Opinion
Civil Action. No. 03-6228.
December 5, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this § 1983 civil rights action, the pro se plaintiff claims the defendant Berks County Prison deprived him of his Eighth Amendment right to be protected from violence at the hands of another inmate. He alleges that he was injured when a fellow inmate slashed his face with a weapon fashioned from a razor blade which had been provided by a prison guard. The defendant prison has filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The plaintiff has not responded.
The prison was nam ed as the sole defendant. Because the prison is run by Berks County, the county shall be treated as the defendant.
After reviewing the facts in light most favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all inferences in his favor, I conclude from the undisputed facts that the plaintiff cannot establish the prima facie elements of a Monell claim against the defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, I shall grant the motion for summary judgment.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In examining the motion, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Intervest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2003).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Once the movant has done so, the opposing party cannot rest on the pleadings. To defeat summary judgment, he must come forward with probative evidence establishing the prima facie elements of his claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The nonmovant must show more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which he bears the burden of production. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). An inference based upon speculation or conjecture does not create a material fact. Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).
Analysis
Although the plaintiff's allegations could make out a colorable claim against the prison guard, the guard is not a defendant. The named defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff was injured. Nor has it presented facts rebutting the plaintiff's claim that an unnamed guard provided a weapon to the assaulting inmate. However, whether the guard actually provided the weapon to the inmate is not critical to the disposition of the motion.
Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attaches only when the constitutional violation resulted from the government's policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. "Policy is made when a `decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action' issues an official proclamation, policy or edict." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481(1986)). A custom is established when a state official's course of conduct is so "`permanent and well-settled' as to virtually constitute law." Andrews, at 1480 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-95 (citations omitted)). In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the prison policy was the proximate cause of the injuries he suffered. See Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff has not proffered any facts showing, directly or inferentially, that the prison had any policy or custom permitting prison guards to aid and abet an inmate-on-inmate assault. Green Dep. at 47:2-8 ( Def. Berks County Prison Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. B). Nor does he believe that such a policy exists. Green Dep. at 47:9-11 ( Def. Berks County Prison Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. B). Moreover, he admits having no evidence to establish that prison officials knew that a corrections officer was capable of providing weapons to inmates or that the prison had a policy of allowing officers to give weapons to inmates. Green Dep. at 45:15-21; 47:3-8 ( Def. Berks County Prison Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. B).
The fact that the prison does not have an express policy authorizing such behavior does not conclusively absolve it of liability. Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990). A plaintiff can sustain an action against the prison if he can establish a "municipal custom coupled with causation." Id. In other words, he must show that "policymakers were aware of similar unlawful conduct in the past, but failed to take precautions against future violations," and that this failure contributed to his injury. Id. However, the plaintiff here has no evidence or knowledge of similar incidents involving other prison employees either before or after the incident. Green Dep. at 52:15-25 ( Def. Berks County Prison Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. B). Thus, there is not even a scintilla of evidence demonstrating that the conduct of this or any other prison guard was in any way accepted or allowed at the Berks County Prison.
Conclusion
Plaintiff has not offered, or even alleged, that the prison knew that the guard might take steps to harm him. On the contrary, he has admitted that the prison officials probably did not know that this guard would harm him. There is nothing in the record connecting his injuries to a prison policy, practice or custom. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of December, 2005, upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56 of Defendant, Berks County Prison (Document No. 34) and after an independent review of the record, it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and JUDGMENT is entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.