similarly, plaintiff's equal protection argument is meritless. As we said in Matter of Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers, Local 1532, v Helsby ( 41 A.D.2d 329, 331, app dsmd 33 N.Y.2d 644), "[t]he Legislature may make classifications * * * without infringement of the equal protection guarantee, and its discretion in this regard is broad and will not be disturbed * * * provided only that it shall not be palpably arbitrary (Matter of Dorn "HH" v. Lawrence "II", 31 N.Y.2d 154 [app dsmd 409 U.S. 1121])." Section 9-0305 seeks to regulate outdoor signs that offend aesthetic values.

However, while the authority of the agency to resolve disputes and to fashion suitable remedies is beyond dispute, the Taylor Act provides that a reviewing court has the power "to make and enter a judgment or decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the board" (Civil Service Law, § 213, subd [d]). It is for the courts to examine the reasonable application of PERB's remedies (see Matter of City of Albany v Helsby, 29 N.Y.2d 433, 438; Matter of New York State Public Employment Relations Bd. v Board of Educ. of City of Buffalo, 46 A.D.2d 509, 513; Matter of Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers v Helsby, 41 A.D.2d 329, 330). It is particularly appropriate that we do so here, for a bargaining order is more than a punitive measure, designed to deter future abuses.

There are no prescribed procedures, either in the statute, or any regulation. (Cf. Matter of Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers v. Helsby, 41 A.D.2d 329; 4 NYCRR 201.9.) Nonetheless, the hearings here are precedent to punishment and necessarily partake of a quasi-judicial nature.