A failure to stop safely cannot be justified by the mere existence of icy conditions and suddenly stopping vehicles.See Green v. Plutt , 790 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1990) ; Grimes v. Haslett , 641 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1982) ; Hahn v. Russ , 611 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1980) ; Clabaugh v. Bottcher , 545 P.2d 172 (Alaska 1976).See, e.g. , Green , 790 P.2d at 1349 (vehicles stopped in roadway); Grimes , 641 P.2d at 819 (vehicle braking before routine left turn); Hahn , 611 P.2d at 67–68 (sudden stop in rush-hour traffic); Clabaugh , 545 P.2d at 176 (downgrades, icy surfaces, intersections).
Falconer alternatively contends that Taylor-Welch's argument on this point "is scantily contained in her brief" and should be deemed abandoned for lack of adequate briefing. Although Falconer argues that Taylor-Welch's negligence was firmly established as a matter of law under Green v. Plutt, 790 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Alaska 1990), Grimes v. Haslett, 641 P.2d 813, 819 (Alaska 1982), Hahn, 611 P.2d at 67, and Clabaugh v. Bottcher, 545 P.2d 172, 176 (Alaska 1976), he does not argue that these cases categorically preclude a finding of negligence by both drivers who are involved in a rear-end collision; rather, he argues only that there is insufficient evidence in this case to support a finding that he did in fact act negligently. We conclude that Falconer's waiver argument is well taken.
Richey's attorney then proceeded to explain in detail how Oen's conduct was negligent and how Richey did absolutely nothing to contribute to the accident. Applying this court's ruling in Green v. Plutt, 790 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1990), the superior court stated, "I will grant the motion for directed verdict and will instruct the jury that the issue of the Defendant's negligence is no longer before them." The court noted, "[o]f course, the issue with regard to causation of injury and preexisting injury remains.