Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-01376-RMG-MGB
05-16-2023
Gregory Kyle Green, Plaintiff, v. Michael Sanchez, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Gregory Kyle Green (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is now before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 62.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's motion (Dkt. No. 62) be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Lee Correctional Institution in Bishopville, South Carolina for a murder conviction.The instant case centers around the constitutionality of Plaintiff's underlying arrest warrant and whether that warrant was procured by false statements in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on May 7, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.) Upon Order of the Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 7, 2021. (Dkt. No. 10.) According to the Amended Complaint, on or around July 7, 2017, Defendant Michael Sanchez, a detective with the North Charleston Police Department, procured an arrest warrant against Plaintiff by “providing falsified information” to the issuing magistrate judge. (Dkt. No. 10 at 4-5.) More specifically, Defendant Sanchez apparently informed the judge that Plaintiff's cell phone records placed him at the scene of the crime and a witness had identified Plaintiff as one of the perpetrators. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that while Defendant Sanchez repeated these false statements at the preliminary hearing on August 15, 2017, he later admitted that he did not have Plaintiff's cell phone records at the time he sought the arrest warrant from the magistrate judge. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Sanchez never verified the alleged witness statement that implicated Plaintiff's involvement in the crime. (Id.) Plaintiff clarifies that he is not challenging the validity of his murder conviction, but rather, is seeking monetary damages for the aforementioned violations of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 5.)
See SCDC Inmate Search, http://www.doc.sc.gov/InmateSearchDisclaimer.html (last visited March 31, 2023); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
After an initial review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the Court determined that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a § 1983 claim against Defendant Sanchez for purportedly violating Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him pursuant to a “constitutionally defective warrant.” (Dkt. No. 28 at 2.) The Court further determined that Plaintiff failed to allege any plausible claims against Defendant North Charleston Police Department and therefore dismissed it as a Defendant. (Id.) Additionally, on September 14, 2022, the Court denied Defendant Sanchez's Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 36; 47.)The Court rejected Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the Supreme Court's ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 412 U.S. 477 (1994). (Dkt. Nos. 36 at 3-6; 47.)
Discovery in this case ended on December 14, 2022. (Dkt. No. 49.) On January 11, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact exists in support of his constitutional claim. (Dkt. No. 62 at 7.) On January 12, 2023, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 63.) Plaintiff responded to the motion on January 20, 2023. (Dkt. No. 65.) On January 25, 2023, Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff's response. (Dkt. No. 66.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Pub'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “‘against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'” Phillips v. Nlyte Software Am. Ltd., 615 Fed.Appx. 151, 152 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
When a court considers the motion, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” News & Observer Pub'g Co., 597 F.3d at 576 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Lane & Roderick, Inc., 736 Fed. App'x 400, 400 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, this standard must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's sole claim is a § 1983 claim against Defendant Sanchez for allegedly violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant “provid[ed] falsified information” in his affidavit underlying the arrest warrant, and Plaintiff's arrest pursuant to that warrant was therefore unlawful. (Dkt. No. 10 at 46.) Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because, even without the allegedly falsified statement in the affidavit, there was still sufficient probable cause within the affidavit to support Plaintiff's arrest. (Dkt. No. 62 at 7.) Defendant further argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity to the extent “he made a mistake as to the information provided.” (Id. at 45.)
A. Standards
1. Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Seizure
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is unreasonable.” Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). A party challenging the veracity of a warrant application must show that the officer(s) deliberately or with a “reckless disregard for the truth” made material false statements in the warrant application, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), or omitted from that application “material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the [application] misleading,” United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “Reckless disregard can be evidenced by an officer acting ‘with a high degree of awareness of [a statement's] probable falsity,' meaning that ‘when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.'” Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 556 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Miller v. Prince George's Cty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007)), as amended (Aug. 22, 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Mayor & City Council of City of Baltimore, Maryland v. Humbert, 138 S.Ct. 2602, 201 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2018). “Omissions are made with reckless disregard when the evidence demonstrates that a police officer ‘failed to inform the judicial officer of facts [he] knew would negate probable cause.'” Id. (quoting Miller, 475 F.3d at 627).
“Moreover, in order to violate the Constitution, the false statements or omissions must be ‘material,' that is, ‘necessary to the [neutral and disinterested magistrate's] finding of probable cause.'” Miller, 475 F.3d at 628 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.) “To determine materiality, a court must excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the corrected warrant affidavit would establish probable cause.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). “If the ‘corrected' warrant affidavit establishes probable cause, no civil liability lies against the officer.” Id.
2. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects officers from liability for “bad guesses in gray areas” and bases liability on the violation of bright-line rules. Id. (quoting Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 2011)). “Qualified immunity provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the court applies “a familiar two-step inquiry.” Harris v. Pittman, No. 17-7308, 2019 WL 2509240, at *10 (4th Cir. June 18, 2019) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). At step one, courts ask “whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the police officer's actions violated a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Meyers v. Balt. Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013). “At step two, the question is whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the time of the officer's conduct.” Id. (quoting Meyers, 713 F.3d at 731). District court and court of appeals judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (2009).
B. Evidence
In connection to a prior motion, Plaintiff submitted the arrest warrant at issue here as well as excerpts of testimony from Plaintiff's underlying criminal trial. (Dkt. No. 21-1.) The arrest warrant is signed by the magistrate judge and Defendant Sanchez and states that “there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named above did commit the crime[]” of “murder” and that “probable cause is based on the . . . facts” set forth in Sanchez's affidavit. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 1.)
Personally appeared before me, a magistrate of this County, one, [illegible] who, first being duly sworn, deposes and says that
Gregory Kyle Green
did within this County and State on the 8th day of June, 2017 violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina in the following particulars:
DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE:
MURDER
16-3-10
The affiant states that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named above did commit the crime(s) set forth, and that such probable cause is based upon the following facts:
On June 8th, 2017, at approximately 4:30 A.M., while at 2278 Bailey Street, which is located in the City of North Charleston, County of Charleston. State of South Carolina, the defendant, Gregory Kyle Green, did commit the offense of MURDER, in violation of section 16-3-10 of the South Carolina Code of Laws of 1976, as amended. In that the defendant did willfully and unlawfully shoot the victim, Freeman Rivers which resulted in his death.
Facts to establish the aforesaid are that on June 8th, 2017, at approximately 4:46 AM., officers of the North Charleston Police Department responded to a report of a fire located at 2278 Bailey Street. Fire fighters located the body of a male later identified as Freeman Rivers. Autopsy showed that Rivers had sustained multiple gun shots which resulted in his death. Detectives obtained a description of the vehicle used by the defendant who was seen entering and fleeing the victims [sic] residence the night of the incident. This vehicle was described as a light blue new
Chrysler 200. Video from the area an hour prior to the incident shows a 2017 light blue Chrysler 200 bearing S.C. tag MJK 304 entering the neighborhood and pulling into the Cheapway Gas Station at 3615 Dorchester Road. A witness to be named in court provided a third party confession indicating that the co-defendant dropped off and picked up the defendant who committed the murder and advised him to burn the house along with the evidence. The witness' statements were corroborated by details provided by other witnesses that viewed the car drop off and pick up the suspect and gave the initial description.
In addition, the witness stated the vehicle had blood transfer to the interior of the car as the suspect of the crime was covered in blood at the time of the incident. On June 22, 2017, Doucet's 2017 Chrysler 200 was located, after being reported stolen on June 19, 2017. Testing on the interior of the vehicle reviewed presumptive positive results for trace evidence of blood after a search was conducted of the car pursuant to a lawful search warrant. Defendant's cell phone records indicate that he was on Bailey Street during the time of the incident and match the witnesses description and timeline of events. The witnesses also heard the name “Kone” uttered by the co-defendant when searching for him in front of the house, and this is a known alias of the defendant. All this done against the law, peace and dignity of the State of South Carolina. Det. M. Sanchez and witnesses to be named in court are witness to prove the same.(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 1.)
Plaintiff has submitted trial testimony from third parties Jonathan Seabrook (“Seabrook”), Lanica Walker (“Walker”), and Kendall Rice (“Rice”). During Seabrook's testimony, he indicates that he was “sitting outside of [his] house,” apparently on the night of the murder, watching someone “going in and out.” (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 2.) His testimony includes the following exchange:
Q. As you just told Mr. Waring you also told Detective Sanchez that you heard that man in the car say a name, right?
A. Yes.
Q. But when you told them the name you weren't certain what it was, right?
A. No.
Q. You said it could have been Kone, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Could have been Kwan?
A. Yes.
Q. Could have been Corn?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't know which one of those it was?
A. Yes.(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 2-3.)
During Walker's testimony, she appears to describe what an unnamed person told her about the murder at issue. Her testimony includes the following exchange:
A....He said as he proceeded to the steps he said he heard some commotion and then he said that he heard two gunshots. So he turned around and he ran to his car. And as he was proceeding to back out he said a young man came out with a gun and he was bloody and he jumped in the car.
