Opinion
NO. 5:19-CV-00370-MTT-MSH
07-09-2020
DAVID KEITH GREEN, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF THOMAS SMITH, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, Plaintiff David Keith Green, a prisoner currently housed in the Autry State Prison in Pelham, Georgia, has paid the required initial partial filing fee. Plaintiff's claims are now ripe for preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and § 1915(e). After conducting this review, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED without prejudice and that his remaining pending motion (ECF No. 13) be DENIED as moot.
PRELIMINARY SCREENING
I. Standard of Review
In accordance with the PLRA, the district courts are obligated to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are "held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on "indisputably meritless legal" theories and "claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and cannot "merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting a claim. Id. at 556. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Factual Allegations and Plaintiff's Claims
A. Unlawful Detention Claims
Plaintiff's first claims arise out of his arrest and detention. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was "pick[ed] up without a warrant" on an unspecified date and held "without charges pending" and without a bond or first appearance hearing for more than sixty days. Id. at 3-4.
In his court-ordered amended or supplemental pleading, Plaintiff clarifies that he was originally arrested on April 21, 2011 for "false crimes," terroristic threats and acts, and stalking. Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff was sentenced to ten years with eight to serve. Id. On April 19, 2013, Plaintiff was released on parole from Johnson State Prison in Johnson County, Georgia, but he was immediately taken into custody by officers from the Washington County Sheriff's Department. Id. Plaintiff contends that at this time, there were "no holds" on Plaintiff, no warrants existed, and officers had "no jurisdiction in Johnson County" to detain Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was transported to the Washington County Jail and then to the Baldwin County Jail, where he was held more than sixty days— from April 19, 2013 until June 20, 2013. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff was then released on probation but was again arrested on November 30, 2018 for violating his probation. Id. at 2. Plaintiff was ultimately charged with stalking and "false crime" and contends that even though he was given a bond, the "Sherriff [sic] dept held [him] in custody." Id. Plaintiff was convicted on the charges arising from the November 30, 2018 probation violation and "was sentenced to 10 years sentence 2 years to run concurrent with the probation [he] was on for 2011." Id.
It appears Plaintiff is attempting to raise claims concerning the allegedly unlawful April 19, 2013, arrest and his subsequent 60-plus day detention in Baldwin County. See, e.g., Attach. 1 to Am. Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 1-1 (verifying dates of incarceration in Baldwin County with "no charges" pending). These claims are time-barred. The limitations period for filing a § 1983 claim is controlled by state law. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985). In Georgia, the proper limitations period for a section 1983 claim is the two-year period prescribed for personal injury claims in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986). Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations period for claims under § 1983, federal law determines the date of accrual. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). Under § 1983, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know he has been injured, and he is or should be aware of who injured him. Id. at 562. Plaintiff states that the allegedly wrongful acts of Defendants occurred—and his claims therefore accrued—no later than the date of his release from Baldwin County custody, i.e., June 20, 2013. Plaintiff had two years from that date to file his § 1983 claims, but he did not do so until late 2019. See, e.g., Attach. 1 to Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff's claims are thus barred by the statute of limitations, and they are subject to dismissal for this reason. See Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1163 (dismissal appropriate on statute of limitations grounds where plaintiff pointed the court "to no particular reason why the statute of limitations might be tolled in his case" and the court could "discern none from the record").
To the extent Plaintiff state that he was "held . . . in custody" even though a judge had granted him a bond on or about November 30, 2018, Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 11, such claim would not be time-barred. Plaintiff appears only to mention this fact in passing, however, and he does not clearly associate Defendant Smith with this detention or plead any other facts describing this detention. Accordingly, even if he were attempting to raise a claim challenging this detention, it would be subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissal of defendants appropriate where plaintiff failed to allege facts associating defendants with a particular constitutional violation). --------
B. Medical Treatment Claims
Plaintiff also states that he did not receive "much needed medical treatment" while housed at the Washington County Jail. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff contends that he had been in the Jefferson County Hospital from November 25-29, 2018, immediately prior to his November 30, 2018 arrest. Attach. 2 to Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 11-2. Plaintiff was diagnosed with high blood pressure and an enlarged heart, and he was prescribed three drugs to treat his high blood pressure and valium to slow down his heart rate. Id.
When Plaintiff arrived at the Washington County Jail, nurse Kristy Lane told Plaintiff that he would not be permitted to have his valium prescription at the jail. Id. Plaintiff also ran out of his blood pressure medication on December 25, 2018, and Lane gave him a different pill. Id. at 2. When Plaintiff asked about the pills, Lane told him the pills were what they had available at the jail. Id.
