Greenberg v. Greenberg

12 Citing cases

  1. Bradford v. Dumond

    675 A.2d 957 (Me. 1996)   Cited 29 times
    Summarizing the holding of Greenberg v, Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 323-324, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (Me. 1945), and adopting its holding as a basic tenet with regard to notions of property ownership in a joint tenancy

    Although it is true that in Boulette we did not specifically deal with a simultaneous contribution and creation of a joint tenancy, this issue has been settled in Maine for over half a century. In Greenberg v. Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 323-24, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (Me. 1945), we held that the joint tenants owned an equal, undivided share of the property, even when one joint tenant supplied 100% of the purchase price and simultaneously had the land deeded to himself and another as joint tenants. II. Co-tenant's Contributions Towards the Properties.

  2. Dalton v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    135 T.C. 393 (U.S.T.C. 2010)

    However, where the transferee is a spouse, descendant, or other natural object of the bounty of the person who paid the purchase price, a gift is presumed. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (Me.1945); 1 Restatement, supra sec. 9(2). Additionally, evidence to establish a resulting trust under Maine law must be “ ‘the most satisfactory and convincing evidence’ “ because the creation of a resulting trust is “ ‘in defiance of the statute of frauds [and] subversive of paper title.’

  3. Dalton v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

    135 T.C. 393 (U.S.T.C. 2010)   Cited 1 times

    [14] Maine courts have held that, where the transfer is to a spouse or from a parent to a child, a gift is presumed. See Greenberg v. Greenberg, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (Me. 1945); Danforth v. Briggs, 36 A. 452 (Me. 1896); Wentworth v. Shibles, 36 A. 108, 109 (Me. 1896); Long v. McKay, 24 A. 815 (Me. 1892). Maine courts have not addressed whether the presumption of a gift extends to other relatives of the person who paid the purchase price.

  4. Young v. Young

    329 A.2d 386 (Me. 1974)   Cited 16 times
    In Young, the acceptance by a husband of a joint tenancy deed on a home before the adoption of the marital property statute did not transmute the property into marital property.

    Hypothesizing, without deciding, that Section 722-A tolerates "transmutation", we turn to the crucial question of whether defendant had in fact objectively manifested actual intention to change the nature of the ownership consequences (as "non-marital") legally attaching in the absence of defendant's exercise of intent into the ownership consequences otherwise legally characterized by Section 722-A as "marital." The exact nature of the legal interest recognized by the law of Maine as of the time defendant accepted the joint tenancy deed was: (1) as stated in Greenberg v. Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 43 A.2d 841 (1945): "[w]hile a resulting trust may arise, the presumption from the relationship of the parties is that the transfer was a gift to the wife . . . [such that] he gave her [a joint] half . . . [interest] in the propert[y] . . ." (pp. 323, 324, 43 A.2d p. 842); and (2) a divorce judgment then granted would be without legal effect to produce any change of the interests. Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15, 70 A.2d 868 (1950).

  5. Register of Wills v. Madine

    219 A.2d 245 (Md. 1966)   Cited 14 times
    In Madine both of the joint tenants had agreed with the State on the selling price for the jointly held real estate and had delivered a fully executed deed to the State in fee.

    "A conveyance of the joint-tenancy property joined in by both or all of the joint tenants necessarily terminates the joint tenancy in the property conveyed * * *." 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 16 (1965), see also § 19; Jackson v. Jackson, 9 Ves. Jun. 591, 32 Eng. Rep. 732 (Ch. 1804); Doe v. Read, 12 East 57, 104 Eng. Rep. 23 (K.B. 1810); Leonard v. Boswell (Va.), 90 S.E.2d 872; In Re Putnam's Estate (Cal.), 28 P.2d 27; Ball v. Mann (Cal.App.), 199 P.2d 706; Greenberg v. Greenberg (Me.), 43 A.2d 841; In Re Cossitt's Estate, 198 N.Y. Supp. 560, aff'd 142 N.E. 268. Maryland has given indication of agreement. In Williams v. Dovell, 202 Md. 351, 358, in which partners held record title to real estate used in the partnership as joint tenants, we said, in holding the partners were tenants in common:

  6. Welch Oil Co. v. State Tax Assessor

    CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-10-43 (Me. Sep. 28, 2012)

    This has been the long-held position of the Law Court, as exemplified in Greenberg v. Greenberg, where the Law Court held that joint tenants own an equal undivided share of the property even if one joint tenant provides the entirety of the purchase price, and simultaneously deeds the land to himself and another as joint tenants. SeeBradford, 675 A.2d at 961 (summarizing the holding of Greenberg v, Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 323-324, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (Me. 1945), and adopting its holding as a basic tenet with regard to notions of property ownership in a joint tenancy). The Law Court has consistently held that contributions made prior to the formation of a joint tenancy should not be considered because to do so would defeat joint ownership altogether.

  7. Ackerman v. Hojnowski

    2002 Me. 147 (Me. 2002)   Cited 20 times

    Id. This is true even though one joint tenant supplied 100% of the purchase price. See id. (discussing Greenberg v. Greenberg, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (Me. 1945)). To consider Ackerman's and Hojnowski's relative contributions to the initial acquisition of the property "would defeat joint ownership."

  8. Smith v. Smith

    472 A.2d 943 (Me. 1984)   Cited 9 times
    In Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943 (1984), we reserved the question whether the Carter presumption "applies only to an interspousal transfer creating a joint tenancy" in real estate.

    On appeal, the husband argued that the entire property remained his separate nonmarital property because the transfer into joint tenancy was evidence of an intent to avoid probate and inheritance taxes, rather than evidence of an intent to make a gift. The wife argued that the common-law presumption of a gift ( see Greenberg v. Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 43 A.2d 841 (1945)), read in conjunction with § 722-A(2)(A), made the transfer a gift, subsequent to marriage, resulting in separate nonmarital property. We concluded that, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a "transfer from one spouse to both spouses jointly evidenced an intent to make a gift to the marital estate."

  9. Carter v. Carter

    419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980)   Cited 34 times
    In Carter, we looked to a decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals in Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) because the Missouri statute was identical to our statute.

    The appellee-wife's response is that the transfer into joint tenancy gave her a one-half interest in the "Ponderosa" as her separate property. This result is compelled, she argues, by operation of the common-law presumption of a gift set out in Greenberg v. Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 323-24, 43 A.2d 841, 842 (1945), read in conjunction with the exception of subsection 2(A) of Section 722-A, making "[p]roperty acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent" subsequent to marriage "non-marital." Resolution of the question of the proper classification of the property in dispute requires us to examine our marital property statute, 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A (Supp.

  10. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts

    406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979)   Cited 48 times
    In Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979), we adopted the source of funds rule for real estate in joint tenancy acquired after marriage with funds that came, at least in part, from one spouse's separate property.

    Neither of the parties have invoked the rule that conveyance of property by one spouse to both spouses in joint tenancy raises a presumption of the gift of a one-half interest. See Greenberg v. Greenberg, 141 Me. 320, 43 A.2d 841 (1945); Coates v. Coates, 64 Ill. App.3d 914, 21 Ill.Dec. 656, 381 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (1978). Cf. Young v. Young, Me., 329 A.2d 386, 390 (1974).