Q. Did he tell you where they went after the guy jumped in his car?
A. He said he took him back to the house.
Q. And did he tell you what happened after he took this person who jumped in his car with blood on his clothes and a gun did he tell you what happened when he went back to the house?
A. The guy's female helped him change his clothes and he said they bleached out the car.
Q. Did he tell you what happened after he bleached out the car?
A. He said he left. He said he told the guy to burn the house down. And then he said that he left.
Q. Did he tell you who this person was?
A. No, I don't know who the person was.(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 4.)
Finally, during Rice's testimony, the following exchange in recorded:
Q. When you met with detectives about this case you described the person you saw across the street.
A. I described the person who I thought it was.
Q. Okay. I know you didn't get a good look at his face, right?
A. I never saw the person.
Q. But you were able to say a few things about what he looked like.
A. I was describing somebody.
Q. And you even told officers that you recognized the guy.
A. I was describing somebody.
Q. You said that you had seen him at Mr. Rivers' house for the past four days before
Mr. Rivers was killed.
A. Not the guy who we trying today.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. Not the guy who we're trying today. The guy who I thought it was was a whole different guy.
Q. Because you said he was dark skinned, right?
A. Right.
Q. Three shades darker than you....(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 5.)
After this exchange, Rice discusses some texts he exchanged with Seabrook, apparently on the night of the murder, in which Rice is giving “a play by play of what” he is hearing because he is “in the house at the time.” (Id. at 8.)
Q. And as far as that conversation the man in that car had with Mr. Seabrook you said you didn't hear any of that, right?
A. I mean we just went over that. They said that I did hear that.
Q. Did you hear the name that the driver of that car said?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. And that's what you said in all your interviews, right?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And even though you don't know that name-
A. -no ma'am-
Q. Detective Sanchez brought up some names to you, right?
A. Right.
Q. He asked you about a guy named Kone.
A. Right.
Q. He asked you about Gregory?
A. Right.
Q. He brought those names up.
A. Correct.
Q. You didn't mention them.
A. No, ma'am.
Q. You told him you didn't know anyone by those names.
A. No ma'am.
Q. You said you had never heard the name of Kone.
A. No, ma'am.(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 8-9.)
Plaintiff has also submitted trial testimony from Defendant Sanchez. During his testimony, Sanchez describes “some mistakes” he made “in this case.” (Id. at 10.) Sanchez explains that he initially obtained a search warrant for Plaintiff's phone records in June of 2017, but accidentally requested the wrong time frame. (Id. at 12.) The murder occurred on June 8, 2017 and Sanchez requested records from February to April of 2017. (Id.) He eventually obtained the proper phone records in September 2019, approximately a month before Plaintiff's criminal trial. (Id. at 15.) Sanchez testified that he “definitely did not have [Plaintiff's] phone records in July of 2017.” (Id.) When asked specifically about the arrest warrant, Sanchez acknowledged that the information in his affidavit about Plaintiff's phone records “was not accurate.” (Id. at 17.) Sanchez also discussed his testimony at Plaintiff's preliminary hearing, in which he testified about phone records disproving Plaintiff's alibi. Sanchez acknowledged that this testimony was given “fifteen days before [he] retrieved the data.” (Id. at 25-6.)
C. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's affidavit included several pieces of false information: (1) that Plaintiff's cell phone records placed him at the crime scene; and (2) that witnesses gave information placing Plaintiff at the crime scene. (Dkt. Nos. 10 at 4-5; 65 at 2.) In his Motion, Defendant appears to dispute both that he provided false information in his affidavit with reckless disregard and that the exclusion of the alleged false information would deprive the warrant of probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for murder. (Dkt. No. 62.) Notably, neither party has provided any evidence with their briefing on the dispositive motion. The only evidence in the record are the documents discussed above, which Plaintiff submitted with his prior motion to appoint counsel. (Dkt. No. 21.)
As an initial matter, the parties dispute what facts Defendant had within his knowledge at the time he gave his affidavit testimony. Plaintiff argues that in addition to Defendant's representations about Plaintiff's cell phone records, his representations about the witness statements were also false. (Dkt. No. 65 at 2.) More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Walker is the witness mentioned in the affidavit who allegedly provided Defendant with the third party confession. According to Plaintiff, Walker's trial testimony indicates she could not have identified or implicated Plaintiff in the murder. (Id.) Likewise, Plaintiff asserts that Seabrook and Rice are the other witnesses mentioned in the affidavit. According to Plaintiff, these third parties did not unequivocally identify Plaintiff as being at the scene of the crime. (Id.) In his motion, Defendant refers to the trial testimony provided by Plaintiff as “random excerpts” and argues that “[t]here is nothing within the documents discussing the Defendant's witnesses found in the arrest warrant affidavit.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 6.)
Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence indicates Defendant must have “had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported” to the magistrate judge concerning Plaintiff's phone records. Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556. Plaintiff has submitted evidence establishing that Defendant did not obtain the proper phone records until after he gave his affidavit testimony, and Defendant admitted at trial that the information in his affidavit about Plaintiff's phone records “was not accurate.” (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 17.) Additionally, the undersigned finds that the third party trial transcripts create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant “must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements” in the affidavit about witnesses placing Plaintiff at the scene of the crime. Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556. When considered with Defendant's affidavit testimony in the arrest warrant, the trial transcripts support the inference that Defendant exaggerated or misrepresented information to the magistrate judge about witnesses unequivocally placing Plaintiff at the scene of the crime.
In his affidavit, Defendant made the following representations about witnesses placing Plaintiff at the scene of the crime:
. . . A witness to be named in court provided a third party confession indicating that the co-defendant dropped off and picked up the defendant who committed the murder and advised him to burn the house along with the evidence. The witness' statements were corroborated by details provided by other witnesses that viewed the car drop off and pick up the suspect and gave the initial description.... The witnesses also heard the name “Kone” uttered by the co-defendant when searching for him in front of the house, and this is a known alias of the defendant.
(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 1.)
When construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Walker's trial testimony indicates that she is the source of the “third party confession” referenced in Defendant's affidavit. The portion of her testimony in the record indicates she did not know the person who “committed the murder” and therefore could not have implicated Plaintiff to Defendant. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 1, 4.) Similarly, the trial testimony from Seabrook and Rice, when construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, indicates these are the other witnesses referenced in Defendant's affidavit. Their testimony indicates they “viewed the car drop off and pick up the suspect,” and that the person they described to Defendant did not match Plaintiff's description. (Id. at 1, 2-3, 5-6.) Further, Rice's testimony indicates he did not hear the name “Kone” uttered by the co-defendant, and that when Defendant mentioned the name “Kone” to Rice, he denied hearing that name. (Id. at 1, 8-9.) Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the evidence creates an inference that Defendant did not accurately describe in his affidavit the information he was given from witnesses about the night of the murder. See Miller, 475 F.3d at 630-31. (“An investigation need not be perfect, but an officer who intentionally or recklessly puts lies before a magistrate, or hides facts from him, violates the Constitution unless the untainted facts themselves provide probable cause.”).
Further, had the magistrate judge been fully and accurately informed of the statements obtained from Rice, Seabrook, and Walker, and had Defendant omitted the information about Plaintiff's phone records, the magistrate judge would not have found probable cause to issue the arrest warrant for Plaintiff. Without the foregoing information, there is no compelling information connecting Plaintiff to the crime scene. See United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 118 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding a law enforcement officer's reckless omission of facts from his affidavit, which undermined the reliability of a confidential informant, were material and invalidated the search warrant); McDougald v. Kersey, No. 1:20-cv-666, 2022 WL 17091685, at *7 (M.D. N.C. Nov. 21, 2022) (denying summary judgment on Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim where “[t]here are disputed questions of material fact as to whether Detective Sadovnikov told the magistrate judge the truth or recklessly hid significantly material facts from the magistrate”). Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the false statements and omissions at issue are material, that is, “necessary to the neutral and disinterested magistrate's finding of probable cause.” Miller, 475 F.3d at 628 (internal quotation marks omitted).
While “trace evidence of blood” was found in a car described at the crime scene, Plaintiff is only connected to this car through the above-mentioned witness statements. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 1.)
Further, given these questions of material fact, the undersigned cannot find Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim. See McDougald, 2022 WL 17091685, at *7 (defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity where disputed questions of material fact exist as to whether defendant “told the magistrate judge the truth or recklessly hid significantly material facts from the magistrate. The constitutional right to a warrant based on probable cause, not false or misleading statements by a law enforcement officer, is well-established”); Mattox v. City of Beaufort, No. 9:14-cv-0384 DCN, 2015 WL 4488036, at *9 (D.S.C. July 22, 2015) (“In viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant Dowling is immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity because he did not act in an objectively reasonable manner when he arrested the Plaintiff based on a warrant he obtained by swearing an affidavit with multiple material false statements and omissions.”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 62) be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).