He offers nothing more than a conclusory argument that the instruction was prejudicial, and in light of the strong evidence of Whittaker's guilt, omitting the instruction would not have given rise to a reasonable probability of a different outcome. See Mangold , 253 Ga. App. at 372 (2), 559 S.E.2d 103 (explaining that "even assuming that the court improperly charged the jury [on alcoholism], we find that this instruction was not prejudicial to Mangold," where undisputed evidence showed that the defendant shot the victim after waving a gun around); Green v. State , 190 Ga. App. 130, 130 (2), 378 S.E.2d 178 (1989) (holding that the alcoholism and voluntary intoxication instructions "were not prejudicial to defendant" in light of the trial court's full charge to the jury).
There was sufficient evidence in the record to justify this charge and we find no error. Moreover, even assuming that the court improperly charged the jury in this regard, we find that this instruction was not prejudicial to Mangold. See Green v. State, 190 Ga. App. 130, 131(2) ( 378 S.E.2d 178) (1989). Likewise, Mangold claims that the court erred in its charge regarding voluntary intoxication.
Weaver v. State, 67 Ga. App. 692 (2b) ( 21 S.E.2d 542) (1942)' Davis v. State, 167 Ga. App. 701 (1), 702 ( 307 S.E.2d 272)." Green v. State, 190 Ga. App. 130 (1), 131 ( 378 S.E.2d 178). In the case sub judice, we have examined the trial court's charge on a landlord's duty to repair and find nothing which could have misled the jury.