On January 6, 2019, Plaintiff's blood pressure increased to 203/98, and he was treated with a clonidine pill that was "not prescribe[d] for [him]." Id. Plaintiff experienced high blood pressure, chest pain, shortness of breath, dizziness, headaches, and "heart racing" for several consecutive days. Id. He was occasionally treated with blood pressure medication, but it does not appear that his blood pressure was ever controlled, and Plaintiff continued to experience additional physical symptoms. Id. at 2-3.
On January 15, 2019, the left side of Plaintiff's face was "drooped" and his blood pressure was 188/101. Id. at 3. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed with Bell's palsy, and a medical professional at the emergency room recommended that Plaintiff go to a "heart center" for further treatment of his "enlarged heart." Id. Plaintiff's blood pressure was still high the day after he returned from the hospital, but he alleges that after January 16, 2019, no one at the jail checked his blood pressure again. Id.
On January 23, 2019, Plaintiff was sent to the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison in Jackson, Georgia. Id. at 4. The doctor who checked Plaintiff into the facility "started working on [Plaintiff's] blood pressure and [his] heart condition" and ended up again taking Plaintiff to the emergency room. Id. While in the hospital, Plaintiff was given an IV and medication to lower his blood pressure, and he was advised that the prison "need[ed] to get [him] to a cardiologist ASAP." Id.
Allegations that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs can state a constitutional claim. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). "To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry." Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. A plaintiff must first "set forth evidence of an objectively serious medical need" and must also "prove that the prison official acted with an attitude of 'deliberate indifference' to that serious medical need." Id. In other words, prison officials must both "know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner." Dunn v. Martin, 178 F. App'x 876, 877 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). For purposes of this analysis, a "serious medical need" is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted). A "serious medical need" may also exist when "a delay in treating the need worsens the condition." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009).
Construing Plaintiff's allegations liberally, as the Court must at this stage, it appears that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need by alleging that he had an enlarged heart and significantly elevated blood pressure; that his blood pressure remained elevated even though he was being given medication; that he was suffering from, inter alia, chest pain, shortness of breath, and dizziness as the result of these conditions; and that he required emergency medical treatment on two occasions. It appears, however, that Plaintiff only named two Defendants in this case: Sheriff Thomas Smith and the "Sheriff Dept." See Compl. 3, ECF No. 1 (identifying "Washington County Sheriff Thomas H. Smith" as only Defendant in this case); see also Attach. 2 to Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 11-2 (listing these two Defendants in caption). Plaintiff's claims against these two Defendants are subject to dismissal.
First, a county sheriff's office is not a legal entity subject to suit or liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that county sheriff's department "is not a legal entity, and therefore, is not subject to suit or liability under section 1983"); see also Brannon v. Thomas County Jail, 280 F. App'x 930, 934 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Murphy v. Med. Dep't Chatham Cnty. Jail, No. CV407-166, 2008 WL 371417, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 11, 2008) (finding that jail's medical department was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983). Any claims against the Washington County Sheriff's Office itself must therefore be dismissed.
With respect to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Smith, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts specifically linking this Defendant to his medical treatment claims. It thus appears Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant Smith liable in his supervisory capacity. But it is well-settled in the Eleventh Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See, e.g., Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Rather, supervisors can only be held liable under § 1983 if they personally participated in unconstitutional conduct or if there is a causal connection between their actions and the alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App'x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). A causal connection can be established if
(1) a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he fail[ed] to do so; (2) the supervisor's improper custom or policy le[d] to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or (3) facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.Id. "The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Smith personally participated in any conduct violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights, that a history of widespread abuse or improper custom or policy existed, or that Defendant Smith directed his subordinates to act unlawfully or knew they were doing so and failed to stop them. It is also important to note that Defendant Smith is not a medical professional, and Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Smith had any reason to believe that prison medical staff was not appropriately treating Plaintiff. See, e.g., Kuhne v. Fla. Dep't Corr., 618 F. App'x 498, 507 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that "when a layperson is accused of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must present[] evidence that her situation was so obviously dire that two lay [officers] must have known that a medical professional had grossly misjudged [the plaintiff's] condition" (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original)); see also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that two defendants who were not medical professionals could not be deliberately indifferent "simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor"). Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege a basis for holding Defendant Smith liable in this case, and Plaintiff's claims against him are subject to dismissal as a result.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e). It is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's remaining pending motion (ECF No. 13) be DENIED as moot.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Marc T. Treadwell, Chief United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO RECOMMENDED, this 9th day of July 2020.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE